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ARTICLE
FEAR OF OVERSIGHT: THE
FUNDAMENTAL FAILURE OF
BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT
*

STEVEN L. SCHOONER

[A] hypothetical system in which nobody looked and nobody cared
might indeed display levels of corruption higher than the current
1
one.
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INTRODUCTION: HARBINGER OF BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT?
Vice President Al Gore’s most visible contribution to the Clinton
Administration has been the National Performance Review (NPR), a
broad-reaching effort to reinvent government by making it more
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businesslike. This endeavor’s flagship and most visible success has
2
been the effort to reform the government’s purchasing process. The
reformed procurement regime was conceived and orchestrated by
Harvard professor and Clinton Administration procurement czar
Steven Kelman. Professor Kelman re-shaped the public purchasing
process to conform to the vision he first articulated in Procurement and
Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government
3
Performance. True to his book’s title, Professor Kelman’s legacy is
defined by his assessment of the government’s need to overcome its
fear of buyer discretion.
Although purchasing may seem mundane in light of the
government’s myriad responsibilities, Uncle Sam shops incessantly,
annually spending more than $200 billion on a veritable cornucopia
of goods and services procured from most every sector of the
4
economy. Because these sums represent a significant portion of the
5
public’s taxes, Congress and the public historically have scrutinized
the government’s purchasing practices. Yet, over the last decade, as a
by-product of aggressive reform of the federal procurement process,
oversight of government spending—both internal and external—has
plummeted. This oversight diminution resulted in a reformed
buying regime lacking meaningful oversight and rapidly propagating
a culture defined by lawlessness. Just as prosperity can breed
complacency, reduced oversight in an era of increased government
employee discretion should cause alarm.
Yet seasoned observers of the procurement process had good
reason to temper their concern regarding the government’s
reduction of internal oversight. Historically, the government has
externalized much of its procurement oversight by relying upon
litigation initiated by contractors and potential contractors to police
the buying process. During the 1990s, however, much of this external


2. See Stephen Barr, After 5 Years, Gore’s Reinvention Gets a ‘B’; Brookings Analyst
Says Results Vary Widely, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1998, at A23 (“Kettl gave the vice
president high marks for helping the government improve the way it buys goods and
services from vendors . . .”). The procurement system, which “operates more
efficiently[,]” received the only “A” other than “effort” (citing DONALD F. KETTL,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: A FIFTH-YEAR REPORT CARD (Brookings Inst. Report CPM
98-1, 1998)); see also VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, THE BEST KEPT SECRETS IN GOVERNMENT:
A REPORT TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 15 (1996)
(procurement reform was the first substantive topic addressed).
3. See KELMAN, supra note 1.
4. See infra text accompanying note 8 (addressing the federal government’s
spending practices in recent years).
5. As discussed at length infra at text accompanying note 170, in the absence of
meaningful or effective internal oversight, the Federal government frequently enlists
the resources of the private sector, in the guise of the private attorney general, to
perform its oversight.
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monitoring also dropped as the volume of litigation in government
contracts plummeted. Although, congressional and executive policy
makers bear responsibility for the drift towards laissez-fair internal
oversight, the causes for the reduction in external oversight are less
clear. It is clear, however, that the current system couples greatly
increased buyer discretion with dramatically reduced oversight. This
combination erodes the public’s confidence in the procurement
system, violates established norms, and is antithetical to a host of
congressional mandates and policies. Accordingly, a backlash is
inevitable.
Because procurement reform is the jewel in the crown of the
efforts to reinvent government, the issues implicated are far larger
than the government’s buying habits and peccadillos. Studies of the
1990s procurement reforms offer a cautionary tale of legal reform
and raise disturbing public policy questions. If procurement is to be
a harbinger of the future of public law, the time has come to weigh
the consequences of the course set by the NPR.
This Article begins with a brief introduction to the federal
procurement process, which is intended to establish a context for the
1990s reforms. It then provides empirical evidence of the dramatic,
sustained reduction in government contract-related litigation during
6
the 1990s. Rather than celebrate this trend, the Article expresses
concern because the trend coincided with two significant changes:
(1) a large-scale congressionally-mandated reduction in acquisition
personnel, which materially reduced internal oversight, and (2) the
sweeping NPR reinvention initiatives, which considerably increased
purchaser discretion. The Article next offers a provisional list of
explanations for the decrease in litigation phenomenon. It then
makes the counter-intuitive assertion that, in this context, litigation—
a form of external monitoring initiated by private attorneys general—
is a public good. Reduced litigation relating to the award and
performance of the government’s contracts threatens the public’s
trust in the reinvention agenda. Litigants, in this context, serve the
public’s interests while pursuing their own self-interest. Moreover,
the need for the private sector to provide this service increases as
internal oversight decreases.
The main argument demonstrates that, despite the success of
procurement reform and its well-intentioned goals, the current
paradigm elevates its facially attractive norms—efficiency and
discretion—at the expense of other established, yet apparently


6. As suggested infra at table accompanying note 57, this decline is particularly
intriguing as civil litigation, at a macro level, continues to increase in this country.
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undervalued, norms necessary to guide the procurement system, e.g.,
transparency, integrity, and competition. This Article cautions that
businesslike government—at least as envisioned by Professor Kelman
and implemented by the Clinton Administration—has diluted
existing internal and external oversight mechanisms and threatened
public confidence in the procurement system. Finally, to the extent
that this successful reform initiative has devalued and diminished
oversight, the Article suggests a critical assessment of the reinvention
agenda.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE MICROCOSM: EXAMINING THE REDUCED
LITIGATION PHENOMENON
A. Defining the Stakes: A Snapshot of the Procurement Pie

1.

$200 billion worth, including the kitchen sink
The current federal procurement system—the reinvented,
businesslike microcosm discused herein—exists because, in
performing its myriad functions, the Federal Government spends
approximately $200 billion each year through the procurement
7
process. While the Defense agencies such as the Air Force, Army,
and Navy spend over half of that sum, at least ten civilian agencies


7. In this regard, the government relies heavily upon the private sector.
Whenever possible, the government aspires to buy what it needs rather than attempt
to make or manufacture goods to fulfill its needs. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 7.301 (1999)
(“[I]t is the policy of the Government to . . . rely generally on private commercial
sources for supplies and services” except with regard to inherently governmental
functions). This spending translates into the government buying $200 billion dollars
worth of goods and services separate and apart from civil service or military
personnel salaries, grants, foreign aid, etc. See Federal Procurement Data System
(FPDS), Federal Procurement Report, at http://fdps.gsa.gov/fdps/fpr.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Federal Procurement Report]. The FPDS, created by Public
Law 98-100, resides within the General Services Administration.
Although the most accurate assessment of the government’s spending habits
derives from the FPDS, numerous flaws limit the utility of these annual reports. For
example: (1) the data reflect the price of contracts at the time of award and,
although the data capture most contract modifications, they do not reflect final
prices paid; (2) on a fiscal year basis, the report more accurately reflects contracts
awarded (or deals made) than money spent; the government almost never pays in
advance, and large construction projects, extensive research and development
undertakings, or complex weapons purchases often take years to complete; (3) the
report excludes a staggering volume of foreign military sales, transactions covered by
the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2595, which makes some sense
because foreign governments (in this case, end users) are expected to reimburse the
government for these purchases; and (4) the report does not concatenate spending
through the government’s 500,000 purchase cards—the report separately details
these 20.6 million transactions, worth more than $10.1 billion during Fiscal Year
1999. See id. at 13; see also infra text accompanying note 113 (discussing the impact of
the Government’s burgeoning use of purchase cards).
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each purchase more than $1 billion in goods, services, and
8
construction each year. The government’s voracious purchasing
habits impact most every sector of the economy through the purchase
of services and construction ($94.3 billion), supplies and equipment
9
($64.2 billion), and research and development ($24.5 billion). The


8. For Fiscal Year 1999, the Department of Defense’s procurement spending
exceeded $123 billion. The major defense agencies include the Navy ($37.4 billion),
the Air Force ($35.4 billion), and the Army ($30.6 billion). The highest spending
civilian agencies were the Department of Energy ($15.6 billion); the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ($10.9 billion); the General Services
Administration ($6.9 billion); Health and Human Services ($4.1 billion);
Department of the Treasury ($3.3 billion); Department of Justice ($3.2 billion);
Department of Agriculture ($3.2 billion); Department of Transportation ($2.7
billion); Department of Veterans Affairs ($2.6 billion); and the Commerce
Department ($1.1 billion). See Federal Procurement Report, supra note 7, at 5.
9. These figures are derived from the Federal Procurement Report, at 7-9. Federal
procurement, of course, represents only a small proportion of total government spending.
In addition to what it buys, the Federal Government spends money on civil service
and military salaries and benefits, grant programs, foreign aid, etc. Total government
spending, which includes Federal, State, and local governments, accounts for about
one-third of the national economy. Federal spending is about two-thirds of this
amount, or twenty percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP is the
standard measurement of the size of the U.S. economy—its total production of
goods and services. Government purchasing represents only a small share of the
GDP. Moreover, as the chart below indicates, that proportion of GDP absorbed by
Federal procurement decreases as the economy expands and ongoing efforts
continue to either reduce, or at very least, constrain, the size of the Federal
Government.
[INSERT TABLE 1]

{INSERT TABLE 2]
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uninformed perception of a small cabal of entrenched defense
contractors capturing agency buyers and dictating the government’s
10
buying decisions is contradicted by empirical evidence. Although, it
is true that the government procures certain products such as fighter
aircraft, nuclear submarines, and tanks from a limited pool of
suppliers, these suppliers do not exert pervasive influence
throughout the purchasing system. The government’s purchasing at
both the prime contract and subcontract levels involves a constantly
changing and broad-based staple of large and small corporations,
health care providers, financial institutions, individuals, and not-for11
profit organizations. Further, although “problems of government


The Government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30 (for
example, FY97 ran from October 1, 1996, though September 30, 1997). The
procurement figures, derived from the Federal Procurement Report, are in billions of
U.S. dollars. The GDP figures, derived from the 2000 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT, H. Doc. 106-161 (Feb. 2000) at 306 (Table B-1), are in billions of dollars.
In October of 1999, the Commerce Department released its benchmark revision of
GDP statistics, raising the annual rate of growth of real GDP by an average of 0.4
percentage points for the eleven-year period from 1987-1998. Id. at 81. For other
tables displaying this evolving data set in, for example, current year dollars, see the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis’s website (visited Aug. 1, 2000), at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/. For the sake of comparison to the $200 billion U.S.
procurement budget, the GDPs of Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey, each
hover between $200 and $250 billion (through 1998). See the U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration, table summarizing World Gross Domestic Product
at
Market
Exchange
Rates,
1989-1998,
at
http://www.eia.doe.gov
/emeu/iea/tableb2.html (visited Aug. 1, 2000).
10. See supra notes 8-9 (providing empirical evidence of the procurement
process).
11. See Top 200 Federal Contractors, GOV’T EXEC., Aug. 1999, at 16-22 [hereinafter
Top 200 Federal Contractors 1999] (noting that in Fiscal Year 1998, the 150 largest
federal contractors included at least twelve of the current thirty Dow Jones
Industrials: Boeing (2); United Technologies (7); General Electric Co. (13); AT&T
(25); IBM (34); General Motors (73); Proctor & Gamble (91); Honeywell (94);
Exxon (100); DuPont (112); Hewlett-Packard (138); and Phillip Morris (142)); Top
200 Federal Contractors, GOV’T EXEC., Aug. 2000, at 42-48 [hereinafter Top 200 Federal
Contractors 2000] (stating that in Fiscal Year 1999, nine of those twelve firms
remained in the top 150: Boeing (2); United Technologies (7); General Electric Co.
(14); AT&T (25); IBM (31); General Motors (73); Proctor & Gamble (99);
Honeywell (17); Exxon (57); and Phillip Morris (137)); see also Federal Procurement
Report, supra note 7, at vii (indicating that in Fiscal Year 1999, small businesses
received approximately twenty-three percent of Federal procurement dollars—more
than $40 billion); infra text accompanying note 184 (discussing small business
contracting policies). See, e.g., Top 200 Federal Contractors 1999, supra, at 16-18 (stating
that the presence of health care providers continues to grow—in Fiscal Year 1998,
the 100 largest Federal contractors included: Humana (23); Triwest Healthcare
Alliance Co. (40); and Health Maintenance of Indiana (92)); see also Top 200 Federal
Contractors 2000, supra, at 42-44 (determining that in Fiscal Year 1999, two different
health care providers broke the top fifty: Chattanooga Hospital and Medical Corp.
(34) and Anthem, Inc. (38), while Occupational Health Services surfaced at number
fifty-one); Top 200 Federal Contractors 1999, supra, at 16-22 (listing examples of
financial institutions among the largest federal contractors in Fiscal Year 1998,
including Goldman Sachs & Co. (82); Morgan Guaranty Trust of New York (134);
Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP (144); and Berkshire Hathaway (175)). Many are
surprised to learn that in Fiscal Year 1998 the 100 largest federal contractors
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procurement are usually presented in the framework of government
relations to the ‘defense industry’[,] . . . there is no defense industry
in the sense there is a steel industry, a copper industry, or an
12
The government buys most of what it
automobile industry.”
requires from the same firms that serve everyday consumers and the
business community. Only a limited number of firms exist and thrive
solely from the Federal Government’s business; most government
contractors also heavily rely upon the commercial marketplace.
2.

A complex regime and a decade of reform
The laws, regulations, and policies controlling the award and
performance of government contracts present a dense thicket
13
reflective of a large, complex bureaucracy. This highly regulated
regime specifies which individuals have authority to bind the
14
articulates a systematic process for planning
government,
15
acquisitions, provides a limited array of schemes for selecting


included numerous institutions of higher education: University of California System
(6), California Institute of Technology (17), Johns Hopkins University (35),
University of Chicago (38), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (43), and Stanford
University (78). Id. at 16-18. Nor are the players’ relative positions entrenched. For
example, in tracking the largest Federal contractors, it was recently observed that
“Dell Computer . . . climbed 55 places . . . this year (from 124 to 69)[.]” Editor’s
Notebook, GOV’T EXEC., Aug. 1999, at 3. The following year, Dell had climbed to
number forty-eight on the list. Top 200 Federal Contractors 2000, supra, at 42.
12. Frederick T. Moore, Efficiency and Public Policy in Defense Procurement, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 4 (1964). Conversely, the very nature of the Government’s
buying practices discourages analogies to a true market. See generally Steven L.
Schooner, Impossibility of Performance in Public Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 229, 262-63 (1986). Nor are defense contractors guaranteed lasting
success—for an anecdotal tragedy set in the military industrial complex, see Eugene
Gholz, The Curtiss-Wright Corporation and Cold War-Era Defense Procurement: A Challenge
to the Military-Industrial Complex Theory, 2 J. OF COLD WAR STUD. 35 (2000) (“once the
second-largest manufacturer in the United States, . . . it is now just a small
subcontractor”). Nonetheless, “[u]nnecessary production contracts in inefficient,
oversized facilities [continue to] waste U.S. resources.” Eugene Gholz & Harvey M.
Sapolsky, Restructuring the Defense Industry, 24 INT’L SECURITY 5, 15-16 (Winter
1999/2000).
13. Accordingly, the legal discipline embraces, inter alia, administrative law,
contracts, commercial law, corporations, and remedies as pedagogical and curricular
bedfellows, while others treat the field as a specialty. See generally Richard E. Speidel,
What Should the Law Schools Do About Federal Government Contracts?, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC.
371, 372 (1966); J.W. Whelan & J.T. Phillips, Government Contracts: Emphasis on
Government, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (1964) (suggesting that “most of these
subjects also reflect somewhat broader areas of concern: i.e., in so far as they reveal
the operations of government generally, not only government contracts but also in
other fields, they are susceptible of use for the purpose of analyzing government
operations as a whole”). See also John W. Whelan, Reflections on Government Contracts
and Government Policy on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Public Contract
Law Section, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (1990).
14. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1999) (discussing contracting officers as officials with
authority to bind the government in contract).
15. See id. § 7 (discussing acquisition planning).
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16

contractors, establishes parameters for managing contractual
17
performance, defines the process for terminating contractual
18
relationships, and presents numerous standard provisions and
clauses addressing every conceivable contingency that could arise
19
under the various types of permissible contract vehicles. Familiar
procurement statutes and regulations ensure that the purchasing
system appears transparent, that integrity permeates the behavior of
20
government and contractor personnel, that the government obtains
21
full and open competition, and that the procurement system
22
furthers a broad range of social policies. The most visible
manifestation of the breadth of extant controls on the procurement
process is Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system, which spans across nine inches
23
of bookshelf space. Some firms perceive this regulatory maze as a
barrier to entry, and critics suggest that those same barriers
historically insulated a coddled class of less-than-competitive suppliers
24
that had adapted to the non-commercial rules of the game.


16. See id. §§ 13-15 (detailing simplified acquisitions, sealed bidding, and
contracting by negotiation); id. § 16 (describing types of contracts).
17. See id. §§ 42-43 (explaining contract administration and modifications).
18. See id. § 49 (discussing terminations).
19. See id. § 16 (discussing types of contracts); id. § 52 (containing standard and
optional provisions and clauses); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 357 (1989) (“[A]lmost every large
firm that has done business with the government complains of the amount of detail
that is part of the contract and the intrusiveness of the scrutiny that is part of the
audit.”).
20. See 48 C.F.R. § 3 (1999) (detailing improper business practices); id. § 9.4
(describing debarment, suspension, and ineligibility); id. § 4.6 (explaining contract
reporting) id. § 24 (discussing protection of privacy and freedom of information); id.
§ 33 (describing protests, disputes, and appeals).
21. See id. § 5 (discussing publicizing requirements for contract actions); id. § 6
(detailing competition requirements).
22. See id. § 19 (addressing small business programs); id. § 22 (outlining labor law
compliance); id. § 23 (explaining environment, conservation, occupational safety,
and drug-free workplace requirements); id. § 25 (highlighting domestic
preferences).
23. See generally JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 503-17
(1992) (discussing the evolution of the uniform regulation system, culminating with
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which first became effective on April 1, 1984).
24. See Steven Kelman, Buying Commercial: An Introduction and Framework, 27 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 249, 250-51 (1998) (“Unfortunately, a variety of special standards,
government-unique certifications, terms and conditions, and record-keeping and
reporting requirements imposed by statute and regulation discouraged many
successful commercial companies from offering their products to Government.”);
Amanda Ripley, Contract Killer, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2000, at 48 (noting that Professor
Kelman described the companies that have suffered as a result of the 1990s
procurement reforms as “firms that sell uniquely to the government, have no
commercial presence, and have been working under dysfunctional government
standards . . . [whose] comparative advantage was mastery of the bizarre government
procurement system”); see also GORE, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing, inter alia, a letter
stating that previously Jockey International “declined to bid on government
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The mid-1990s witnessed a tsunami of procurement reforms
heralded as the most successful aspect of Gore’s reinventing
government initiative, which were intended to make the
procurement system less bureaucratic and more businesslike. The
25
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and the 1996
26
Clinger-Cohen Act, two wide-reaching reform statutes implemented
by numerous new and revised regulations, dramatically altered the
27
federal procurement landscape. The resulting regime reflects the
vision of the acquisition reform movement’s catalyst, Professor
Kelman, whose bravura performance re-shaped the public purchasing
28
process.
As Professor Kelman promised, at a macro level, the


business . . . because the solicitations asked them to manufacture a T-shirt to unique
specifications . . . and provide sensitive pricing data . . . .”).
25. Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 40, and 41 U.S.C.).
26. Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 4001-4002, 110 Stat. 642 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 10, 40 and 41 U.S.C.); §§ 5001-5703, 110 Stat. 679 (renamed the “ClingerCohen Act” by the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996)).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93 (addressing major changes that have
recently occurred in the procurement community); see also Steven L. Schooner,
Change, Change Leadership, and Acquisition Reform, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 467 (1997).
28. Kelman is the Albert J. Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Public Management at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government. Kelman served as the White House’s procurement point person—the
Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)—from 1993 until
1997. Congress tasked the Office of Federal Procurement Policy “to provide overall
direction of Government-wide procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and
forms for executive agencies and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
in the procurement of property and services by the executive branch of the Federal
Government.” 41 U.S.C. § 404(a). The Administrator “shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 41 U.S.C. § 404(b). In
that capacity, he vigorously toiled to effectuate the policies articulated in his book,
PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 1. Kelman deserves great credit
for spear-heading a wave of acquisition reforms. For a retrospective of Kelman’s
efforts at OFPP and his perspectives on Acquisition Reform, see the cover story,
Ripley, Contract Killer, supra note 24, at 45 (Apr. 2000). See also Stephen Barr,
Outgoing Chief Leaves His Mark on Procurement Process, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at
A23 (“His departure represents a substantial loss for Vice President Gore, who
repeatedly pointed to Kelman’s procurement changes as examples of how
‘reinventing government’ can improve government performance.”); Rorie Sherman,
Editor’s Note, CORP. COUNS. 11 (Apr. 2000) (“Remember the Clinton administration’s
campaign to ‘reinvent government?’ Harvard University professor Steven Kelman
took it seriously, went to Washington, and helped make the government
procurement system behave more like private business.”). For additional comment
on Ripley’s assessment of the Kelman regime, see Steven Kelman, Defending His
Reforms, CORP. COUNS. 13 (June 2000); Marcus Corbin, Disagreeing With Kelman, CORP.
COUNS. 12 (July 2000); John S. Pachter, Procurement Concerns Justified, CORP. COUNS.
12 (Aug. 2000). On his last day in office, September 12, 1997, I had the opportunity
to accompany Kelman as he reflected on his tenure at the Council for Excellence in
Government in Washington, D.C. Kelman discussed his perception of the biggest
pending issues (past performance, performance based service contracting, leveraging
of the government's buying power, and acting more commercial, many of which are
discussed below); his major accomplishments (streamlining, culture change, the rewrite of Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 and oral presentations, plus multiple
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reinvented procurement system is (1) defined by greater purchaser
29
discretion, (2) less encumbered by bureaucratic constraint and
30
31
internal oversight, and (3) more businesslike.


award task order contracts); his lessons learned (the need for vision, focusing upon
the people that do the work, the reality that there are two sides to every change); and
future challenges (keeping the reform message alive, not trying to change everyone,
and accepting the process of continuous improvement). Although Kelman has
authored numerous books, it often seems that, outside of the procurement
community, he is better known for his student account of events at Harvard, WHEN
PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: THE ESCALATION OF STUDENT PROTEST (1970). Now that he
has returned to Harvard, he is re-united with some of his most influential political
allies, Elaine Kamarck (creator and manager of the Clinton Administration's
National Performance Review (NPR), also known as the Reinventing Government
project) and Christopher Edley.
29. The use of the term “discretion” in this context merits further clarification.
Administrative discretion, and the control of that discretion, defines much of the
body of administrative law. See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 154 (1994) (“If legislation is the skeleton of the administrative state,
discretion—the official’s freedom, within the limits of her power, to make a choice
among possible courses of action or inaction—is its musculature. Discretion vitalizes
agencies, infusing them with energy, direction, mobility, and the capacity for
change.”). Yet, the type of discretion discussed here, although exercised by
government employees, differs from the broad decision, policy and rule-making
issues most frequently addressed in administrative law and public policy scholarship.
See Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 588, 589 (1989) (“Discretion consists of the departure of agency decisions
from the positions agreed upon by the executive and legislature at the time of
delegation and appointment.”). Rather, the exercise of discretion at issue is not in
determining the amount of leeway that Congress delegated to the regulation drafters
to promulgate purchasing rules. This examination focuses upon the amount of
flexibility individual buyers enjoy in selecting individual contractors and managing
the performance of those contracts. The concern here involves how and from whom
the government buys. Kelman, whose work focused primarily upon purchasing
computers, suggests that “[t]he three major limitations on discretion in procurement
by competitive proposals are [1] the rules and practices for establishing the
government’s requirements, [2] the criteria by which proposals from vendors are
evaluated, and [3] the information that may be used in evaluating proposals against
those criteria.” KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 19.
These limitations are the tip of the iceberg. The statutory and regulatory regime
also: (1) mandates the use of scores of standard solicitation provisions and contract
clauses, (2) limits the type of contracts that may be used, (3) indenntifies numerous
required sources of supplies and services, (4) constrains the government’s ability to
reimburse contractors for a host of commonly incurred costs of doing business, such
as advertising and selling costs, entertainment expenses, lobbying costs, etc.,
(5) limits the amount of profit that can be paid on certain contracts, and (6) limits
the extent to which the contracting officer can negotiate a change to an existing
contract. See 48 C.F.R. § 52; 48 C.F.R. § 16; 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a); 41 U.S.C. § 254(b);
48 C.F.R. § 16.102(c); 48 C.F.R. § 8; 48 C.F.R. § 31.205; 10 U.S.C. § 2306(e); 41
U.S.C. § 254(b); 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-4(c)(4)(i); 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1(a).
30. See infra note 146 (noting that during the 1990s, Congress slashed the
acquisition workforce, eliminating approximately half of the auditors and quality
assurance personnel that provided internal oversight of the procurement process).
31. While it is difficult to summarize the reforms of the 1990s, the most
significant changes contributing to a more businesslike approach would include, inter
alia, (1) a movement towards more commercial purchasing; (2) the change in highvolume, low-dollar purchasing associated with the micro-purchase threshold and the
burgeoning use of government purchase cards; (3) introducing the evaluation of
contractor past performance as an evaluation criteria for contractor selection;
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B. An Empirical Summary of Reduced External Monitoring
The commotion and bustle of reinvention masked a slow and
steady, but now unmistakable, decrease in government contract
32
litigation. This phenomenon—particularly the speed and depth of
33
the decline—came as a surprise to the procurement community.
The decrease contradicts the widely-held belief that our procurement
system is unduly burdened by a systemic deference to the principle of
due process and a historically litigious constituency. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the decline in litigation was matched by its consistency.
The extraordinary drop in litigation activity is evident at both the
procurement process’s front-end (described as bid protests or
disappointed offeror litigation) and the back-end (which
34
encompasses contract disputes). For the purposes of the discussion
that follows, the distinction between protests and disputes is
significant. Protests are challenges concerning the formation or
35
award of government contracts. The putative plaintiff in a protest

(4) the proliferation of flexible umbrella contract vehicles (such as multiple award
task order and delivery contracts); (5) the balkanization of the uniform procurement
system (e.g., exempting the Federal Aviation Administration from the federal
procurement regulations and permitting the use of “other transactions authority”);
(6) encouragement of the use of performance-based service contracting;
(7) increased privatization and outsourcing; (8) enhanced purchaser flexibility and
discretion; and (9) elimination of certifications not required by statute. Many of
these changes benefit from recent technological advances and the correspondingly
rapid development of electronic commerce.
32. As becomes clear in my empirical discussion, infra at text accompanying
notes 55 et seq., the barometer I use for assessing the volume of litigation is the
commencement of proceedings, specifically the filing of a lawsuit. For my purposes
here, whether the parties try the case, settle, or permit the adjudicator to render a
decision, is irrelevant. For discussion of a similar usage, see David Luban, Settlements
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2620 n.4 (1995) [hereinafter
Luban, Settlements].
33. On this point, I must distinguish Kelman’s goals, efforts, and knowledge from
the larger effort to re-invent government, in this case the NPR.
Kelman
unequivocally desired less litigation and was pleasantly surprised when that result was
achieved. It is less clear whether Kelman’s desires, in this regard, are reflective of the
NPR’s principles and, more importantly, it is difficult to demonstrate that Congress
was cognizant of any potential cause and effect along those lines.
34. See generally RALPH C. NASH, JR. ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
REFERENCE BOOK 197-98, 423 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter NASH ET AL., REFERENCE
BOOK] (distinguishing disputes from protests).
Pedagogically, the body of
government contract law neatly divides into two basic disciplines along similar lines.
See generally JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter CIBINIC & NASH, FORMATION]; JOHN CIBINIC,
JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1995)
[hereinafter CIBINIC & NASH, ADMINISTRATION].
35. The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines “protest” as:
a written objection by an interested party to any of the following: (a) A
solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a contract for the
procurement of property or services. (b) The cancellation of the solicitation
or other request. (c) An award or proposed award of the contract. (d) A
termination or cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written
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36

matter is often termed a disappointed offeror. By contrast, contract
37
disputes involve controversies or claims arising during the
performance of a contract. In a dispute, the putative plaintiff is a
contractor with an existing contractual relationship with the
government, otherwise known as the putative defendant. Although it
may seem counter-intuitive, these two regimes have little in common.
For example, protests and disputes rely upon entirely separate waivers
38
of the government’s sovereign immunity, entail distinct remedial
39
40
schemes, and, for the most part, proceed in different fora.


objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is based
in whole or in part on improprieties concerning the award of the contract.
48 C.F.R. § 33.101 (1999).
36. The term “disappointed offeror” is somewhat of a misnomer. Some protests,
such as an allegation that the government’s solicitation is ambiguous or defective, are
sufficiently proactive that the potential offeror has not yet become disappointed at
the time the matter is commenced. See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the
Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 461 (1995) [hereinafter
Kovacic, Procurement Reform].
37. A contract claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a dispute. See generally 41
U.S.C. §§ 605, 606, 609; 48 C.F.R. §§ 33.201, 52.233-1.
38. Protestor or disappointed offerors utilize different sovereign immunity
waivers, depending upon the forum they choose. Generally, disappointed offerors
have commenced suit in Federal Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), or based
upon Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Protestors may
challenge agency actions at the General Accounting Office pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3556; 4 C.F.R. § 21; 48 C.F.R. § 33.104. Protestors also may commence
agency protests pursuant to Executive Order 12979 (Oct. 25, 1995), 60 Fed. Reg.
55,171 (Oct. 27, 1995); 48 C.F.R. § 33.103. Conversely, contract disputes are
governed by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613, which is
implemented through the standard Disputes clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.233-1, found in
individual contracts with Executive agencies; see also 48 C.F.R. Subpart 33.2.
39. Common remedies sought by protestors include: suspension of the
procurement (including automatic stays, temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, or permanent injunctions), re-solicitation of the Government’s
requirements, award of bid or proposal preparation costs. The key point here is
demonstrated by GAO’s list of issues that it will not consider, found at 4 C.F.R.
§ 21.5. The first issue listed is “contract administration.” GAO explains that: “The
administration of an existing contract is within the discretion of the contracting
agency. Disputes between a contractor and the agency are resolved pursuant to the
disputes clause of the contract and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. 41 U.S.C. 601613.” 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(c). By contrast, common remedies sought by contractors
through the disputes process include: contract extensions, contract adjustments
(payment for additional incurred costs); equitable adjustments (payment for
additional incurred costs plus an allowance for profit); conversion of a termination
for default to a termination for the convenience of the Government.
40. Protestors typically choose between three potential adjudicators: (1) the
contracting officer or his/her supervisor (these are called “agency protests”), 48
C.F.R. § 33.103; (2) the Comptroller General, typically referred to more broadly as
the General Accounting Office, 4 C.F.R. § 21, 48 C.F.R. § 33.104; and (3) the Federal
Courts—either the District Courts or U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. §
1491(b). In disputes, contractors elect between the appropriate agency board of
contract appeals, 41 U.S.C. §§ 606, 607; or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 41
U.S.C. § 609; 48 C.F.R. § 33.211(a)(4)(v); Thomas C. Wheeler, Let’s Make the Choice of
Forum Meaningful, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 655 (1999); Michael J. Schaengold et al., Choice
of Forum for Contract Claims: Court v. Board, 92-12 BRIEFING PAPERS (Nov. 1992).
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Conversely, the protest and dispute systems have long shared in their
efforts to deputize the private sector, specifically the contractor
community, to regulate government behavior.
More recently,
protests and disputes have commonly experienced a precipitous
decline in activity.
1.

Dominant fora: The General Accounting Office and the Agency Boards
of Contract Appeals
For the purposes of the empirical portion of this discussion, I focus
upon the most heavily trafficked administrative (non-judicial)
tribunals that confront issues related to government contracts: the
General Accounting Office (GAO) for bid protests and the Armed
41
Service Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) for contract disputes.
Both of these administrative, quasi-judicial fora exercise statutory
42
jurisdiction largely concurrent with judicial fora. Although other


41. For these reasons, I am not the first to attempt to mine this area. See generally
Gary P. Quigley & Catherine S. Drost, Defense Contractor Use of Preaward and Postaward
Dispute Forums, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 188, 189 (1991) (discussing results from a 1981-86
study period of GAO and ABSCA appeals). The contrast between the early 1980s
data—which reflected “sharp [in the number of contractor protests] increases shown
by the military departments” and a fairly level number of protests for the GAO—and
the 1990s data presented here, which chronicles a sustained government-wide
downturn, is startling.
42. The concurrent jurisdiction lies with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and, at
times, the U.S. District Courts. More recently, Congress has altered the disappointed
offeror jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress expanded the protest jurisdiction
of the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) with the Administrative Disputes Resolution
Act of 1996 (ADRA). Section 12, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (Oct. 19, 1996),
which amended the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, to permit the CFC to provide
protestors injunctive relief before and after award of the contract and broadened the
kinds of protests that the court could hear. During a multi-year study period,
completed in January, 2001, the CFC and the Federal District Courts shared
concurrent jurisdiction over these matters. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(c),
GAO conducted “a study regarding the concurrent jurisdiction of the district courts
. . . and the Court of Federal Claims over bid protests to determine whether
concurrent jurisdiction is necessary.” For a summary of arguments in support of
concurrent disappointed offeror (or protest) litigation jurisdiction in the CFC and
the district courts, see Michael S. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S. District Courts—Why
Congress Should Not Allow the Sun to Set on This Effective Relationship, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J.
567 (1997); Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 461. While the statutory
machinations attract interest, they are not statistically significant here, because
historically, only a few dozen of these actions commence in Federal court each year.
Similarly, each forum’s nuances are not significant here. For those interested in the
differences, a rich body of literature chronicles the evolution of the current regime.
See, e.g., JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS 17579, 291-317 (1981); Dorn C. McGrath, III, The Transfer and Consolidation of the Contract
Disputes Act, 15 PUB. CONT. L.J. 256 (1985); Alan I. Saltman, “Breach” of Contract: The
Comptroller General, the Boards, the Courts and the All-Disputes Clause, 7 PUB. CONT. L.J.
123 (1974); David V. Anthony, Recommendations Concerning Legal and Administrative
Remedies for Contract Claims: A Workable Remedies Package, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 300
(1974); Gilbert A. Cuneo & Eldon H. Crowell, Parallel Jurisdiction: If the Court of Claims
Can, Why Not the Administrative Boards?, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 137 (1964); Richard E.
Speidel, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Government Contracts, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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judicial and administrative fora exercise jurisdiction over matters
43
impacting government contracts, for the last two decades the GAO
and the ASBCA have confronted the lion’s share of litigation in their
respective spheres of influence—the GAO is the most heavily utilized
protest forum; the ASBCA handles the greatest volume of contract
44
disputes. In addition, both maintain and make publicly available (at


621 (1963). Those unfamiliar with the Court of Federal Claims may not recognize
that, after a lengthy tenure, the U.S. Court of Claims was bifurcated by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (Apr. 2, 1982), 28
U.S.C. §§ 171 et seq., creating the U.S. Claims Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. A decade later, with the Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (Oct. 29, 1992), the Claims Court
morphed into its current form, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
43. For this task, I detail neither the protests nor the contract disputes activity at
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC), or its predecessors, the Claims Court and
the Court of Claims. Although the judicial forum merits attention, it proves less
helpful for a host of reasons. First, the volume of protest activity before the GAO
dwarfs the court’s protest activity—these cases are numbered in the dozens. Second,
the volume of disputes activity before the agency boards dwarfs the court’s disputes
activity. Third, Congress has repeatedly altered the Federal Courts’ disappointed
offeror jurisdiction (particularly in 1982 and 1996), which has injected unnecessary
uncertainty into the process. See generally Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., The Initial
Experience of the Court of Federal Claims in Applying the Administrative Procedure Act in Bid
Protests—Learning Lessons All Over Again, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that
Congress gave the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over protest bids in 1982 and
later granted concurrent bid protest jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims and
the district courts); Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., The Federal Courts Improvement Act
Needs Improvement: A Renewed Call for Its Amendment, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 3 (1991)
(critiquing the expansion of Court of Claims jurisdiction over causes of action
seeking principally injunctive and declarative relief); Gregg A. Day, The Bid Protest
Jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court: A Proposal for Resolving Ambiguities, 15 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 325, 341 (1985) (describing how the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 gave the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction
over claims court decisions); Joel Feidelman & Josephine L. Ursini, Contract Formation
Jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 41 (1983) (noting that
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 created the U.S. Claims Court, which
replaced the former Court of Claims trial division); Steven L. Schooner, Feature
Comment—Watching the Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest
Jurisdiction in the COFC and the District Courts, 42 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 108 (2000)
[hereinafter Schooner, Watching the Sunset]. Fourth, the court tends to group
“contracts” cases broadly, including in its statistics more than just CDA disputes.
Fifth, the fluctuations in the court’s contract docket do not appear consistent or
statistically significant. For example, the court docketed over 250 “contract” cases in
Fiscal Year (FY) 1992, 247 cases in FY 1993, 299 in FY 1994, 279 in FY 1995, 285 cases
in FY 1996, and 280 cases in FY 1997. See generally CONFERENCE BRIEFS: THE FEDERAL
PUBLICATIONS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS YEAR IN REVIEW CONFERENCE, COVERING 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 sess. 6; Steven L. Schooner & Keith D. Coleman, The
CDA at Twenty: A Brief Assessment of BCA Activity, 34 PROCUREMENT LAW. 10, 16-17 n.2
(1999). Other sources give broader insight into this court’s evolving role. See, e.g.,
Eric Bruggink, A Modest Proposal, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 529, 531-32 (1999) (arguing for
more coherence and completeness in the Court of Federal Claim’s jurisdiction);
Loren Smith, Alan E. Peterson Lecture: The Role of the Courts What Would Sherlock Holmes
Say?, 34 PROCUREMENT LAW 1, 28 (1999).
44. For the most part, the judicial and administrative fora enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction. See 41 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1994) (creating concurrent jurisdiction between
the Court of Federal Claims and agency boards of contract appeals). These two
administrative fora routinely handle between ten and twenty times the volume of
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least somewhat) useful data chronicling their activity.
The Comptroller General, through the GAO, is the most popular
forum in which prospective contractors raise challenges to
46
government activity relating to the award of contracts. The GAO, an
47
arm of Congress, exercises statutory authority to hear bid protests.
Despite its home in the legislative branch, the GAO functions and is
48
perceived as an administrative dispute resolution forum. Over many
decades, GAO has established an intricate web of precedent
addressing every conceivable nuance implicated in the process of
acquisition planning, bid or proposal solicitation, vendor
49
competition, source selection, and contract award. Moreover, GAO
practice has evolved dramatically to, in the more extreme cases,
50
resemble federal court litigation.
There has also been a litigation decline at the ASBCA, the largest
of the agency boards of contract appeals. Agency boards hear
appeals from contractor claims arising under or relating to
government contracts pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978

related matters filed in the federal courts. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
45. See Schooner & Coleman, supra note 43, at 10-16. Although this earlier work
did not address the cause of the decline, it chronicles the decrease and (1) describes
the data available; (2) focuses upon the workloads of the largest administrative
boards, which compiled the most complete statistical data sets; (3) discloses the
limited data available at the smaller boards; (4) contemplates the volume of
published board decisions; and (5) encourages the administrative boards to provide
the public with better insight into their workloads. Id.
46. See generally Alexander J. Brittin, The Comptroller General’s Dual Statutory
Authority to Decide Bid Protests, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 636, 636-91 (1993) (describing the
evolution of the GAO’s systematic involvement in adjudicating bid protests to its
statutorily authorized role as adjudicator under the Competition in Contracting Act
of 1984).
47. See Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 470-74 (outlining how the
General Accounting Office fits into the maze of administrative and judicial fora).
48. See generally General Accounting Office, Administrative Practice and
Procedure, Bid Protest Regulations, Government Contracts, 4 C.F.R. § 21.1 (1999);
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-96-24, BID
PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE (6th ed. 1996), available at http://www.gao.
gov/special.pubs/ og96024.htm.
49. See Gov’t Accounting Office, Bid Protest Decisions, at http://www.gao.gov/
decisions/bidpro/bidpro.htm (last modified Apr. 13, 2001) (displaying recent GAO
bid protests and decisions). Between 1921 and 1994, select GAO decisions were
published in the official reporter, DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES (Comp. Gen.). Since 1958, commercial publishers, including West
(parent of Federal Publications), CCH, and LEXIS, have reproduced, distributed,
and indexed all Comptroller General protest decisions.
50. Although the extent of this evolution is outside the scope of this discussion,
the two most dramatic turning points have been GAO’s willingness to conduct
hearings and, more recently, broaden the potential for parties to engage in limited
discovery. See 4 C.F.R. § 21.3(g) (1999) (“The protester may request additional
documents”); id. § 21.7 (“At the request of a party or on its own initiative, GAO may
conduct a hearing in connection with a protest. The request shall set forth the
reasons why a hearing is needed to resolve the protest.”).
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51

(CDA). Although agency boards have long provided contractors a
forum for the pursuit of their claims, since 1978 these boards have
been empowered by Congress to resolve matters arising under or
relating to contracts (once awarded) in much the same manner as
52
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The ASBCA provides adjudicatory
services to the major defense agencies which, as discussed above,
spend over half of the government’s procurement budget. Moreover,
53
pursuant to the CDA, the ASBCA provides its services to less litigious
agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), which have deemed it not cost effective to maintain
54
independent boards.
2.

Quantifying the decrease
Statistics regarding the activity of the General Accounting Office
and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals paint similar
pictures. Both exhibit a dramatic reduction in new filings of protests
and disputes respectively. Each institution’s docket has more than
55
halved in less than a decade. More striking is that both boards
experienced uninterrupted, straight-line decreases. This should be
contrasted with the general increase, or at the very least stability, in
56
the volume of civil litigation in the Federal Courts. As data from the


51. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601613 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (outlining the definitions, judicial process, and other
roles of government contract dispute mechanisms).
52. See 41 U.S.C. § 609 (1994) (outlining process for judicial review of board
decisions).
53. See id. § 607(c) (providing for dispute resolution where the volume of claims
is not sufficient to justify an agency board).
54. See generally Paul Williams, A Brief Look at the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, 22 PUB. CONT. NEWSLETTER 3 (1986).
55. See GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1999 at
http://www.gao.gov/. To navigate this site select “other publications,” then select
“complete listing.” Reports are then presented alphabetically. Reports for prior
fiscal years are on file with the author. The author thanks GAO’s Dan Gordon and
Jerold D. Cohen for their assistance in obtaining this data. See also Melanie I. Dooley,
Contract Appeals: ASBCA, Engineers Board Likely to Be Merged, 73 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA)
149 (Feb. 8, 2000) (noting the Board’s docket decreased from 2,503 in 1987 to 663
in 1999).
56. It is not my intent here to join the debate regarding the public’s perception
of a “litigation explosion.” For those seeking insight into this conversation, see, e.g.,
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Criminal Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 721 & n.14 (1998) (providing an extensive list of
literature refuting the jaundiced view of legal legends, such as the litigation
explosion); Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our Civil Litigation System:
A Critique of “Base Rate” Analysis and Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA. L. REV. 77, 136
(1996) (explaining that after filings declined during the late 1980s, data from 1991
to 1995 indicate that filings “are in an upward direction again, and the rates of
increase are substantial”); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)—Much Ado About Nothing, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 681 (1995)
(referencing “[t]he widespread public and professional perception of a litigation
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts demonstrate,
although the consistent trend of increases was interrupted in the late
1990s, the volume of civil litigation still exceeds that of the early to
mid-1990s.
Civil Cases Filed in the
57
United States District Courts

a.

Protests at the General Accounting Office

Although it is premature to chronicle the death of protests, ample
evidence of hemorrhaging exists. The volume of protests before the
GAO—long the primary forum for disappointed offerors to seek
58
relief —continues to plummet. As the chart below indicates, after a


explosion”); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession,
68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 85, 107 (1994) (“The public perceives that lawyers file every
conceivable type of case, regardless of merit. As a result, the quantity of cases . . . has
burdened court dockets and threatens the quality of justice.”); Matthew Scott Morris,
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990: By Keeping up
With the Joneses, the SEC’s Enforcement Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151,
186 n.169 (1993) (offering “[e]vidence of a trend towards increased litigation”);
Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
275, 277 n.8 (1992) (“Claims of a litigation explosion have not gone without a
serious challenge based on close examination of available evidence.”); Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 37-38 (1986)
(challenging the litigation explosion myth); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 69
(1983) (asserting that conclusions about a litigation explosion are based on casual
scholarship).
57. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1999: THE 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 53 tbl. S-7 (1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999
/contents.html; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1997: THE 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 44 tbl. S-7 (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judicial_business/contents.html. These numbers reflect “original filings.” The
report also contains data on total filings, which adds cases removed from State courts
to the number of original filings.
58. Although GAO annual protest filings long have numbered in the thousands,
disappointed offeror cases in the federal courts typically are counted in the dozens.
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period of slowly growing dockets in the early 1990s, GAO protests
have decreased for six consecutive years. In 1993, GAO received
59
3,377 cases; by 1999, GAO received just under 1,400. In addition to
the consistency of this decline, the severity—a decrease of nearly 60
percent—is breath-taking.
[INSERT TABLE 4]

GAO PROTEST FILINGS
Cases Filed
62
1,852

60

61

[INSERT TABLE 5]


See, e.g., Schooner, Watching the Sunset, supra note 43, at 8; Bid Protests: Characteristics of
Cases Filed in the Federal Courts, GAO/GGD/OGC-00-72, B-282743, Apr. 17, 2000.
59. See supra note 55 (explaining the GAO contracts and the decrease in bid
protests).
60. Id. (citing GAO protest filing information from 1990-99).
61. Id. (including both protests and requests for reconsideration under the
category of “cases filed” in GAO reports).
62. Id. (showing that beginning in Fiscal Year 1997, GAO began identifying the
number of cost claims received as a subset of protests). To the extent that the
volume of cost claims fluctuated between twenty-two and twenty-nine from 1997 to
1999, this does not appear to be statistically significant for these purposes.
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This slump is particularly striking because despite the long-term
trend, observers had every reason to expect an increase in 1996 or
1997. In 1996, Congress eliminated the authority of the General
Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) to resolve protests
63
During its
involving information technology (IT) procurements.
short-lived existence, the Board’s IT protest jurisdiction had proven
64
quite popular with the protest bar.
Accordingly, if the GAO’s
docket increased by 150 or 200 filings in 1996 or 1997, the increase
would likely have been attributed to forum substitution. Yet, the
increase never materialized. If either the GAO or the courts
captured the GSBCA’s lost protest business, any forum substitution
was swamped by the decline in other protests.
b.

Disputes at the administrative boards

The contract dispute arena, which entails contract performance
and administration issues, experienced a decline in activity similar to
GAO’s, yet the decline spanned a longer time frame. ASBCA is by far
the largest of the agency boards of contracts appeals (BCAs). The
ASBCA employs between two and three dozen judges, while the GSA
65
board, the second largest, currently employs eight. Many of the
agency boards have the statutorily mandated minimum of three
administrative judges. The ASBCA alone has historically received as
many as ten times the number of contract disputes handled by the
66
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.


63. See National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 5101, 110 Stat. 186, 680 (repealing 40 U.S.C. § 759, known as the Brooks Automatic
Data Processing Act). The Brooks Act initially addressed automated data processing
equipment or ADPE, but subsequently adopted the more familiar IT label.
64. In 1995, the last full year before its elimination, the GSBCA docketed 178
protests. 64 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 393, 405 (Nov. 6, 1995) (explaining that the
protest level remained the same as the previous year). During 1994, the board
docketed an almost identical 179 protests. 62 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 477, 491 (Nov.
7, 1994) (finding a decrease of thirty percent in bid protests). In 1993, the GSBCA
docketed 287 protests. 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 467, 485 (Nov. 1, 1993) (finding a
decrease in bid protests for Fiscal Year 1993). In the less-than-one-year-period
preceding its elimination in 1996, the GSBCA docketed eighty-three protests. 66
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 563, 565 (Dec. 9, 1996).
65. See GSA Board of Contract Appeals, available at http://www.gsbca.gsa.gov/
(visited Apr. 15, 2001). Comparing the relative size of the foras’ benches masks the
full breadth of the size difference. Unlike the ASBCA, where the administrative
judges address only CDA matters, the GSBCA administrative judges, in addition to
CDA matters, resolve federal employee claims for expenses incurred while on
temporary duty travel or relocation, carrier or freight forwarder rate determination
claims, and claims for the proceeds of the sale of property of dead, ill, or missing
federal civilian employees. Id., citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3726(g)(1), and 5 U.S.C.
§ 5564.
66. Under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, a contractor, upon receipt of a
contracting officer’s decision, may elect to challenge that decision either before an
agency board of contract appeals, 41 U.S.C. § 607 (1994), or before the U.S. Court of
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With the passage of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), the
number of filings at the ASBCA, referred to as appeals, increased
68
consistently for a decade, peaking near the end of the 1980s. In
1990, the ASBCA docketed 2,218 appeals, but during the 1990s the
bottom fell out. By 1999, the Board had docketed only 663
69
appeals —more than a two-thirds decrease. During the same period
in which the board shouldered the work of the now-defunct NASA
BCA—the ASBCA experienced a decrease in administrative judges.
The total number fell from a peak of thirty-seven to a post-CDA low
in the mid-twenties. While other agency BCAs have not exhibited
70
similar straight-line decreases, the cumulative effects are similar.
Compare the five largest boards’ volume of new appeals:
[INSERT TABLE 6]
Corps
71
of Engineers
[INSERT TABLE 7]


Federal Claims, 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(1) (1994).
67. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (detailing the review process
for private contractors’ disputes with the Federal Government).
68. Schooner & Coleman, supra note 43, at 11. Our research supports the widely
held belief that the 1980s were the boom years of government contracts disputes
litigation. Conversely, by almost any objective measure, the 1990s were an era of
declining dispute litigation.
69. See Dooley, infra note 71, at 149 (noting the Board’s decreased docket).
70. See generally Schooner & Coleman, supra note 43. Unfortunately, the smaller
boards provide the public little or no insight into their workload, and some appear
incapable of generating meaningful historical statistics. Id. We noted one peculiar
and troubling trend—the three small boards that provided the most limited data
were also the only boards to report docket increases in recent years. Id. at 13.
71. As a reflection of the continued reduction in BCA dockets, the ASBCA recently absorbed
the Corps o f Engineers BCA. See Melanie I. Dooley, Engineers Board Being Merged With
ASBCA; Judge Thomas Named New Vice-Chairman, 74 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 54 (July 18,
2000). To the extent that previously “[t]he Defense Department [was] the only
federal agency that [had] two separate entities to hear contract appeals[, t]he
rationale for merging the two boards is that there is no justification, either in terms
of caseload (which has declined significantly at the ASBCA over the past decade) or
subject matter, to maintain two separate boards.” Id.
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These statistics demonstrate the diminished volume of trial-level
activity in the BCAs.
Not surprisingly, there has been a
corresponding, albeit somewhat delayed, decrease in appeals to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the BCAs.



       

          

72

  !

 "!



72. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 125 tbl. B-8 (1999) (U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending), available
at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep99.pdf; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 131 tbl. B-8 (1998) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals
Filed, Terminated, and Pending), available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/
b08sep98.pdf; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 117 tbl. B-8 (1997)
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, Terminated, and
Pending), available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep97.pdf. Prior year data
comes from Table B-8 of the annual JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.
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Compared to the early 1990s, the latter half of the decade shows
marked decline. The 1999 low point—when only forty appeals
derived from the boards of contract appeals—represents less than
half the annual volume generated between 1991 and 1994.
C. Searching for Explanations: A Provisional List
It is difficult to determine authoritatively what caused these
dramatic declines, and I doubt that a definitive explanation will
emerge. Numerous rosy rationales could explain the reduced
litigation phenomenon, while a host of pessimistic theories likewise
abound. The 1990s provide us with a diverse palette of potential
causes, implicating variables involving economic events, government
and contractor behavioral changes, and wide-reaching statutory,
regulatory, and policy mutations. At this early point, it appears that
further empirical research, focused on each individual variable, could
validate a number of potentially synergistic or, for that matter,
73
contradictory explanations.
Lacking an unequivocally accurate
diagnosis, I offer a provisional list of potential causes. I present the
explanations on a continuum, progressing from the most sanguine to
the most bleak.
1.

Optimistic accounts of the litigation downturn
The most cheering explanation for the decrease in litigation
activity is the one least related to the Government’s procurement
market or practices. Entering the new millennium, the 1990s
witnessed a prodigious, enduring economic boom, which produced
74
the lowest unemployment rate in three decades. With the nation’s
economic engine running at maximum efficiency, disappointed


73. In the text that follows, I posit no less than ten putative causes for the
litigation downturn. Few, if any, of the individual events discussed below could
explain both the decline in protests and disputes (particularly because there a threeyear lag between the decline in disputes and protests). From a temporal standpoint,
no potential cause aligns nicely with the actual commencement of the descents in
disputes or protests. Conversely, I am confident that further research could
demonstrate a strong correlation between each individual cause and the decline in
either protests or disputes. The inability to explain precisely the phenomenon,
however, should not dissuade further investigation. See Mark J. Roe, Commentary:
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 667 (1996) (“Right
now, none of the three paradigms—chaos, evolution to the local hilltop, or path
dependence—is developed enough to enable us to make explanatory predictions.
They do not tell us that if this happens, then that will happen. These paradigms are
not even very good at letting us classify past paths . . . because we rarely have the
bases to compare what might have happened if events in the deep past had taken
another turn.”) (citation omitted).
74. See 2000 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOC. NO. 106-161, at 3,
21, 278, 354 (discussing how the lowest levels of unemployment since 1969 is fueling
an expanding economic growth in 2000).
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offerors (e.g., potential contractors frustrated over a failed bid,
proposal, or opportunity) might cry less over their spilt milk.
Similarly, a disgruntled contractor (e.g., a firm dissatisfied with its
profit margin or facing potential losses on an existing contract)
reasonably could conclude that it was inefficient to pursue, through
litigation with an agency, the marginal dollars in dispute. This
suggests that the plethora of available business opportunities
elsewhere decreases firms’ incentives to litigate issues involving any
75
individual piece of work. While this hypothesis seems reasonable, it
is difficult to reconcile with the lack of any corresponding trend
depicting a drastic reduction in civil, or more specifically,
commercial, litigation.
A second, similarly rosy thesis is one of the most fanciful. The
Clinton Administration frequently posits that, as a result of their
76
acquisition reforms, contracting officers (CO’s), program managers,
government attorneys, and senior decision-makers are better avoiding
77
Proponents point to better
the practices that prompt lawsuits.


75. At a certain level, it seems to me an oversimplification to suggest that, from a
management perspective, the existence of plentiful business opportunities
diminishes, in a relative sense, the value of each marginal dollar sought through
litigation. Because litigation rarely is the contractor’s primary line of business, or
purpose, a business’s production capacity (or ability to pursue or perform an
additional service contract or construction project) is not necessarily constrained by
the firm’s ability to obtain counsel and engage in litigation. Accordingly, it seems a
stretch to suggest that a strong economy alters the actual opportunity cost of
litigation—a fully-employed assembly line does not, unto itself, consume litigation
resources. Of course, litigation does consume other key resources—e.g., it may
distract management or key employees that must assist counsel in marshaling facts.
The calculus may shift, however, if the consideration is framed in terms of the
relative rate of return on a hypothetical marginal dollar invested. Arguably, a
litigation risk analysis—evaluating the facts, law and past performance of the
adjudicator—does not depend upon the strength of the economy. Conversely, in
assessing alternative investment opportunities, whether a potential investment in
additional plant, labor, or research, the decision may depend in large part upon the
economy’s current and potential performance. Thus, a booming economy and
plentiful business opportunities may lead a firm to decrease the perceived relative
rate of return on an investment in litigation. Furthermore, from the perspective of
an individual contractor or contractor manager/stakeholder, this approach will
depend in large part upon its corporate practice of allocating litigation costs and/or
recoveries either (a) to division or corporate operating or overhead accounts or
(b) final cost objectives such as individual contracts.
76. In Federal procurement, contracts may be entered into and signed on behalf
of the Government only by duly appointed contracting officers (CO’s). 48 C.F.R.
§ 1.601 (1999). By virtue of their selection and appointment in writing, CO’s have
authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related
determinations and findings. See id. §§ 1.602-1(a), 1.603-2, 1.603-3(a) (noting that
Congress established the Federal Acquisition Regulations System for the codification
and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive
agencies); see also Federal Acquisition Regulation Home Page, at http://www.arnet.gov/
far/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (detailing the Federal Acquisition
Regulations System).
77. The most frequently identified government purchasing practice that may
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78

training, more pro-active and businesslike attitudes, and increased
efforts to “partner” between government and industry. It is
indisputable that, over time, more precise solicitations and crystal
clear contracts should decrease protests and disputes. Unfortunately,
this hypothesis seems a stretch because scarce empirical evidence
supports claims of improved quality work by the federal procurement
workforce. Rather, the data suggests that Congress’ relentless
campaign to reduce the size of the acquisition workforce has unduly
79
burdened, over-extended, and exhausted the government’s buyers.
Another hypothesis comes from devotees of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), who suggest that their on-going initiatives, whether
prompted or encouraged by statute, high-level policy guidance, or
grass roots agency initiatives, deserve credit for less formal
80
adjudication. Without doubt, ADR has become an integral part of


have led to a decrease in protest activity is the debriefing process, the requirements
for which were upgraded during Kelman’s tenure. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.505, 15.506.
In negotiated government procurements, excluded offerors are entitled to prompt
debriefings. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(6)(A); 41 U.S.C. § 253b(f)-(h). The revised
regulations appear to have resulted in agencies providing more useful information to
disappointed offerors on a more expeditious basis. Conventional wisdom suggests
that quality debriefings reduce contractors’ incentive to file exploratory protests.
Along the same lines, broadened exchanges between government and industry
before receipt of proposals, particularly the increased circulation of draft requests
for proposals, logically reduce the volume of award-related controversies. See 48
C.F.R. § 15.201. Similarly, to the extent that the government now buys more
commercial-off-the-shelf commodities rather than drafting detailed specifications for
government-unique products (e.g., the dreaded fruitcake specification that resulted
in a dense, tasteless product deemed inedible by legions of service members), fewer
potential offerors may complain about ambiguous, defective, or overly restrictive
specifications.
78. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat.
666 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 433 (Supp. IV 1998)) (known as Clinger-Cohen Act)
(authorizing appropriations for the Department of Defense, reforming acquisition
laws and information technology for the Federal Government); Acquisition
Management Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2450 (1992)
(amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1764 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring Secretary of
Defense to develop fulfillment standards for training purposes).
79. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD ACQUISITION
WORKFORCE REDUCTION TRENDS AND IMPACT 17-20 (2000) [hereinafter DEP’T OF
DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE], available at http://dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/
00-088.pdf (identifying, among many others, the following effects of the personnel
reductions:
(1) increased backlog in closing out completed contracts;
(2) insufficient staff to manage requirements; (3) reduced scrutiny and timeliness in
reviewing acquisition actions; (4) difficulties retaining personnel; and (5) insufficient
contract surveillance). In the absence of an empirical study, one can reasonably
conclude that reduced oversight contributed far more to the decreased litigation
trend than any efforts to upgrade personnel training.
80. See generally David P. Metzger & Christopher R. Yukins, Using Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Streamline Contract Claims, CONT. MGMT., Jan. 1999, at 4, 5
(suggesting the ease of ADR allows parties to find common ground and use more
remedies than litigation); Joseph McDade, Resolving Contract Disputes Through the Use
of ADR: Filling the Information Void, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 1998, at 7 (“[I]t
appears the emphasis on ADR use. . . may be leading to a quiet reinvention of
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81

and, conceptually, reflects an
the procurement process
improvement in the way the Government interacts with its current
82
and prospective contractors. The statistical significance of increased
ADR usage is difficult to measure in this context. Because the data
discussed above tracks docketed matters, once a matter is docketed, it
is not relevant whether that matter subsequently is resolved through


dispute resolution procedures.”); Frank Carr et al., The Untapped Potential of ADR in
the Construction Industry, 42 FED. LAW. 32, 34 (1995) (“[A construction dispute] lends
itself to resolution by an experienced arbitrator or mediator, who can help the
parties cut through and resolve such issues of interpretation and allocation.”).
As a general rule, I strongly support most of the agencies’ initiatives in this regard.
As discussed infra note 82, however, I harbor at least two reservations regarding the
lionization of alternative dispute resolution and the demonization of litigation.
(1) With ADR, public access to and scrutiny of settlements is greatly diminished. I
find this particularly troubling given the number of experienced agency counsel that
express their belief that their agencies today willingly pay out larger settlements to
comply with the “spirit” of ADR. (2) As more matters are resolved outside of
established adjudicatory settings, tribunals decide—and in so doing, publish—fewer
decisions. The value of precedent generally, and specifically in a highly regulated
system, cannot be overstated. In a regime where hordes of buyers, sellers, and
counsel utilize standard solicitation provisions and contract clauses, the published,
precedential interpretation of those provisions and clauses by the boards of contract
appeals and the Court of Federal Claims serve to modulate behavior. Sealed
settlement agreements, conversely, fail to inform other buyers, sellers, or counsel of
lessons learned.
81. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-81 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (permitting an agency
to use a dispute resolution proceeding for the resolution of an issue in controversy
that relates to administrative program); 41 U.S.C. § 605(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(allowing a CO and contractor to use ADR for resolving claims); 48 C.F.R. § 33.201
(1999) (defining ADR as “any procedure or combination of procedures voluntarily
used to resolve issues in controversy without the need to resort to litigation”); id.
§ 33.204 (“Agencies are encouraged to use ADR procedures to the maximum extent
practicable.”); id. § 33.214 (1999) (explaining ADR objectives and procedures);
INTERAGENCY ADR WORKING GROUP, CONTRACT AND PROCUREMENT SECTION,
ELECTRONIC GUIDE TO FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ADR (1999), at http://www.adr.af.mil/
iadrwg.
82. As I suggest supra at note 80, one of my primary reservations with ADR is that
it typically permits dispute resolution insulated from the public’s—and similarly,
congressional—scrutiny.
Further, as discussed at length below, the increase in
alternative dispute resolution dilutes the pool of matters that result in published
opinions that provide useful precedent which informs the procurement community
of vital information regarding standard contract clauses and provisions, practices,
and policies. Also, in the context of the discussion of private attorneys general, infra
text accompanying notes 254-64, I suggest that the ADR movement—in the context
of federal purchasing and, more broadly, the business of governing—creates
externalities in terms of oversight. It is not my purpose here to divine the golden
mean between ADR and litigation, although that debate already has commenced
and, in my opinion, merits further examination. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment:
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (“To be against settlement is only to
suggest that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and for a
price it does not know it is paying.”). Similarly, I recognize the contractors, first and
foremost, are businesses, and I generally find that non-governmental disputes
(whether business-related or involving domestic relations) pose the more compelling
case for ADR. Accordingly, I would expect that individual businesses would be less
enamored with a third-party oversight mechanism than similarly situated goodgovernment advocates.
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settlements prompted by formal or informal ADR efforts, decisions by
the adjudicator, voluntary withdrawal, or other means. Because some
matters resolved through ADR are included in these statistics, it is less
likely that ADR accounts for the bulk of measured decline.
Nonetheless, it seems fair to conclude that the government’s
investment in ADR initiatives has paid some dividends.
The end of the Cold War, which stymied and then reversed the
Reagan-era defense buildup, leads to at least two potential
explanations for the decline in contract-related litigation. First, to
the extent that the defense agencies spend more than sixty percent of
83
the government’s procurement dollars, it seems reasonable to
conclude that, as the defense agencies buy less, there should be fewer
contract-related protests and disputes. Conventional wisdom suggests
that this theory might lead to different results between the protest
and disputes regimes.
For example, fewer new contracting
opportunities might increase the number of protests, as contractors
more vigorously pursue their piece of an ever-shrinking pie. At the
same time, if there are fewer contracts, there should be fewer legal
problems arising from those contracts.
Although some have
suggested that the available data supports this latter hypothesis, that
84
claim does not withstand close examination.


83. See generally Federal Procurement Report, supra note 7.
84. Statistics provided by a telephone interview and email exchange with Richard
L. Hanson, Deputy Chief Trial Attorney for the Air Force, in December, 1999,
demonstrate that there existed a direct correlation, from 1978 to 1998, between
(1) procurement appropriations in dollars and (2) the number of CDA disputes
pending at the end of the fiscal year). Hanson’s most compelling chart depicts two
lines moving in tandem—annual Air Force procurement appropriations (in billions
of dollars) and the number of Air Force disputes pending at the ASBCA. This
correlation is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, Hanson’s data is
correlated to pending cases. The docket of pending cases, as compared to new
docketings, is an inapt measure of litigation volume, particularly at the ASBCA.
Since the mid-1980s, the number of administrative judges at the ASBCA has
fluctuated dramatically, beginning with thirty-three administrative judges, and rising
to thirty-seven in the late 1980s. Since the early 1990s, however, even having
absorbed the now-defunct NASA board, the bench’s population declined steadily
due to retirements and deaths without new appointments. The Board currently has
only twenty-five administrative judges, and a number of those have amassed nearmythical reputations based upon their lack of productivity. Unlike new docketings,
the impact of individual and collective judge productivity upon the pending docket
cannot be overstated. See generally John A. Howell, The Role of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy in the Management of the Boards of Contract Appeals: From Great
Expectations to Paradise Lost, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 559, 566 (1999) (discovering seven
administrative judges that published no decisions during a one-year period).
Second, Hanson’s data has not been adjusted into constant year dollars. This badly
skews any suggested correlation, particularly because the number of filings—as
opposed to the amount sought in those suits—would not require adjustment. For
example, Hanson suggests that Congress appropriated approximately $13 billion for
Air Force procurement in 1979, compared to approximately $37 billion in 1990 and
only $17 billion in 1998. Yet, the figures look very different when grossly adjusted
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Second, the end of the Cold War led the government to
encourage, and at times subsidize, a restructuring of the defense
85
industry. This industry consolidation may have taken a toll on the
amount of litigation, particularly in the protest arena. With fewer
firms competing for certain work and former competitors now allies,
teammates, or subsidiaries, there may be fewer disappointed offerors
to challenge source selection decisions. For example, despite the
Government’s recent decision not to approve General Dynamics’s
86
attempted acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding, these firms
already share the contractual work for the Navy’s new attack
87
submarine. Less than a decade ago, these companies bitterly
88
contested the award of the early Seawolf submarine contracts.
Today, the absence of competition for scarce, yet lucrative, multibillion dollar nuclear submarine production contracts eliminates the
potential for lawsuits related to the Navy’s selection of its primary
submarine contractor(s).
Accordingly, this hypothesis can be


into constant 1998 dollars (e.g., $31.7 billion in 1979, $47.5 billion in 1990, and $17
billion in 1998). Third, through active management, the Board’s chairman can
dramatically impact the pending docket. It is more difficult for an adjudicator to
manipulate the contractor community’s initiation of suits. This does not suggest that
the administrative boards have never engaged in docketing hijinks, particularly with
regard to consolidated matters or multiple claims arising out of large, complex
contracts. For example, the chairman can alter the pending docket by prioritizing
an individual judge’s workloads to either (1) address dispositive motions that appear
likely to prevail or promptly resolve the greatest number of simple, often low-dollar
matters or, conversely (2) eschew easy cases and grind through larger, more complex
matters (often involving quantum rather than entitlement issues), some of which
may have been languishing on the docket for years, if not decades. Finally, the
correlation between procurement appropriations and CDA disputes is questionable
because throughout the 1990s, the Air Force has been one of the most aggressive
(and successful) agencies at adopting and implementing alternative dispute
resolution initiatives.
85. See Eugene Gholz & Harvey M. Sapolsky, Restructuring the Defense Industry,
INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1999/2000, at 5, 23, available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/
journals/ISEC/is24-3a.pdf (“[I]n the post-Cold-War era, the face of the defense
industry has changed dramatically[, nonetheless, the authors assert that,] despite the
changes in corporate nameplates, the mergers have not led to a true defense
industry restructuring.”); William E. Kovacic & Dennis E. Smallwood, Competition
Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Autumn
1994, at 91, 94 (“The policy challenge is to balance the necessity of industry
consolidation with the advantages of competition.”).
86. See DOD’S Opposition Squashes General Dynamics’ Bid for Newport News
Shipbuilding, 71 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 549 (Apr. 19, 1999) (noting that if DOD
approved General Dynamics Corp.’s $1.4 billion bid for Newport News Shipbuilding
Inc. it would have consolidated the Navy’s nuclear vessel construction industry into
one corporation).
87. See General Dynamics, Newport News To Split New Attack Submarine Contract, 70
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 335 (Oct. 5, 1998).
88. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 960
F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the State of Connecticut and the
Commonwealth of Virginia filed amicus curiae briefs supporting their respective
home state contractors).
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supported by this, and possibly a few additional, high-profile
anecdote(s). It is less certain whether the sum of these anecdotes
could become statistically significant.
2.

By-products of reform: Systemic changes, externalities and evolving
norms
Procurement re-invention acolytes assert that many of Steven
Kelman’s mid-1990s’ reforms individually deserve credit for the
89
diminished litigation phenomenon. Without question, numerous
specific policies that increased buyer discretion in the spirit of
90
enhancing customer satisfaction and obtaining “best value” for
agencies and taxpayers may have reduced litigation. Accordingly, a
cluster of the most relevant hypotheses follows. Further evaluation of
each potential cause takes place in the context of the particular
91
reform initiatives. Throughout this discussion, it is important to
bear in mind that, although each hypothesis has a surface plausibility,
it may be belied by the statistical evidence that the litigation atrophy
began before passage and implementation of the most significant
92
reform legislation. Yet, to the extent that we cannot distinguish the


89. The most vocal has been Kelman. “The idea of trying to win customers
through litigation, to force customers into doing business with you, is . . . somewhere
between anomalous and absurd.” Ripley, supra note 24, at 45, 49. “He thought
lawyers were a detriment to the system, that all we were interested in was gumming
up the works.” (quoting John Pachter discussing Kelman). Id. at 47.
90. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1999) (“Best value means the expected outcome of an
acquisition that, in the Government’s estimation, provides the greatest overall
benefit in response to the requirement.”).
91. It is significant that so many of the reform initiatives are implicated as causes
of the litigation decline. In a period of aggressive statutory and regulatory change, it
would be reasonable to expect the opposite—that new laws and rules would cause an
increase in litigation.
Suppose . . . that a completely new statute has just been enacted. There are
no precedents indicating how the statute is to be applied to a variety of
disputes. . . . Initially, therefore, there will be great uncertainty as to the
practical meaning of the statute. The uncertainty will increase the private
costs of negotiating out-of-court settlements of disputes resulting from
attempts to apply the statute because the outcome of the litigation over the
meaning of the statute will be difficult to predict. Hence a good deal of
litigation can be expected. . . .
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 273 (1976) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Legal
Precdent].
92. As discussed above, the decline in disputes activity had begun by 1991, and
protest activity reached its peak in 1993. Yet Congress did not pass the two primary
statutory procurement reform bills until late 1994 and 1996. The Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (signed by
the President on October 16, 1994); the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996
(FARA), Pub. L. No. 104-106, Division D, §§ 4001-4402, 110 Stat. 642, and the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1995 (ITMRA), Pub. L. No.
104-106, Division E, §§ 5001-5703, 110 Stat. 679 (1996), are now jointly known as the
Clinger-Cohen Act. Moreover, implementing regulations, subjected to notice-and-
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causes for the initial reduction from the causes that sustain the trend,
each hypothesis merits discussion.
a.

The chilling effect of contractor performance evaluations

One of Professor Kelman’s most important initiatives, and most
controversial policies in implementation, entailed the use of
contractor past performance information as an evaluation factor in
93
negotiated procurements. Professor Kelman argues that, prior to
the 1990s’ reforms, the Government viewed prospective contractors
in its vendor selections as a blank slate regardless of agencies’ prior
94
contractual dealings.
In selecting contractors, agencies failed to
reward their best contractors with a competitive advantage in
subsequent buys. Similarly, the Government rarely sanctioned
contractors for inadequate work regardless of whether costs were
overrun, delivery schedules missed, or technical requirements
degraded; poor performers were not penalized in subsequent
competitions.
Professor Kelman deemed this approach
dysfunctional, preferring the thought process utilized by consumers
and businesspeople, which was to give preferential consideration to
those businesses, and others, that performed well in the past and
avoid firms that previously disappointed the agency.
Today, as a result of Professor Kelman’s efforts, extensive
95
regulation and guidance requires agencies to formally evaluate


comment rule-making, rarely are promulgated sooner than six months after laws take
effect, and often require more than a year to become final rules. See generally 48
C.F.R. §§ 1.2 (administration), 1.5 (agency and public participation).
93.
Past performance information is relevant information, for future source
selection purposes, regarding a contractor's actions under previously
awarded contracts. It includes . . . the contractor's record of conforming to
contract requirements . . . ; the contractor's record of forecasting and
controlling costs; the contractor's adherence to contract schedules . . . ; the
contractor's history of reasonable and cooperative behavior and
commitment to customer satisfaction; and generally, the contractor's
businesslike concern for the interest of the customer.
48 C.F.R. § 42.1501. One feature that distinguishes negotiated procurements from
sealed bid transactions is the use of evaluation factors other than price. A contract
“award decision is based on evaluation factors . . . that are tailored to the acquisition.
. . . Evaluation factors . . . must—(1) Represent the key areas of importance and
emphasis to be considered in the source selection decision; and (2) Support
meaningful comparison and discrimination between and among competing
proposals.” 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(a), (b).
94. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 38, 47, 63, 93 (suggesting that during vendor
selection of newly established firms agencies could not rely on past performance,
good or bad).
95. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. PROCUREMENT POL’Y, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BEST PRACTICES FOR COLLECTING AND USING
CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION ch. 2, at 9 (2000), available at
http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/pastpeformguide.html [herein-
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contractor performance on existing contracts, collect and organize
these “report cards,” and then utilize the data in evaluating firms for
96
Although the logic underpinning the use of past
future work.
performance evaluation in public procurement is widely accepted,
97
Most
implementation has proven error-prone and controversial.
importantly for present purposes, critics of Professor Kelman’s past
performance policies assert that the risk of adversely affecting their
own past performance ratings intimidates contractors obsessed with
98
pleasing government evaluators. As a result, the private bar suggests
that the collection and evaluation of contractor past performance
data discourages contractors from pressing legitimate contract
99
disputes. The prospects of a negative, or less than stellar, past
performance report card increase contractors’ litigation opportunity
costs and chill contractors’ willingness to exercise due process rights,
whether competing for new contracts or facing efforts to resolve
disputes on existing work. The GAO has warned agencies of the
chilling effect upon contractors prompted by the Government’s


after BEST PRACTICES].
96. See 41 U.S.C. § 405(j) (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c)(3)(ii) (1999) (“past
performance shall be evaluated in all source selections for negotiated competitive
acquisitions issued on or after January 1, 1999, for acquisitions expected to exceed
$100,000”); id. § 42.1502(a) (“agencies shall prepare an evaluation of contractor
performance for each contract . . . in excess of $100,000 . . . at the time the work
under the contract is completed. In addition, interim evaluations should be
prepared . . . to provide curent information for source selection purposes, for
contracts with a period of performance . . . exceeding one year. . . . The content and
format of the performance evaluations . . . should be tailored to the size, content,
and complexity of the contractual requirements.”).
97. Proponents laud increased use of past performance information, because
(1) contractors appear more focused upon customer satisfaction; and (2) source
selection officials have stronger tools to avoid awarding contracts to mediocre
contractors. See generally Steven Kelman & Mathew Blum, Past Performance As An
Evaluation Factor—Strengthening the Government’s Best Value Decisions, 38 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 463, at 3 (Oct. 2, 1996) (defending the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy’s position on past performance); Timothy P. Malishenko, Using
Past Performance Results in Better Value and Improved Performance, CONT. MGMT., Dec.
1996, at 23 (explaining the primary goal of past performance); David Muzio, Past
Performance: What We Thought We Said and What We Need to Say, CONT. MGMT., June
1995, at 27 (arguing that selecting a contractor based on an elaborate proposal to
achieve good performance does not ensure good performance, but settles for
mediocrity).
98. See John Cibinic, Customer Relations: Valid Procurement Tool, Means for Extortion,
Or Open Door To Cronyism?, 10 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 37, at 109 (July 1996)
(discussing improper uses of customer satisfaction in past performance); John S.
Pachter & Jonathan D. Shaffer, Past Performance as an Evaluation Factor—Opening
Pandora’s Box, 38 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 280, at 3 (June 12, 1996) (criticizing the
exclusive use of past performance).
99. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 405(j) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring the
administrator of an agency to establish past performance guidelines); 48 C.F.R.
§ 15.304(c) & 42.15 (1999) (requiring past performance to be an evaluation factor in
source selections).

SCHOONERJCI-CONTRACT.DOC

658

7/23/2001 12:20 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:627
100

and recent
broadened use of past performance evaluations,
101
guidance has attempted to constrain improper behavior.
Nonetheless, contractors have legitimate cause to be wary of the
102
Enough
ramifications of suing the Government in this regard.
practitioners and executives have voiced this concern to convince me
that past performance evaluation has chilled litigation, although it is
unclear to what extent.
b.

Task and delivery vehicles: End user enthusiasm for anti-competitive
behavior
Another likely explanation for the decline in litigation is the
103
burgeoning use of new contracting vehicles, spawned by the 1990s’
procurement reforms that specifically limit contractors’ protest
rights. Surely the most dramatic example has been the proliferation
104
of multiple award indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts,
known in the trade as ID/IQ’s, and at times referred to as umbrella
contracts. These vehicles facilitate the Government’s purchase of
varying amounts of supplies or services during a fixed period, within
specified limits that are expressed in terms of numbers of units or as
105
dollar values. Deliveries or performance of the above contracts are


100. See, e.g., AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Comp. Gen. B-282271, June 21,
1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 5, at 6 n.5 (“[A]bsent some evidence of abuse of process, agencies
should not lower a firm’s past performance evaluation solely on its having filed
claims. Contract claims, like bid protests, constitute remedies established by statute
and regulation, and firms should not be prejudiced in competing for contracts
because of their reasonable pursuit of such remedies in the past.”); Nova Group,
Comp. Gen. B-282947, Sept. 15, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 56, at 9 (“We think that it would
be improper for contracting agencies to impose evaluation penalties merely for an
offeror’s having availed itself of the contract claims process, such as occurred here;
imposing such penalties would create barriers to legal remedies created by
Congress.”).
101. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 95, at 22-23 (“The source selection team
should be cautious not to downgrade or penalize offerors for the judicious use of the
contract claims process.”).
102. This is analogous to performance under award-fee type contracts, where “the
contractor’s fee will be determined largely by an award given periodically by a highranking official in the procuring agency.” CIBINIC & NASH, FORMATION, supra note
34, at 1148-49. One downside to such a subjective incentive scheme “is the potential
for the [award-fee] contractor to follow Government directions without challenge.”
Id.
103. See John A. Howell, Governmentwide Agency Contracts: Vehicle Overcrowding on the
Procurement Highway, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 395, 427 (1998) (“[F]ederal buyers today
face a bewildering array of choices in determining which contractual vehicles will
best meet agency requirements.”).
104. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(c) (1999) (providing administrative preferences for
multiple award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts).
105. See id. § 16.501-2. This explains that:
There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts: Definite-quantity
contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity contracts. The
appropriate type of indefinite-delivery contract may be used to acquire
supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of
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scheduled by placing orders directly with the contractor.
The Government’s use of indefinite-quantity contracts is not new.
Now, however, the congressional preference is for making multiple
awards of indefinite-quantity contracts that use a single solicitation for
the same or similar supplies or services to two or more previously
106
identified sources. Less than a decade ago, the goods and services
obtained through these individual task or delivery orders represented
hotly contested individual procurements. Today, part and parcel of
the multiple award, indefinite-quantity contract, is the ability to by107
pass time consuming “full and open competition,” which, for more
than fifteen years, has set the defining standard for award of most
government contracts.
Because Congress expected that there would be robust
competition under this regime, its legislative mandate bars
contractors from protesting award decisions for individual task or
delivery orders; the theory was that protests would be superfluous in
108
the anticipated hyper-competitive environment. As a result, despite
109
the fact that competition proved to be chimerical, the contract

future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. . . .
[R]equirements contracts and indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as
delivery order contracts or task order contracts.

Id.
106. See id. § 16.504(c).
107. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2701, 98 Stat.
494, 1175 (1984) [hereinafter CICA].
108. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(a)(7) (1999) (“No protest under [FAR] Subpart 33.1 is
authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of an order under a
task order contract or delivery order contract except for a protest on the grounds
that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract.”).
109. In principle, up-front competition is conducted for the initial multiple-award
contracts; contractors were supposed to compete to become part of an umbrella
contract, which offers them little more than the opportunity to compete for
individual task or delivery orders. Unfortunately, this anticipated competition rarely
materializes at this stage and agencies frequently include all comers on the contract
vehicle. This should not surprise, to the extent that inclusion on the contract is no
more than an opportunity to compete, akin to a “hunting license.” But real
competition does not take place at the task-order stage either. Because all “contract
holders” are permitted to market their services directly to individual agencies, those
agencies—affected by considerations including speed, convenience, personal
preference, and human nature—frequently obtain those services on a sole source or
non-competitive basis from those possessing these hunting licenses. As a result,
legitimate competition infrequently occurs. See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-56, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: FEW COMPETING
PROPOSALS FOR LARGE DOD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORDERS 4 (2000) (“Most of
the 22 large orders we reviewed were awarded without competing proposals having
been received . . . Only one proposal was received in 16 of the 22 cases—the 16 cases
all involved incumbent contractors and represented about $444 million . . .”); see also
48 C.F.R. § 6.003 (1999) (“Sole source acquisition means a contract for the purchase
of supplies or services that is entered into or proposed to be entered into by an
agency after soliciting and negotiating with only one source.”). As a result, this
popular, time-saving purchasing methodology proliferates despite its failure to
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vehicles insulate an ever increasing piece of the procurement pie
from meaningful competition and, of equal significance, denies the
Government, contractors, and the public of third-party oversight of
this spending. Accordingly, this proliferation of contract vehicles
appears to be a credible explanation for at least some portion of the
protest decline.
c.

Commercial buying practices: Flexibility at the expense of oversight

Other reforms, which have expanded the use of flexible,
commercial-like purchases, permit large classes of transactions to
110
The most
escape scrutiny and avoid competition and oversight.
dramatic example entails the widespread use of the Government’s
111
The streamlined procedures available under the
purchase card.
simplified acquisition threshold also merit examination in this
112
context.
It may seem strange that the Government only began widespread
113
use of conventional credit cards for purchasing in the last decade.


comply with congressional intent. Professor John Cibinic described the current
situation as “virtual anarchy.” See John Cibinic, Jr., Task and Delivery Order Contracting:
Congress Speaks, GAO Reports, and the FAR Does a Fan Dance, 14 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
¶ 32 (June 2000) (“It is obvious that Congress smells something fishy but doesn’t
quite know what to do about it.”). See also John Cibinic, Task and Delivery Order
Contracts: The Pot is Boiling, 13 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 18 (Mar. 1999) (criticizing the
FAR for failing to provide guidance on the use of task and delivery order contracts).
Congress took an unimpressive stab at tightening the reins on these vehicles in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, directing that the Federal
Acquisition Regulation “be revised to provide guidance to agencies on the
appropriate use of task order and delivery order contracts . . .” Pub. L. No. 106-65,
§ 804, 113 Stat. 512, 704 (1999). Unfortunately, the revised rule fails to cure what ails
the process. See generally 65 Fed. Reg. 24,317 (Apr. 25, 2000) (to be codified, inter
alia, at 48 C.F.R. pt. 16) (providing the text of the final rule amending the FAR).
110. This is not true of all commercial purchases, many of which remain subject to
scrutiny both by government auditors and by private attorneys general. See Ron R.
Hutchinson, The Government’s Audit and Investigative Powers over Commercial Item
Contracts and Subcontracts, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 264 (1998) (arguing that the
government’s “potent arsenal of audit and investigative powers . . . have frustrated
the commercial item reform efforts”); Linda S. Lebowitz, Bid Protest Issues Arising in
Commercial Item Acquisition, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 429 (1998).
111. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 13.301 (1999).
112. See generally Pub. L. No. 103-355, §§ 4001, 4201, 108 Stat. 3243, 3338, 3342
(1994) (defining and describing the simplified acquisition procedures); 48 C.F.R.
§ 13.301 (1999) (delineating the simplified acquisition protocol). “Simplified
acquisition threshold means $100,000, except that in the case of any contract to be
awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, outside the United States in
support of a contingency operation . . . or a humanitarian or peacekeeping
operation . . . , the term means $200,000.” Id. § 2.101 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). Simplified acquisition procedures are intended to: “(a) Reduce
administrative costs; (b) Improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, and
women-owned small business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Government
contracts; (c) Promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and (d) Avoid
unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors.” Id. § 13.002.
113. The Government has long used plastic purchase or charge cards for
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Once Congress authorized government employees to harness the
convenience of consumer-type buying, however, the practice spread
like wildfire. The congressionally created $2,500 micro-purchase
114
authority is the real catalyst credited with accelerating government
115
purchase card usage. Below that threshold, buyers may ignore the
Government’s normal procurement rules and procedures, which
mandate transparency and competition. In Fiscal Year 1999, more
than 500,000 government employees spent in excess of five percent
116
of all Federal procurement dollars (more than $10 billion) without:
(1) risk of protest; (2) full and open competition for the business;
(3) use of standard solicitation provisions and contract clauses; and
117
118
(4) visibility in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).


employee travel and fleet use (e.g., gasoline purchases), but has not permitted use of
charge cards for the general procurement function. Instead, for small purchases the
Government primarily relied upon purchase orders or its equivalent of petty cash,
known as the “imprest fund.” Id. § 13.001. The imprest fund is a “cash fund of a
fixed amount established by an advance of funds, without charge to an
appropriation, from an agency finance or disbursing officer to a duly appointed
cashier, for disbursement as needed from time to time in making payment in cash
for relatively small amounts.” Id.
114. See id. § 2.101 (“Micro-purchase means an acquisition of supplies or services
(except construction), the aggregate amount of which does not exceed $2,500,
except that in the case of construction, the limit is $2,000. Micro-purchase threshold
means $2,500.”) (emphasis in original). See generally 41 U.S.C. § 428 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998) (describing procedures applicable to purchases below the micro-purchase
threshold); 48 C.F.R. §§ 13.201, 13.202 (1999) (providing general information and
purchasing guidelines for purchases at or below the micro-purchase threshold); Pub.
L. No. 103-355, § 1054, 108 Stat. 3243, 3261 (1994) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 253h
(1994)).
115. See 48 C.F.R. § 13.001 (1999) (defining “Government-wide commercial
purchase card” as “a purchase card, similar in nature to a commercial credit card,
issued to authorized agency personnel to use to acquire and to pay for supplies and
services.”). See generally 48 C.F.R. § 13.301(a) & (c) (1999) (describing the nature
and uses of government purchase cards). The card is also known as the international
merchant purchase authorization card (IMPAC).
116. This entails more than twenty million transactions per year. See generally
Steven L. Schooner & Neil Whiteman, Purchase Cards and Micro-Purchases: Sacrificing
Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency, 9 PUB.
PROCUREMENT L. REV. 148 (2000) (offering an extensive examination of the
proliferation of purchase card activity).
117. Readers may find this surprising given the reasoned perception that financial
institutions possess powerful information technology tools, such as the now
ubiquitous point-of-sale terminals connected to inventory systems, capable of
tracking, organizing, and capitalizing upon data related to purchase card
transactions. In 1998, agencies had the opportunity to select from a number of card
vendors—financial institutions vying for the opportunity to provide cards to tens of
thousands of deputized buyers within each agency. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET & OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY REPORT, AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACTIVITY IN PROCUREMENT (1998), available at
http://policyworks.gov/org/main/me/epic/assessment.html.
In February 1998, GSA awarded a government-wide multiple award task
order contract for the next generation of purchase cards. This contract
(which takes effect in November 1998) will allow agencies to select a service
provider to help reengineer and integrate business practices related to
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Purchases above the micro-purchase threshold, but below the
separate simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000, are not free
119
from all government procurement rules and procedures. Yet, they
still offer substantial insulation from the normal time-consuming
competition and transparency-related requirements. Accordingly,
these streamlined procedures also increase efficiency at the expense
of public notice and, as a result, competition and oversight.
The defining characteristics of many of these actions is that the
contracting officer: (1) need only “promote competition to the
120
maximum extent practicable”; (2) can limit the competition to as
121
few as three vendors “within the local trade area”; (3) may “solicit
122
quotations orally to the maximum extent practicable”; and (4) in
123
certain circumstances, solicit from a single source. Contrasted with
the Government’s typical policy of broadly advertising its
124
procurements, fewer firms are aware of, or realize they missed the


purchase, travel-related payment services, and fleet services. These program
enhancements will give agencies access to multi-functional ‘smart’ cards, as
opposed to single purpose ‘charge’ cards. These increased capabilities will lead
to better management through greater and easier access to information, continued
cost savings, additional flexibility, increased accountability, and more
streamlined operations.
Id. (emphasis added).
Not surprisingly, these decisions turned less on the reputation of the individual
financial institution and more on the package of card-related services and benefits
offered. In this context, the key choice for agencies typically was between higher
rebates or smart-card technological features. Despite the potential benefits of smartcard technology in terms of oversight, accountability, and management, agencies
overwhelmingly eschewed these high technology options for marginally higher
rebates. Short-term cash trumped investment in long-term command and controltype technology solutions. This seems penny-wise and pound foolish.
118. The FPDS provides statistical data at the time of contract award or inception
about Federal Executive Branch procurement contract transactions. Contrasted with
the extensive information provided for most procurements, the FPDS provides only
summary data on purchase card transactions—no more than the number of
transactions and dollars spent by individual agencies. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 405(d)(4)(A),
417 (1994) (mandating the establishment of an automated system for collecting,
evaluating, and disseminating information about Federal procurement contracts).
See generally Federal Procurement Data Systems, U.S. Government Acquisition Statistics,
at http://fpds.gsa.gov/fpds/fpds.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (providing on-line
access to FPDS statistics from 1979-2000). It appears that the Defense Department is
moving in the direction of at least attempting to remedy this situation. See generally 65
Fed. Reg. 39,707 (June 27, 2000) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 204) (including, for
the first time, “[p]urchases made using the Governmentwide commercial purchase
card” in the definition of “contracting action”).
119. See supra note 112 (delineating and citing statutory requirements for
government contracts with values falling between the micro-purchase threshold and
simplified acquisition threshold).
120. 48 C.F.R. § 13.104 (1999).
121. Id. § 13.104(b).
122. Id. § 13.106-1(c).
123. Id. § 13.106-1(b) (conditioning single-source solicitation on a determination
that only one source is reasonably available).
124. For other purchases, the Government publicizes its pending requirements in
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opportunity to compete for, the large number of Federal purchases
under the $100,000 simplified acquisition threshold. Absent notice
of the purchasing action, contractors—even if they could offer a
superior product or price—lack the opportunity to compete or
subsequently challenge the Government’s actions. There is little
doubt that expanded, simplified purchasing leads to less litigation—
both in terms of protests and disputes. It remains difficult, however,
to quantify that impact.
d.

Increased discretion suggests less arbitrary and capricious behavior

At a more macro level, critics of the acquisition reform movement
condemn the increase in contracting officer discretion that served as
125
Acquisition reform
the reform movement’s rallying cry.
proponents hail this broadened discretion, asserting that the
Government’s anticipated efficiency gains from the recent reforms
depend upon contracting officers’ abilities to exercise business
judgment rather than blindly follow rules. As the statutory and
regulatory scheme more loosely prescribes the breadth of permissible
activities, potential litigants face greater hurdles in proving that
buyers’ actions were arbitrary, capricious, or outside the scope of
their duties. In an era of seemingly unfettered contracting officer
discretion, and faced with what they perceive as a dismal likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, prospective litigants are discouraged from
initiating litigation to challenge agencies’ source selection
126
decisions. For example, experience suggests that it was reasonable
to expect increased protest activity following the high-profile rewrite
of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15, which prescribed
127
the rules for negotiated procurements.
The FAR Part 15 revisions

print and on the Internet through the CBD. See generally id. § 5.101(a)(1) (requiring
dissemination of contracts exceeding $25,000 in value in the Commerce Business
Daily); United States Department of Commerce, Commerce Business Daily, at
http://cbdnet.gpo.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (providing on-line access to the
CBD).
125. As discussed above, the title of his book indicates that increasing buyers’
discretion was the keystone of Steve Kelman’s rhetorical message. See generally
KELMAN, supra note 1 (discussing Kelman’s reform of the public procurement
process).
126. I can only offer anecdotal evidence on this point. A number of experienced,
respected members of the protest bar have suggested to me that, in light of the
above-referenced reforms and the perception that the source selection officials enjoy
greater discretion, they have revised their assessment of the likelihood of prevailing
upon the merits of specific matters and, accordingly, more frequently counsel their
clients to forego filing protests.
127. See Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-02, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,224 (Sept. 30,
1997) (providing the text of the FAR Part 15 re-write). The revised rule became
effective on October 10, 1997. See id. Many agencies, however, delayed its
implementation until January 1, 1998. FACs are the formal amendments to the FAR
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represent the most significant revamping of the competition rules in
more than a decade. But the wave of protests never materialized,
most likely because the revised regulation’s hallmark was increased
contracting officer discretion. Contractors and litigators continue to
perceive that increased discretion in purchasing reduces the
likelihood that protests will succeed. Still, at this point, only
anecdotal evidence, primarily obtained by word of mouth, supports
this hypothesis.
e.

Unsatisfying forum shopping?

The most pessimistic rationalizations are rarely voiced for
attribution. Some contractors, and the counsel that represent them,
confess that they have lost faith in the adjudicative forums’ ability to
enforce the fundamental precepts of the procurement system. The
GAO and the courts grant or recommend relief only in a small
128
number of protests. Without the GSBCA, a more protestor-friendly
forum, enthusiasm for protests may have waned. In the disputes
arena, as we enter the third decade of CDA practice, experienced
practitioners bemoan that the boards no longer offer an inexpensive,


System and can be accessed via the FAR web site. See Federal Acquisition Regulation
Home Page, at http://www.arnet.gov/far/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
For additional discussion of the FAR Part 15 revisions, see John Cibinic & Ralph C.
Nash, Award Without Discussion: The Flexibility in the New FAR, 12 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
¶ 13 (Mar. 1998); John S. Pachter et al., Feature Comment: Source Selection Provisions of
the FAR Part 15 Rewrite—A Train Wreck Avoided, 39 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 578 (Dec.
1997); Ralph C. Nash, Jr., The FAR Part 15 Rewrite: A Final Scorecard, 11 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 63 (Dec. 1997) (identifying three improvements in the rewrite:
(1) “[b]etter guidance on the types of communications permitted during acquisition
planning”; (2) “[b]etter guidance on the evaluation process”; and (3) an
“[i]mproved statement of the ‘discussions’ rule”).
128. Historically, the GAO recommends relief in fewer than 10% of the protests
filed. During the late 1990s, the protest bar was surprised to see their success (or
“sustain”) rate begin to climb to 12% in Fiscal Year 1997, then 16% in Fiscal Year
1998. When, in Fiscal Year 1999, the GAO protest sustain rate exceeded 20% for the
first time in recent memory, the GAO struggled to explain—and attempted to
downplay—its rising sustain rate. See generally Bid Protests: GAO Protests Continue
Downward; ADR Use, Success Increase, 72 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 562 (Nov. 15, 1999).
The rising sustain rate, particularly when superimposed against reduced protest
activity, could suggest better self-censorship on the part of the protest bar. More
cynical observers posit that the rising sustain rate reflects the GAO’s perception that
better results may spur new business. The GAO’s self-preservation instinct might be
stimulated by fears associated with the prolonged downturn in protest activity and
concerns regarding the future viability of the forum. In any event, these numbers
seem inconsistent with the “50% trial hypothesis,” which suggests that plaintiffs
should prevail approximately half of the time regardless of the adjudicator or the
substantive legal standard. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984), discussed in Jonathan T. Molot,
How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955,
1007 n.195 (1998).
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An almost
efficient, and expedited dispute resolution option.
inexplicable chasm exists between the boards’ current role, as a
parallel, quasi-judicial, and at times, indistinguishable, alternative to
the Court of Federal Claims, and their original purpose, which was to
130
resolve contract matters on behalf of the agency head. As discussed
at length below, the protest and disputes systems were designed to
ensure that litigants could pursue matters with minimal costs of entry,
invest reasonable amounts of resources, and expect prompt and fair
results. As the bar and contractor community doubt these premises,
131
their inclination to commence litigation wanes.


129. See generally, e.g., C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is It
Time to Roll Back Sovereign Immunity?, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 545 (1999) (discussing the
impact of sovereign immunity under the CDA as giving the government an unfair
advantage that more remedies should be available to private contractors against the
government); John A. Howell, The Role of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the
Management of the Boards of Contract Appeals: From Great Expectations to Paradise Lost?, 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 559 (1999) (asserting that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
has failed in its obligation to monitor the boards in their duty to provide an informal
and expeditious forum for the resolution of contract disputes); Steven L. Schooner,
What Next? A Heuristic Approach to Revitalizing the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 28 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 635 (1999) (purporting that the current dissatisfaction with the system
under the CDA, as evidenced by the decrease in litigation, compels a new discussion
as to what changes must be made to improve efficiency). But see generally, e.g.,
Clarence Kipps et al., The Contract Disputes Act: Solid Foundation, Magnificent System, 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 585 (1999) (applauding the success of the system established under
the CDA and the Federal Courts Administration Act and commending the fair and
reasonable forum that was created for resolving disputes); Nicholas “Chip” P. Retson
& Craig S. Clarke, Overjudicialization of the Contract Disputes Process: Fact or Fiction, 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 613 (1999) (offering a qualitative analysis of the system established
under the CDA and concluding that assertions of complexity and inefficiency are
inaccurate).
130. See generally 2 RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
LAW 2037 (3d ed. 1980) (citing Joel P. Shedd, Jr., Disputes and Appeals: The Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1964) (setting forth a
discussion of the purposes, procedures and jurisdiction of the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals)). Shedd, then a member of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, articulated purposes such as: (1) ensuring that “accomplishment
of the military mission will not be frustrated by a dispute with [a] contractor”;
(2) providing “a means of settling disputes fairly and expeditiously without the
expense of an action at law[,]” and (3) furthering “harmonious relations with its
contractors.” Shedd, supra, at 39-40. The Senate Report accompanying the CDA was
prescient in identifying a paradox. “The aim of any remedial system is to give the
parties what is due them as determined by a thorough, impartial, speedy, and
economical adjudication. However, it is difficult to be economical, yet thorough;
thorough, yet speedy.” S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5247.
131. John Janacek, the Air Force’s leading civilian contracts attorney, suggests a
more cheerful scenario. Janacek correctly identifies the massive volume of
jurisdictional litigation that followed the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)). Janacek has suggested to me that after twelve years of aggressively testing the
parameters of the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, there simply are fewer
issues remaining to be decided. Although I concede that the Boards of Contract
Appeals confront fewer jurisdictional issues today, I am not persuaded that this
phenomenon is reflected in a drop in new filings. This is not to say that greater
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The False Claims Act: Proliferation of compliance pitfalls

Finally, a small but vocal cadre asserts that, during the 1980s, the
Federal procurement system became so criminalized, and the
associated penalties so severe, that the risks inherent in the mere
exercise of due process rights became too great, and, accordingly,
132
contractors are discouraged from pursuing otherwise valid claims.
The most frequently cited example of the criminalization trend is the
133
False Claims Act, which is frequently ridiculed as a bounty hunter


jurisdictional clarity does not reduce the boards’ workload; it does. Rather, it
suggests that given their nature, few of the jurisdictional issues alter the number of
disputes that the boards actually docket. See, e.g., infra note 237. For example, the
most successful certification challenges resulted in matters being dismissed without
prejudice, thus delaying, rather than foreclosing, the eventual adjudication of the
matter.
132. The private attorneys general concept has been vilified by certain segments
of the contractor community in light of the qui tam provisions of the False Claims
Act Amendments of 1986. A wealth of literature suggests that the False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994), coupled with burdensome statutory and regulatory
compliance requirements, deters commercial firms from participating in
government procurement. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a
Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201,
205 (1998) [hereinafter Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation] (suggesting that “CFCA
contractors regard this “oversight as a costly, substantial burden of doing business
with the government”).
133. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). The False Claims Act gives “the government
remedies against parties that process false claims, . . . and is commonly used to
address fraudulent conduct by contractors.” NASH ET AL., REFERENCE BOOK, supra
note 34, at 231; see also Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(stating that, “[t]he purpose of the False Claims Act is . . . to discourage fraud against
the government.”). The False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562,
100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (1994)), affected all
aspects of the False Claims Act. The amendments decreased the level of intent
required to knowingly defraud the government, decreased the burden of proof to
“preponderance of evidence” rather than “clear and convincing,” expanded the role
of the relator and the class of relators that may file a qui tam proceeding, increased
the damages and penalties for filing a false claim, increased the percentage that a
relator receives upon a successful false claims allegation, gave relators protection
from retaliation by employers for their whistleblower activity, and expanded the
statute of limitations to file a qui tam suit. See Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie,
Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims
Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 27 (1998). These reforms were intended “to cure two
perceived agency problems: that contractors exploit private information to shirk
their commitments to government customers, and that government law enforcement
bodies fail to attack fraud as aggressively as taxpayers would prefer.” William E.
Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1806 (1996) [hereinafter Kovavcic, Whistleblower Bounty
Lawsuits]; see also United States ex rel. Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509, 1511 (8th
Cir. 1994) (defining the purpose of the False Claims Act: “to promote private citizen
involvement in exposing fraud against the government, while at the same time
prevent[ing] parasitic suits by opportunistic late-comers who add nothing to the
exposure of the fraud”). The qui tam provision grants a person, subject to the
limitations in section 3730(e), to “bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729
of . . . [T]itle [31] for the person and for the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(1) (1994). This provision was intended to help the government uncover
fraudulent activity. See Virginia C. Theis, Note, Government Employees as Qui Tam
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134

For contractors, one of the most intimidating features of
statute.
135
the False Claims Act is the rapidly multiplying monetary remedies.
A broad range of critics deride the False Claims Act as a disgruntled
employee’s retirement subsidization act or simply a vehicle for
136
parasitic actions. Although the False Claims Act originally sought to


Plaintiffs: Subverting the Purposes of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 227
(1999) (discussing the history of the False Claims Act and asserting that the qui tam
provision was intended to aid the government in stopping fraud by providing the
incentive of half the damages collected to relators). The Department of Justice
(DOJ), representing the United States, has the option to prosecute the claim
themselves or allow the relator to continue the suit. See NASH ET AL., REFERENCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 430. In return for the relator’s disclosure, the relator is
granted a “monetary recovery” consisting of a percentage of the successful damage
award ranging from ten to thirty percent, dependent upon the relator’s involvement
in the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (establishing the
circumstances under which a person originally bringing an action under § 3730(b)
of the Act will be awarded a percentage of the settlement of the claim); NASH ET AL.,
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 430. Additionally, qui tam relators enjoy whistleblower protection from retaliation by the employer. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994);
NASH ET AL., REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 430; see also Raspanti & Laigaie, supra,
at 45, 47 (explaining that industries feel threatened by the qui tam provision because
it serves as an incentive for any employee to become a whistleblower and act against
the interests of the employer).
134. See generally Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits, supra note 133, at 1821-41
(describing the False Claims Act qui tam suits as “bounty-hunter” lawsuits; discussing
the potential advantages and disadvantages of the Act to government procurement;
and criticizing qui tam relators as motivated by the cash award following a successful
qui tam action). But see Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do
Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37
VILL. L. REV. 273, 325-26 (1992) (suggesting that the fear of meritless claims
motivated by greed are unfounded for a host of reasons).
135. See Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2(7), 100 Stat. 3153, 3153 (1986) (codified at 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (establishing that the penalties under the
False Claim Act consist of: (1) fines ranging from $5,000 to $10,000 per false claim;
(2) a fine of three times the amount of damages sustained by the government from
the false claim; and (3) the relator’s attorney’s fees and expenses); see also Kovacic,
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits, supra note 133, at 1818-19 (reiterating the penalties for
violating the False Claims Act). Because contractors may submit routine invoices for
payment, they are exposed to potentially staggering penalties. See Frederick M.
Morgan, Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, The Last Privateers Encounter Sloppy Seas:
Inconsistent Original Source Jurisprudence Under the Federal False Claims Act, 24 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 163, 167 & n.29 (1998) (expanding on the notion that penalties for false
claims under the Act are severe by demonstrating that when contractors must submit
multiple claims, such as a Medicare provider, such penalties are substantially
greater); Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. REV.
935, 944-46 (1993) (discussing how the 1986 Amendments resulted in an increase in
the penalties for false claims as well as an increase in the recovery to a relator
bringing a valid claim); Carl L. Vacketta & Dorn C. McGrath, III, Procurement Reforms
of the 99th Congress: False Claims Amendments Act, BRIEFING PAPERS 86-13 (Dec. 1986).
136. Parasitic actions typically refer to suits filed based on publicly available
information, where the relator lacks first hand knowledge of the fraud. The 1986
Amendments sought to limit parasitic actions by disqualifying any suit when
information has already been subject to public disclosure, with an exception for
“original sources.” See Morgan & Popham, supra note 135, at 168-69 (defining
“original sources” as those who have direct or independent knowledge of the
information); Purcell, supra note 135, at 941-43 (noting that the original source
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minimize fraud within the government, over time opponents have
hypothesized that the Act chilled contractors’ willingness to pursue
137
otherwise valid claims. Despite significant investments in enhanced
internal compliance programs during the late 1980s and throughout
138
the 1990s, firms fear that filing claims, and later, litigating disputes,
may expose them to Government counter-claims for potentially
139
minor, yet undetected, accounting or reporting errors. Contractors


doctrine in the 1986 Amendments prohibits suits based on publicly disclosed
information unless the party bringing the suit had independent knowledge of the
information). Contractors fear an army of potential whistle-blowers within their
ranks, keeping a close watch for lucrative windfall at the company’s expense. See
Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits, supra note 133, at 1819 (describing a group of
employees who may have great incentive to bring a qui tam suit as those who have
been laid off or who see little room for advancement in their current employment);
Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 133, at 45 (outlining efforts by industry groups to
eliminate the qui tam suit out of concern for its effect on those industries that rely
on government contracts).
137. See, e.g., Theis, supra note 133, at 225; see also United States ex rel. Rabushka v.
Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509, 1511 (8th Cir. 1994); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp.
266, 269 (N.D. Ill. 1993). I believe that, to some extent, the False Claims Act chills
the pursuit of contractor claims and, accordingly, reduces the volume of disputes
litigation. The private bar suggests that the False Claims Act chills disputes litigation,
rather than protest litigation. Yet, as Kovacic and I have discussed, I do not accept
the contractor community’s broader assertions regarding the apocalyptic impact of
the qui tam provisions. Specifically, I do not perceive the False Claims Act as a
significant barrier to entry with regard to firms’ willingness to do any business at all
with the Federal Government. I am not persuaded that any significant number of
commercial firms refuse to do business with the government based solely upon fear
of the False Claims Act. In a number of instances in which anecdotal evidence has
been put forward on this issue, further examination has found the facts wanting. For
example, a popular myth described the refusal of Microsoft to do business with the
Government based upon fears of False Claims Act and compliance pitfalls. To the
extent that legions of government employees use Microsoft products daily,
something apparently was missing from the story. Minimal research uncovered that
Microsoft does not sell directly to anyone (except for distributors and retailers).
Thus, it makes perfect sense that Microsoft would not sell directly to the Federal
Government. In the larger context, despite the False Claims Act, innumerable firms
continue to aggressively pursue the Federal Government’s procurement dollars. As
Kovacic concedes, “it would be an exaggeration to say that . . . oversight, standing
alone, commonly induces firms to deal solely in the commercial arena. It is doubtful
that any single attribute of the procurement regulatory system has that discouraging effect.”
Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation, supra note 132, at 239 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Kenneth Penska & Khi V. Thai, Regulation vs. Self-Governed Compliance
in Government Procurement: The Perceived Impact of DII, 12 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. &
FIN. MGT. 462, 467-69 (2000) (discussing the impact of the “Defense Industry
Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct” on the management of the defense
industry).
139. See Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation, supra note 132, at 211.
The [False Claims Act’s] impact on contractor behavior depends crucially on
what conduct constitutes a false claim. Implementation of the 1986 . . .
amendments has coincided with a major expansion of the types of conduct
that may be regarded as fraudulent. . . . [F]irst is a large increase . . . of
contractor duties under existing statutes such as the Truth in Negotiations
Act . . . . [Second] . . . is the creation of new regulatory requirements whose
infraction may constitute a false claim. . . . [M]any public procurement
commands . . . compel contractors to certify [compliance]. . . . [E]ach
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performing fixed-price contracts may perceive potential pitfalls
inherent in claim preparation, particularly disclosure requirements
140
Contractors
mandated by the Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA).
“perceive that the [False Claims Act] enables the government to
convert what in the commercial world would be simple contract
disputes into fraud allegations and to use the threat or prosecution of
fraud-based claims to obtain settlements that could not be attained in
141
commercial practice.” Accordingly, these contractors may abandon
or settle claims rather than risk the audit, examination, and scrutiny
142
associated with litigating those claims.
Anecdotal evidence lends credibility to this hypothesis, and like
many of the others discussed above, limited empirical evidence
bolsters the support. From a temporal standpoint, however, this
hypothesis is appealing because it nicely correlates with the dispute
volume trend line. Unlike the mid-1990s reforms discussed above,
the key legislation here precedes the drop in litigation. The decline
in disputes begins in the 1990s, which would give the relevant parties
a few years of experience following the 1986 False Claims
Amendments before beginning to change their behavior.
As this discussion demonstrates, numerous potential causes could
explain the decrease in external monitoring performed by
prospective vendors and contractors through protest and dispute
litigation. I welcome efforts to quantify the impact of the issues
discussed above or others. Regardless of the reasons for the litigation


request for payment under a contract for which a false [or incorrect]
certificate is signed might be attacked as a false claim.
Id.; see also Thomas P. Barletta & Barbara A. Pollack, Civil Litigation of Allegations of
Fraud in Connection with Government Contract Claims, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 235, 241
(1988) (asserting failure to meet certification requirements as one of the many acts
for which a contractor may be penalized).
140. See 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1994); 41 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1994). Kovacic’s contractor
survey respondents:
used the interplay between the [False Claims Act] and the Truth in
Negotiations Act (TINA) to illustrate the possibilities for procurement
agency opportunism. . . . The likelihood that an audit can discover a TINA[]
violation for any single contract is substantial. . . . For complex programs . . .
disclosure omissions are virtually inevitable. Perfect TINA compliance may
be infeasible. . . .
Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation, supra note 132, at 227-29.
141. Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation, supra note 132, at 227.
142. Arguably, this phenomenon is analogous to lawyers’ unwillingness to pursue
fee disputes due to fear that their clients will respond with malpractice allegations.
See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys’ Fees: The Role of ADR, 46
SMU L. REV. 2005, 2017 (1993) (“The lawyer contemplating an action to recover an
unpaid fee must realize that such a suit virtually guarantees a counterclaim for
malpractice—which might take any form from the relatively commonplace allegation
that the underlying services were negligently performed, to more dramatic
accusations of misbehavior.”).
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decline, however, several issues remain clear. At least in the short
term, nothing will reverse the trend of reduced internal and external
oversight. Although the decrease in internal oversight has caused
ongoing consternation, only recently has the depth of the decreased
litigation trend been acknowledged, with mixed reactions. Individual
practice groups and boutique firms mourn the evaporation of a
business staple. Some scholars and policy makers herald a new era.
Although emeritus Professors Ralph Nash and John Cibinic opined
143
that they “don’t yet see any danger signs in these statistics[,]” I
144
Second, Professor Kelman’s
cannot share their sanguinity.


143. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Dateline January 1999, 13 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
at 1 (Jan. 1999) (discussing the decline in the number of cases heard by the ASBCA
between 1990 and 1998). Professor Cibinic and I have discussed this issue at length
and he recently responded to my earlier work regarding the role of the federal
courts in disappointed offeror litigation. See John Cibinic, Court Jurisdiction over
Award Protests: A Difference of Opinion, 14 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 38 (July 2000)
[hereinafter Cibinic, Court Jurisdiction] (addressing the role of protests in promoting
integrity in the procurement process and concluding that protests do not ensure
compliance with procurement regulations); see generally Schooner, Watching the
Sunset, supra note 43. Cibinic concedes that he and Nash “are not fans of the protest
process.” Cibinic, Court Jurisdiction, supra, at 112. He argues that the resources
invested in the protest “process could be put to better use in increased auditing of
procurement activities.” Id. I differ with Cibinic’s perception that GAO possesses
either the ability or means to meaningfully provide procurement oversight through
audit. Yet, while Cibinic and I disagree as to what potential improvements could
make the protest regime more effective, he joins with me in opposing either an
expanded Inspector General presence or “any new organization to police the
procurement system.” Id. Cibinic, however, does not oppose the presence of
litigation. He merely opposes the existing protest mechanism and its potential
injunctive remedies. Accordingly, he “favor[s] permitting disappointed offerors to
sue for lost profits as well as other damages if they are injured by agencies violating
procurement rules.” Id. Cibinic would prefer to “take the lawyers and courts out of
the procurement process and put them where they belong—dealing with money
claims.” Id. I agree that this suggestion has a certain appeal, yet I find it inconsistent
with the procurement system’s long-standing norms. Even with the regime’s obvious
efficiencies, I prefer the problem-solving aspect of injunctive protest remedies to
expenditures from the public fisc derived from the highly-speculative remedies that
grant lost profits.
144. I fear that John Pachter was as prescient as he was cynical when he remarked:
“The pendulum swings back and forth. . . . What’s going to happen now is that there
will be some abuses, and then there will be some hearings, and then congressmen
will say they’re shocked—and then there will be a new wave of legislation.” Ripley,
supra note 24, at 50. The pendulum theme—the more things change, the more they
stay the same—pervades procurement literature. “You come to the realization that,
although items have become more expensive and complicated, the procurement
process itself—with all its successes and scandals—has remained remarkably the
same.” NAGLE, supra note 23, at 517. As my colleague, Joshua Schwartz, has
observed:
As the Gore [NPR] Report illustrates, from time to time reformers in
Congress, the Executive Branch or the public at large will recognize the high
price that we pay for creating a procurement system that is so tightly
governed by rigid rules. . . . [A] counter-movement is almost inevitable. . . .
If . . . procedures are de-regulated to a sufficient degree to allow capable
procurement officials to exercise sound discretion . . . , there will also be
enough discretion so that some less capable or less honest officials will be
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fingerprints are found on many of the potential explanations for the
145
litigation decline. Accordingly, his writings and efforts bear further
examination.
III. THE TOLL OF REDUCED EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
I do not disagree with Professor Kelman’s primary policy
aspirations, and I applaud his efforts to encourage more businesslike
behavior by government buyers.
My concern lies with the
implementation of Professor Kelman’s policies in two related areas.
First, I am disappointed that Professor Kelman was a willing
accomplice to the dramatic reductions in acquisition personnel
concurrent with the implementation of his reforms, as depicted in
146
the figure below.



able to abuse their discretion in many different ways. When such abuses
inevitably emerge, they are likely to be spotlighted by the press and . . .
Congress, and a new cry for a different kind of reform will arise. Congress
will then impose new constraints and safeguards to regulate the abuses[, . . .]
recreat[ing] the environment decried by . . . Gore. . . . The cycle will . . .
repeat itself. . . . This . . . is why the public and Congress will always be dissatisfied
with the corpus of government contract law and procedure, and why change will be
perpetual.
Joshua Schwartz, Cases and Materials for a Survey of Government Procurement Law,
Vol. I, at 11 (Fall 1999) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author)
(emphasis in original). Using this metaphor, the question becomes whether the
pendulum has swung too far. I suggest that, unless some effort is undertaken to reconceptualize the Kelman vision, the system, sooner rather than later, is doomed to
repeat the scandals that permeated the public’s perception of the Government’s
buying practices in the 1980s.
145. As I suggested above, further empirical research might validate a number of
potentially synergistic or contradictory explanations. Until that research evolves, it
would be naive to conclude that the litigation decline was caused by circumstances
unrelated to the NPR initiative and the Kelman reform agenda. Rather, it seems
reasonable to conclude that much of the litigation decrease derives either from
(a) foreseeable or intended consequences of specific Kelman-era initiatives (such as
the expansion of multiple-award task order and delivery contracts and expanded use
of the purchase card for micro-purchases) or (b) unforseen side-effects of the
Kelman agenda (such as the evaluation of past performance information, broadened
commercial product purchasing, and increased purchaser discretion).
146. For example, between 1990 and 1999, the number of “accounting and
budget” personnel within the acquisition workforce fell from 17,504 to 6,432, a
decrease of 63%. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79, at 7.
The cumulative reduction in these specialties is more dramatic, because these figures
exclude “the Defense Contract Audit Agency[, whose] staffing decreased from 7,030
work years in FY 1990 to 3,958 in FY 1999, a reduction of about 44 percent.” Id.
Further, during the same period, the number of “quality assurance, inspection, and
grading” personnel fell from 12,117 to 5,191, a decrease of 57%. Id. See also infra
notes 221, 224 (setting forth the policies of the Defense Contract Management
Agency).
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[INSERT TABLE 10]

Granted, both executive and legislative branch pressures prompted
the reduction in the size of the federal bureaucracy, but this effort,
particularly in this context, was penny-wise and pound-foolish.
Specifically, these across-the-board cuts diminished internal
oversight, and nothing suggests a reversal of the trend toward
continued downsizing of the acquisition workforce.
Second, and on this point Professor Kelman and I share no middle
ground, Professor Kelman denies any value in external monitoring by
147
The troubling result is that the 1990s
private attorneys general.
witnessed a dramatic increase in government purchasing discretion,
coupled with a corresponding reduction in both internal and
external oversight of the process through which the government
purchases $200 billion in goods and services.
Consistent with Professor Kelman’s writings, the government today
148
acts more businesslike, generally favoring businesslike concepts,


147. Kelman’s position never surprised me because he does not respect the legal
profession, and he abhors the inefficiencies associated with litigation. As the
reduction of the acquisition personnel continued to diminish internal oversight, I
naively expected him to embrace the private attorneys general as a substitute for
internal oversight or a privatization of the oversight function. But Kelman’s
resistance to litigation in the procurement process remained.
148. “The National Performance Review (NPR) and its regulatory reinvention
initiatives feature a preference for both market-based regulatory mechanisms and
flexible, negotiation-based processes. The NPR also adopts private sector measures
for monitoring productivity and ensuring accountability. . . .” Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 555 (2000). Freeman’s
thoughtful work challenges the distinction between the public and private realms
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such as customer satisfaction and efficiency. As implemented,
however, the Kelman reforms provided buyers discretion to act in a
businesslike fashion at the expense of oversight and bureaucratic
149
This substitution in implementation highlights my
control.
philosophical difference with Professor Kelman. The government
can become more businesslike without jettisoning oversight and, in
so doing, sacrificing important goals of the procurement process. I
have little quarrel with Professor Kelman’s previously articulated
vision of the procurement regulatory system, which is premised upon
three goals: equity (providing bidders fair access to compete);
integrity (reducing the likelihood of corruption); and economy and
efficiency (buying the quality goods or services desired at the lowest
150
possible price).
These are neither startling nor radical, and they
correlate nicely with my preferred desiderata, the shorthand
triumvirate of transparency, integrity, and competition, discussed at
151
length below.
That the Government’s public procurement regime is perceived as
more efficient today, is no surprise. Even the most harsh critics of
Professor Kelman and the acquisition reform movement should
concede that progress was made in this regard. Professor Kelman’s


and argues for an “alternative conception of administration as a set of negotiated
relationships” between public and private parties. Id. at 548.
149. In this regard, I find the writing of Kelman’s colleague, Malcolm Sparrow,
informative:
The nature and quality of regulatory practice hinges on which laws
regulators choose to enforce, and when; on how they focus their efforts and
structure their uses of discretion; on their choice of methods for procuring
compliance. Yet the vogue prescriptions for the reinvention or reform of
government . . . say little about these issues and sometimes seem to ignore them
altogether. The popular prescriptions for reform focus on service, customers,
quality, and process improvement, not on compliance management, risk
control, or structuring the application of enforcement discretion. They rely
heavily on management tools and methods imported from the private sector, which has
few comparable challenges.
MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
150. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
151. See generally James J. Myers, The New UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement, 23
PUB. CONT. L.J. 267, 268 (1994). Myers describes the model law’s preamble, stating
that it:
establishes the key policies and objectives of maximizing economy and
efficiency . . . ; encouraging participation by and promoting competition
among contractors . . . ; providing for fair and equitable treatment of
contractors . . . ; achieving transparency; and promoting integrity, fairness,
and public confidence in the procurement process.
Id. My colleague William Kovacic offers a similar articulation of the taxonomies
utilized to classify the goals of the procurement process—efficiency, fairness, wealth
distribution, and integrity. See Kovacic, Deterrent to Participation, supra note 132, at
205-10 (evaluating the history of the procurement process and its reforms through
the 1980s and 1990s, as well as describing the goals of modern procurement policy).
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broad-based 1990s governmental reforms increased purchasing
officer discretion with the intent of enhancing administrative
152
efficiency and saving money. Much of our disagreement lies in the
use of the term “efficiency.” If the aspiration is for buyers to
purchase quality at good prices, as Professor Kelman’s writings
suggest, I conclude that compliance with the congressional competition
mandates achieves that purpose. In implementing his policies,
however, Professor Kelman did not stand by this definition of
efficiency. Rather, his reforms focused on enhancing administrative
efficiency, which permitted fewer buyers to conduct more purchases
in a timely fashion. Professor Kelman views less litigation as a public
good because it enhances transaction efficiency. Here we part
company, because public purchasing—obtaining resources to
perform the business of government utilizing the public’s funds—is
153
about more than administrative efficiency.
Quite simply, I expect


152. In the end, these reforms disregard the historic rationales for limiting
discretion.
Discretion enables and even invites officials to overreach, to discriminate
invidiously, to subordinate public interests to private ones. . . . In the United
States . . . fear [of abuse of discretion] is so chronic and pervasive that it
constitutes a defining element of our political and legal cultures, accounting
for much that is admirable—and much that is pathological—about
American government.
FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 155 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1994). Moreover,
[t]he reasons for limiting discretion are obvious. Bureaucrats might use
discretion to further personal goals such as career enhancement, minimizing
their own workload, or personal enrichment. . . . [In addition,] even if all
bureaucrats were good-faith agents of the social will, it may be necessary to
limit discretion if the DoD is to make a credible commitment to follow
certain types of behavior. . . .
William P. Rogerson, Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process, 8 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 65, 86 (1994). Rogerson also notes that Kelman favors “allowing more
discretion. Of course, contracting officers might also abuse additional discretion.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also William F. West, Structuring Administrative Discretion:
The Pursuit of Rationality and Responsiveness, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 340, 340 (1984) (“The
most significant problem presented by bureaucratic discretion is that it conflicts with
our fundamental beliefs about institutional limitations and responsibilities.”).
153. I find Kelman’s and Kovacic’s use of efficiency as a goal an appropriate
analog to Kovacic’s suggestion that wealth distribution is a fundamental purpose of
the process. For example, I do not believe that wealth distribution is one of the
procurement system’s primary goals. This does not suggest that Congress does not
use the procurement system to attempt to redistribute wealth. But those efforts are
transitory for the same reasons they are controversial. Two examples demonstrate
the never-ending turbulence affecting social policies. First, in the same year that
Congress increased the government-wide goal for small business participation in
federal procurement from twenty to twenty-three percent, it extended the Small
Business Competitiveness Demonstration (Comp-Demo) Program. See Steven L.
Schooner, Mixed Messages: Heightened Complexity In Social Policies Favouring Small
Business Interests, 8 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. CS78, CS82 (1999) [hereinafter
Schooner, Mixed Messages]. The Comp-Demo favors big business by stopping agencies
from setting aside contracts for small business in four selected industries in which
small business have proven themselves competitive. Second, Congress effectively
gutted its affirmative action contracting program by mandating that the Defense
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Congress to provide sufficient resources for agencies to achieve their
missions and goals. Further, despite the NPR initiative, I am
unpersuaded that Congress embraced administrative efficiency as a
154
Unfortunately, no
fundamental goal of the procurement process.
biblical stone tablets proclaim the desiderata of the Federal
procurement system. In this regard, the constantly changing
patchwork of statutes defies efforts to identify broad Congressional
aims, and the literature is strangely silent with regard to efforts to
155
define the system’s fundamental values.
I do not deny that Professor Kelman was effective in obtaining
Congressional authority to make the process more efficient. For
example, Professor Kelman bootstrapped his concept of
administrative efficiency onto the regulatory scheme, or at least onto
the conscience of the government’s purchasing corps, by publishing a
156
statement of guiding principles.
These guiding principles, which


Department (representing sixty percent of government buying) suspend use of price
preferences for disadvantaged firms following any year in which the statutory fivepercent participation goal is met. See id. at CS83. Moreover, wealth distribution is
merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the procurement process
(or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to promote social policies.
These social policies, in addition to those that potentially distribute wealth to
domestic manufacturers, essential military suppliers, and small (and small
disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses, also mandate drug-free workplaces,
occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws, preferences for
environmentally friendly purchasing practices, etc. Accordingly, although I concede
that congressional manipulation of the procurement process to promote social goals
is a significant aspect or feature of the system, I cannot agree that wealth distribution is
a fundamental purpose of the procurement regime.
154. In fact, there is at least one instance where Congress has legislated that
administrative efficiency is not an absolute priority. “The reduction of administrative or
personnel costs alone shall not be a justification for bundling of contract requirements
unless the cost savings are expected to be substantial in relation to the dollar value of
the procurement requirements to be consolidated.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 644(e)(2)(C)
(Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
155. “The Federal Government has been making contracts for as long as it has
existed, yet little attempt has been made to rationalize this phase of governmental
activity in its relation to the functions of government and to the persons and firms
with whom contracts are made.” John Wm. Whelan & Edwin C. Pearson, Underlying
Values in Government Contracts, 10 J. PUB. L. 298, 298 (1962) (suggesting the need for
such an “explanation and rationalization” and providing a general overview of the
subject). Professor Whelan notes that “[g]overnment contracts obviously fulfill one
prime function: they are vehicles for the acquisition or disposal of property,
performance of services or such other governmental ends as may involve the use of
promissory obligations.” Id. at 302. He then catalogs four subsidiary functions:
“(1) expressions of general public policy, (2) policies for the safeguard of
government integrity, (3) imposition of government controls on contract
performance and (4) reflections of certain intragovernmental relations.” Id. at 303.
156. See Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(a) (2000). This
language was added to the regulations without following the typical notice-andcomment procedures for amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The Federal
Register notices concede that this effort was Kelman’s response to the National
Performance Review report. See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Rewrite, 60
Fed. Reg. 4205 (Jan. 20, 1995). The regulatory action was not subject to Office of

SCHOONERJCI-CONTRACT.DOC

676

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/23/2001 12:20 PM

[Vol. 50:627

lead with customer satisfaction, more closely mirror the NPR’s
aspirational themes than the existing statutory framework underlying
the procurement system.
Accordingly, I suggest that, despite the benefits of more
businesslike purchasing practices, reduced oversight is the fly stuck in
the ointment of the reinvented procurement regime. Below, I discuss
the general reduction in oversight manifested by the erosion of thirdparty monitoring system, which dilutes competition and threatens the
157
system’s integrity and transparency. I address the breach of what I
call the contingency promise, a subtle yet corrosive trend that, in the
long run, may prove costly to the public fisc and detrimental to the
policies effectuated by the Government’s well-established regime of
standard contract clauses. I suggest that less litigation cannot be a
public good unless the procurement system’s traditionally robust
third-party monitoring is replaced with increased internal
158
government oversight.
Unfortunately, because such a substitution
is sufficiently unlikely in the present political climate of Executive
and Legislative obsession with reducing the size of the Federal


Management and Budget Review under Exec. Order 12,866 (Sept. 30, 1993), nor was
it subjected to scrutiny under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 60 Fed. Reg. 34,732,
34,733 (July 3, 1995). Small entities were permitted to submit comments, but only
after the final rule was published in the Federal Register. Id.
157. As I discuss throughout, I do not suggest the need for oversight because the
government or the contractor community is fundamentally corrupt or incompetent.
Rather, I believe that, particularly given its size and scope of endeavor, our
government, more often than not, is a model of integrity. Yet, unlike Kelman, I
acknowledge that the implementation of policies must recognize that governments
are populated by humans and, accordingly, remain fallible. James Madison artfully
articulated that “[a]ll Governments, even the best, as I trust ours will prove itself to
be, have their infirmities. Power, wherever lodged, is liable, more or less, to abuse.”
Unsent letter from James Madison to Thomas Lehre (Aug. 2, 1828), in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 18161828, at 635 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865); “The essence of Government is power; and
power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse.” James
Madison, Speech in the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830 (Dec. 2, 1829), in 4
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1829-1836, at 51 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) [hereinafter Madison, Speech
in the Virginia State Convention].
158. I do not mean to suggest that Steve Kelman desired the outcome of an acrossthe-board reduction in oversight, nor do I believe that he accepts it. Rather, one of
Kelman’s most endearing traits and, in this case, his greatest failing, is his deeply
rooted, seemingly boundless optimism regarding the institution of government, the
nature of government employees, and the attention span of the public. See KELMAN,
supra note 1, at 103 (Kelman willingly acknowledges his “predisposition to pollyannish optimism”). In this regard, it is striking that the following sentence appears
twice in Kelman’s book: “I am happy there remains enough pride in our institutions
of government to hold them to especially high standards of probity.” Id. at 95-96.
Unfortunately, I cannot share Kelman’s uncompromisingly rosy outlook. Rather, I
agree with the sentiment: “It is tempting to offer strategies for fundamental reforms,
for no one can embrace waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement.” KETTL, supra note
2, at 57.
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159

workforce, hotly debated priorities for utilizing potential budget
160
161
surpluses and highly partisan pre-election gridlock, we cannot
162
expect progress in that regard.
It would be unfair to suggest that
we stand at a cross-roads because inertia propels us along our current
course. Rather, affirmative action is required to restore, or at least
reinvigorate controls to maintain important norms in federal
purchasing.
A. Reduced External Oversight: The Unintended Consequence of
Acquisition Reform
Looking back at the NPR’s


163

acquisition reform efforts, and

159. See GORE, supra note 2, at 207 (reflecting that the Executive Branch,
excluding the independent Postal Service, has “the smallest workforce in 30 years”).
One of the related by-products of this effort is increasing pressure to contract out
traditional government services. Without addressing the risks associated with
contracting out or privatizing inherently governmental functions, this pressure
results in increased costs.
DoD acquisition organizations stated that reductions in in-house . . . support
personnel required the[m] to contract for additional services, such as
engineering and logistical analysis, that the Government once would have
provided. As a result, technical support costs increased because . . . obtaining
contract support was more expensive than obtaining in-house . . .
support. . . . [C]ontract labor rates are significantly higher [$20,000 to
$180,000] per staff year than rates . . . charged for the same service
performed by Government employees.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79, at 18; see also RICHARD
STILLMAN II, THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: THE CORE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 307
(2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that the growth of contracting out has “tended to
accelerate numerous problems and dilemmas of managerial efficiency, oversight,
and accountability.”). As discussed elsewhere, the procurement workforce has borne
the brunt of the downsizing frenzy. Congress incrementally mandated a fifty-five
percent reduction of the federal acquisition workforce between 1989 and 2001. See
generally National Defense Authorization Act for 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 922, 113
Stat. 512, 724 (1999).
160. Although the 2000 presidential candidates’ proposals focused upon utilizing
surpluses to, inter alia, reduce taxes, shore up the Social Security system, enhance
and broaden health care benefits, reduce the existing debt burden, increase military
readiness, and invest in education, neither party’s platform prominently advocated
investment in increased oversight resources of existing government programs.
161. See Eric Pianin, In Congress, GOP Leaders Take On Oversight, WASH. POST, July
28, 2000, at A23 (discussing diminished Congressional oversight during the 1990s
caused by, inter alia, Republican efforts to reduce the size of the congressional
bureaucracy and shifting of remaining oversight resources from programmatic issue
towards partisan aims).
162. See KETTL, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing GAO’s list of twelve high risk
government programs):
Thus, the fraud, waste, and abuse risks to the government, indeed, are as
large as critics and policymakers have suggested. Eliminating them,
however, is not like eliminating a simple line item. Managing the risks
required, instead, sustained investment in management and careful
oversight of the programs. The latter proved administratively difficult; the
former often politically impossible.
163. The NPR was subsequently re-named, becoming the National Partnership for
Reinventing Government. See NPR, at http://www.npr.gov/ (last visited Feb. 11,
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painted in the most optimistic light, the phenomenon of drastically
reduced litigation in the Federal procurement arena could be
perceived as an inadvertent outcome. Neither the elimination of
oversight, nor the imposition of constraints upon private attorneys
164
general, emerged as an argument supporting individual reforms.
Neither the legislative history nor the chaotic nature of the statutory
165
Rather, I
drafting process evince an intent to reduce oversight.
suggest that the result was unintended by Congress and, at the very
least, unacknowledged by executive branch policy-makers.
As
discussed at length below, Professor Kelman opined that: “Any
loosening of the procurement regulatory straightjacket should be
accompanied by, and linked to, increased resources for public
166
corruption investigations. . . .”
Nonetheless, there is little doubt
that the 1990s reforms, intentionally or unintentionally, reduced
oversight by both the government and contractors who were acting in


2001). For insight into the roots and outcomes of the NPR effort, see generally
Donald F. Kettl, Public Administration at the Millennium: The State of the Field, 10 J. PUB.
ADMIN. 7, 25-27 (2000) [hereinafter Kettl, Public Administration] (suggesting that the
NPR utilized “traditional top-down, Wilsonian/Hamiltonian-style reforms[,]” and
included “Jeffersonian-style bottom-up reforms[,]” thus raising the ire of “Modern
Madisonians”); STILLMAN, supra note 159, at 360-94 (distinguishing the Hamiltonian,
Jeffersonian, and Madisonian normative models). Stillman concedes:
Americans have never made up their minds . . . as to which of the three
models they prefer. . . . From time to time, the stress has been placed on
promoting the values of administrative efficacy. . . . at other times,
accountability to the general public has predominated; and at still other
times, responding to diverse interest group demands has been clearly an
overriding priority. Yet within any single historic period where one value has
held sway over the other two, the others have never been entirely neglected or
ignored.
Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
164. The NPR did aspire to “amend protest rules,” but that initiative was aimed
primarily at reigning in the General Services Administration Board of Contract
Appeals, which was eventually eliminated. See AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS;
CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS; REINVENTING FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT 39 (1993). None of the twenty recommendations for reinventing
federal procurement suggest reduced oversight.
Id. at 111-13.
Although
recommendation PROC11 calls for an effort to “improve procurement ethics laws,”
the nature of the recommendation involves creating consistency across agencies;
nothing suggests paring back ethics standards.
165. For example, the Senate Report accompanying the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act stated:
[This] comprehensive overhaul of the federal acquisition laws . . . would
increase the government’s access to products developed in the commercial
sector; . . . streamline hundreds of other acquisition laws[,] . . . address
chronic management problems[, and] . . . provide incentives for saving time
and money. . . . Moreover, these objectives would be accomplished without
undermining the key features of the current procurement statutes, such as full and
open competition and an effective bid protest process, that have been established over
the years to safeguard the acquisition system and prevent abuse.
S. REP. NO. 103-258, at 3 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2563 (emphasis
added).
166. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 98 (emphasis added).
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their capacity as private attorney generals. Although this issue has
not captured the attention of either scholars or policy makers, I
suggest that, in retrospect, this reduced oversight may prove the
single most significant aspect of the 1990s reform effort.
1.

Litigation as oversight: Kelman’s bete noir
Most vocal amongst those celebrating the death of litigation is
Professor Kelman.
As one commenter quipped:
“If the
Government’s trains are running on time at the expense of oversight,
due process, and access to litigation, it would not be at all surprising.
After all, the system was remodeled by a man who is known to detest
167
lawyers.” Professor Kelman believes reduced litigation manifests an
evolution in the relationship between contractors and the
168
Government. Moreover, he applauds those contractors that choose
to voluntarily relinquish their due process rights.
Professor Kelman, and other opponents of litigation, offer a
visceral, and at times, compelling parade of horribles associated with
litigation in Federal procurement. Other than the observation that
the public procurement litigation regime differs from the private
sector, Professor Kelman’s primary complaints are that: (1) protests
and disputes are expensive and time-consuming; (2) in contractual
litigation, individual civil servants may twist in the wind, subjected to
zealous advocates, soiling the well of government-industry
partnership; and (3) protests and disputes undoubtedly prompt riskaverse, and potentially time consuming, behavior amongst agency
procurement personnel, such as increased (and at times excessive)
documentation of source selection or contract administration
169
decisions.


167. Ripley, supra note 24, at 46. “In what Kelman views as a huge victory for
human-kind, reforms have made it dramatically more difficult to protest government
contracts through litigation.” Id. at 49. Kelman can be excused for his exasperation
with the involvement of attorneys in almost every facet of the contracting function.
As John Whelan observed: “[T]he practices and procedures of Government
contracts are characterized by extensive legalism. . . . Whether such legalism is
produced by the fact that we idealize the constitutional goal of government under
the ‘law’ so that our psychology is to proliferate regulations governing government
officials (rather than simply trusting wide areas of activity to the judgment of
individual officials) or whether such legalism is produced by the extensive utilization
in the government of law school graduates . . . is hard to say.” JOHN W. WHELAN &
ROBERT S. PASLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1-2
(1975).
168. Although my disagreement with Kelman on this issue is longstanding, the
issue was recently aired in the trade press. See Steven L. Schooner, Protests Serve Public
as Watchdog, FED. COMPUTER WK., Mar. 8, 1999, at 17; see also Steven Kelman, Silence of
Protesters’ Bark Signals New Era, FED. COMPUTER WK., Feb. 22, 1999, at 21.
169. See Kelman, supra note 168, at 21 (alleging that bid protests are inherently
inefficient); KELMAN, supra note 1.
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For these reasons, Professor Kelman never accepted the private
170
attorney general as a familiar fixture in the procurement process.
Yet, those that do business with the Government, and the counsel
that represent them, long have played the role of private attorneys
171
general both as conventional interested parties and, more recently,
172
as bounty hunters.
In the public procurement regime, Congress
implicitly deputized as private attorneys general (1) prospective
173
contractors —those firms that desire to sell to the Government or
firms from which the Government desires to purchase;
(2) contractors—those firms from which the Government buys; and


170. Judge Jerome Frank is commonly credited with first penning the phrase
“private attorney general.” Assoc. Indus. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d
Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (finding that Congress could
empower individuals to bring suits “to vindicate the public interest”). The term
generally refers to “[n]ongovernmental actors . . . [who] help implement, monitor,
and enforce compliance with regulations.” Freeman, supra note 148, at 547.
171. “Third party oversight has long been a feature of securities regulation,
antitrust, and even government procurement.” Freeman, supra note 148, at 661
(emphasis added) (citing Robert C. Marshall et al., The Private Attorney General Meets
Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight By Protest, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1991))
[hereinafter Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest] (arguing that “protests are an
effective means of deterring and connecting” procurement problems). For an
extensive (although now somewhat outdated) examination of role of adjudication in
the Canadian government procurement regime, see SUE LOUISE ARROWSMITH,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: A STUDY OF CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC
FUNCTION (1988). Professor Arrowsmith suggests, and to some extent debunks, the
general assumption that “procurement . . . is substantially immune from judicial
review” and advocates the expansion of judicial review in procurement, while
remaining cognizant of the hardships associated with greater judicial involvement or
interference. Id. at 9-11. Professor Arrowsmith’s work highlights, among other
things, “[a]n evolution of the law . . . consistent with the view . . . that there is no
reason in principle to exclude the procurement function from [the operation of]
administrative law principles. . . .” Id. at 34.
172. The bounty hunter role most prominently arises under the 1986
amendments to the False Claims Act, discussed supra text accompanying notes 13337.
173. More explicitly, for three decades, courts have used the term private
attorneys general to describe protestors, and others, who keep our government
honest by pursuing their own self-interest through “citizen suits.” See Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (describing a private attorney general provision
through which a citizen may bring suit to enjoin governmental action which
allegedly violates a certain law). More specifically, in its landmark 1970 decision,
Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals explained that prospective contractors, injured by arbitrary and
capricious government actions, should be able to sue or protest to “vindicate their
very real interests, while at the same time furthering the public interest.” Id. at 864;
see also Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private Attorneys General, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 248 (1999) (“[W]here Congress has conferred standing on a
plaintiff to initiate judicial review of federal agency action, the prudential zone-ofinterest test should not be applied to that plaintiff”); 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.16, at 95 (3d ed. 1994)
(“Once Congress issues a command to agencies and calls on courts to enforce that
command, a judicial refusal to enforce the command . . . is . . . accurately
characterized as abdication of judicial responsibility to enforce the policy of a
politically accountable Branch.”).
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(3) contractor employees.
Professor Kelman bristled that, over time, the Government, albeit
unconsciously, increased its reliance on the contractor community to
fulfill its duty and, in some contexts, seemed comfortable with the
175
concept of third-party monitoring. Accordingly, Professor Kelman
was pleased that the 1990s witnessed a profound, systematic decline
176
in the activity of the accidental private attorneys general who
monitored Federal purchasing. In a procurement regime where
sporadic oversight has devolved toward seemingly nonexistent
monitoring, the reduction in third-party oversight prompts concern if
not alarm.
2.

Watching the watchmen: Defending private attorneys general
I cannot reconcile Professor Kelman’s rejection of the private
attorney general as a monitoring mechanism with his articulated
recognition of the compelling need for meaningful oversight of the
procurement system. From a policy standpoint, Professor Kelman
should welcome private attorneys general. In economic terms, the
protest and dispute regimes are a bargain. Whether a handful of law
firms thrive on the practice is irrelevant. Opponents of litigation are
hard pressed to demonstrate a more cost effective, less intrusive
compliance regime. An increased Inspector General presence, or
177
other labor-intensive oversight mechanisms, would please no one.


174. As discussed below, the role of the contractor as private attorney general is
the least acknowledged and, arguably, has been ignored in the past.
175. See Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 486 (citing Julie Research
Lab., Inc., GSBCA No. 8070-P-R, 86-02 BCA 18,881 (1986)) (“[T]he intent of
Congress . . . was to encourage private enforcement of the law and regulations
mandating the acquisition of [information technology] through full and open
competition.”).
176. I coin this phrase because, in treating all private attorneys general alike, the
most valuable and cherished private attorneys general (the unintended or
“accidental” private attorneys general) are lumped together—nay, smeared—with
their less respected cousins, e.g., bounty hunters. Arguably the latter group primarily
seeks a windfall or personal profit from the litigation rather than resolution of the
underlying ill. As bounty hunters have become more prevalent, the popularity of
private attorneys general has waned. This is problematic because, although there are
many types of potential private attorneys general exhibiting widely varying motives,
the literature tends to obfuscate these distinctions. “It is revealing that there is still
no legal definition, nor any well-established pattern of usage, which precisely
identifies a litigant as a ‘private attorney general.’” Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of
the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 194-95 (1998). Rabkin
draws from this that the increasing skepticism of private attorneys general derives
from “the notion that unelected advocates speak for the public—whatever their
motives.” Id. at 195.
177. On this, Cibinic and I agree. “Like Steve, we do not favor increasing the
Inspector General presence. Nor do we call for any new organization to police the
procurement system.” John Cibinic, Court Jurisdiction over Award Protests: A Difference
of Opinion, 14 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 38 (July 2000).
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A robust litigation regime offers potent deterrence

It is easy to forget that protests and disputes—challenges to the
contract award process and agency decision-making—help reinforce
the impartiality that defines our procurement system. Historically
and currently, the U.S. Government boasts that its procurement
system allows all responsible firms to compete for work based upon
178
stated government requirements.
Government officials take pride
that source selection officials evaluate offers on their merits, using
stated criteria, without regard to irrelevant considerations. The public
expects that contracting officers fairly award and administer
179
contracts.
Similarly, Congress expects that government buyers “faithfully
execute their duties,” and, in so doing, fulfill a broad range of
180
statutory mandates imposed upon the procurement system.
The
breadth of these considerations, and the incentives for contracting


178. Many foreign governments, particularly in developing countries, marvel at
the integrity of our procurement process. At the same time, they deride our
burdensome protest, dispute, and litigation regimes. In doing so, they fail to
recognize a nexus between the two.
179. See Harold C. Petrowitz, Conflict of Interest in Federal Procurement, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 196, 196 (1964) (suggesting that “[o]pen corruption in the Federal
Government has never been condoned . . . but the ethics of individual officials has
not always been scrutinized as closely as they are today”).
180. The need for oversight of the procurement system implicates issues far
broader than minimizing the frequency of collusion or incidence of fraud. This is
not to suggest that elimination of fraud and collusion is not important—it is. Rather,
it reflects the existence of an over-arching compliance regime, predicated upon an
intricate web of statutory and regulatory requirements that define the procurement
system. Our rule-bound regime reflects thoroughly western values and judgments
regarding ethics, and many nations would argue that we cast our net too broadly in
describing corruption. See, e.g., Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Comment, Revisiting Corrupt
Practices from a Market Perspective, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1998) (arguing
that developing states see the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “as a culturally arrogant
encroachment on their ability to govern activities exclusively within their borders, in
accordance with international law principles on territorial sovereignty”). In
procurement, compliance implicates not just high standards of integrity, but also the
maintenance of system transparency, the maximization of competition, and the
furtherance of a host of congressionally mandated social policies. Any one of these
issues opens the door to a host of pitfalls. For example, integrity in public
procurement implicates issues related to, inter alia, personal and organizational
conflicts of interest, gratuities, bribes, handling and disclosure of proprietary source
selection information, contractor certification of compliance with numerous social
programs (such as contractor size status, disclosure of cost or pricing data, or origin
of end products delivered), contractor maintenance of a drug-free workplace,
contractor allocation of specified unallowable costs to specific pools, appropriate
supervision and cooperation by government employees, proper use by contractors of
mandated supplies or raw materials, faithful execution by contractors of inspection
and testing provisions, etc. Despite the complexity of the federal procurement
system and the reality that this complexity subjects the system to criticism, the
statutory and regulatory regime is intended to hold contractors or government
personnel accountable for compliance with congressional mandates.
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181

officers to ignore them, may not be readily apparent. In addition to
the most basic requirements of transparency, competition, and
integrity, a host of congressionally mandated social and economic
182
policies burden the procurement process.
No one debates that,
were government buyers permitted to ignore or bypass the existing
regulatory regime, government end users could obtain needed goods
and services more quickly and, most likely, more frequently utilize
183
the brands and service providers they prefer. Critics rightly identify


181. Consistent with his focus on efficiency and his preference for purchaser
discretion, Kelman was quietly dismissive of most congressionally mandated social
programs. Some of his most contentious experiences in the White House involved
his lack of interest—real or perceived-in maintaining or promoting social programs.
See, e.g., Stephen Barr, Small Firms Want More U.S. Contracts, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1997,
at A17 (discussing a leaked Kelman memo to White House Chief of Staff Erskine
Bowles via OMB Director Frank Raines, which “underscored a seemingly
never-ending policy battle that has grown out of recent procurement reforms . . . and
increased competition by large and small companies to hang onto their share of the
federal procurement pie”). The Kelman memo drew “heavy criticism from lobbyists
representing small business interests, who contend it essentially acknowledges that
the administration’s procurement practices are increasingly excluding small
companies.” Id.; see also Dawn Kopecki, White House Memo Irks Small Business, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at C1 (noting criticism of the administration’s policies as “antismall business”).
182. For a taste of these ever-evolving mandates, see, e.g., 48 C.F.R. Part 19 (Small
Business Programs, including preferences for disadvantaged businesses and womenowned businesses); id. Part 22 (Application of Labor Laws to Government
Acquisitions); id. Part 23 (Environment, Conservation, Occupational Safety, and
Drug-Free Workplace); id. Part 25 (Foreign Acquisitions (or domestic preferences));
id. Subpart 26.1 (Indian Incentive Program); id. Subpart 26.3 (Historically Black
Colleges and Universities and Minority Institutions); see also Federal Acquisition
Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 36016, 36,016-20 (June 6, 2000) (implementing Exec.
Order 13101 and amending 48 C.F.R. §§ 4.3, 11.0, 11.3, 23.4, 23.7). These
amendments include affirmative programs to procure environmentally preferable
products or services, i.e., products or services “that have a lesser or reduced effect on
human health and the environment when compared with competing products or
services that serve the same purpose” and mandating the use of paper with a
minimum recycled content, etc. Id. at 36,017.
183. Nor should we be surprised that government buyers have every motive to
please their customers. (Customers, of course, could include high ranking
government officials, peers or co-workers, as well as the more ephemeral end users,
such as astronauts, soldiers, sailors, pilots, park rangers, meat inspectors, agents,
auditors and, of course, the public.) These “customers” rarely appreciate the value
of congressionally mandated social policies that delay their ability to obtain needed
supplies or services. Accordingly, it seems almost natural that government buyers
might disregard the rules to achieve greater customer satisfaction; such is human
nature.
We all know that conscience is not a sufficient safeguard; and besides, that
conscience itself may be deluded; may be mislead, by an unconscious bias,
into acts which an enlightened conscience would forbid. . . . [I]n the
proverbial maxim, that honesty is the best policy, present temptation is too
often found to be an over-match for those considerations. These favourable
attributes of the human character are all valuable, as auxiliaries; but they will
not serve as a substitute for the coercive provisions belonging to Government
and Law.
Madison Speech in the Virginia State Convention, supra note 157, at 52.
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the policy inconsistencies inherent in these programs and the
increased costs and diminished efficiencies prompted by these
policies, while advocates bemoan failed efforts to implement the
184
Nonetheless, these policies remain the law and
same policies.
185
failure to execute the policies violates the law.
In such an environment, protests and disputes serve to correct
hopefully rare incidents of (at best) inadvertent or (at worst) illegal,
arbitrary, or capricious agency action. Protests and disputes provide a
186
public good where the annual stakes are $200 billion in taxpayer
money. In a government of the people, where the governed share
responsibility with those who govern, public trust is key. For
187
centuries, people have asked “who watches the watchmen?,” and


184. See generally Schooner, Mixed Messages, supra note 153; Jennifer McCadney,
Note: The Green Society? Leveraging the Government’s Buying Powers to Create Markets for
Recycled Products, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 135 (1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not
Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
537 (1998); David A. Wallace & Steven L. Schooner, Affirmative Action in Procurement:
A Preview of the Post-Adarand Regulations in the Context of an Uncertain Judicial Landscape,
ARMY LAW. 3 (Sept. 1997); Gilbert J. Ginsberg & Janine S. Benton, One Year Later:
Affirmative Action in Federal Government Contracting After Adarand, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1903 (1996); Steven L. Schooner, The Davis-Bacon Act: Controversial Implementation of
the 50% Rule, 5 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9 (No. 3, 1985); Julius Rothlein & Steven L.
Schooner, The Trade Agreements Act—Installation Procurement and International
Government Acquisition Law, ARMY LAW. 1 (Sept. 1983); Thomas E. Reynolds & Cyrus
E. Phillips IV, Evaluation Procedures under the Buy American Act and Executive Order, 3
PUB. CONT. L.J. 219 (1970); Arthur S. Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control:
A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27 (1955).
185. See, e.g., Mark Cancian, Acquisition Reform: It’s Not as Easy as it Seems,
ACQUISITION REV. Q., Summer 1995, at 189, 191, clarifying that:
These goals are often regarded as illegitimate by people inside the system
because they have no direct bearing on national security or on acquisition.
Indeed, they look like the workings of powerful special interests trying to
bend society’s rules in their favor. However, democracy is a messy form of
government. One person’s selfish special interest is another’s vital national
priority.
Id.
186. Although this discussion falls outside of my purpose here, I agree with those
who suggest that litigation itself is a public good.
[The less controversial and more familiar] arguments do not commend
adjudication as a good in itself, but rather as a necessary condition for
fulfilling other values that our culture accepts. The . . . less familiar and
more controversial [argument] considers adjudication an intrinsic good, a
process that is as much a sign of a healthy society as free elections.
Luban, supra note 32, at 2621. See generally Fiss, supra note 82 (advocating litigation as
an effective dispute resolution system); Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent, supra note
91 (suggesting that precedent is a public good).
187. From the Latin, “quis custodiet ipsos custodes.” JUVENAL, SATIRES VI 347,
available at http://patriot.net/~lillard/cp/juvenal.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
Today, however, many associate the phrase with the ground-breaking comic book
series, later converted into a best-selling graphic novel. See ALAN MOORE & DAVE
GIBBONS, WATCHMEN (1987). For those who have had the privilege of enjoying this
rich, dense, and thought-provoking work, I highly recommend Professor Stuart
Moulthrop’s Watching the Detectives: An Internet Companion for Readers of Watchmen, at
http://raven.ubalt.edu/staff/moulthrop /hypertexts/wm/ (last updated Nov. 2000);
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the question remains vital today. The Government’s contractors long
have played a vital role in monitoring most aspects of the
procurement cycle. Today, they appear strangely quiet. Over time, if
contractors continue to abdicate their responsibility to ensure the
system’s integrity, and the policy makers implicitly or explicitly
encourage this complacence, the procurement system will suffer.
Recognizing that litigation remains an unwieldy, inefficient means
to resolve most problems that arise the in marketplace, I do not assert
that increased litigation is the optimal solution to the government’s
pressing, ongoing need for oversight. Nor do I attempt here to
divine the optimal balance between internal and external oversight. I
am confident, however, that the recent phenomenon of concurrent
reduction in internal and external oversight is cause for concern.
Accordingly, I suggest that, in the absence of perfect control over the
exercise of the buying community’s discretion, a robust private
attorney general regime serves as a utilitarian substitute for a yet-tobe-discovered optimal oversight mechanism, if not a competent
188
second-best alternative.
By this point, I hope to have demonstrated that the dramatic
reduction of litigation in government contracting fora merits
attention. Further, reduced oversight is the most significant concern
prompted by the litigation atrophy, which is exacerbated by the
corresponding congressional trend toward thinning the acquisition
189
workforce.
Reduced oversight, with regard to massive outlays of
public funds, should raise our antenna, but even more so when the
putative causes may be related to increased discretion among the
government’s purchasing officials. My concern is heightened by
(1) the consistency and depth of the litigation decline; and (2) the


see also Doug Atkinson, The Annotated Watchmen, at http://www.msu.edu/
userwhitero2/watchmen.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001); Martin Rowson, Watchmen,
at http://users.fast.co.za/~stuartm/rave/cypunx/comix/watch.html (last visited Jan.
25, 2001).
188. Looking ahead, I applaud the perception that “good policy analysis is not
about choosing between the free market and government regulation. . . .
[B]y
working more creatively with the interplay between private and public regulation,
government and citizens can design better policy solutions.” IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-4
(1992). Further, as I hope this article demonstrates, I agree with Ayres and
Braithwaite’s assertion that: “[r]egulatory tasks might usefully be delegated: (1) [t]o
public interest groups (2) [t]o the firms themselves or to their industry associations,
and (3) [t]o the firm’s competitors[.]” Id. at 158.
189. That Congress permitted these two declines to occur in tandem is surprising.
Rather, it seems commonly accepted wisdom that private attorneys general “can . . .
be enormously helpful to understaffed and overburdened regulators . . . [by] helping
to shoulder the agency’s enforcement burden, . . .” Freeman, supra note 148, at 663.
Similarly, “[b]y relying on third-party enforcement, an agency spreads the cost of
ensuring compliance . . . .” Id. at 662.
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absence of initiatives to invest meaningful resources in oversight
mechanisms, either to replace the oversight lost by reduced thirdparty monitoring or to recognize the risks associated with the
increased discretion granted to buyers in the 1990s reforms.
b.

Lauding interested parties, not bounty hunters

Because there is little hope for increased governmental or internal
oversight, I suggest a need for an increased private attorneys general
190
presence. Numerous rationales have been suggested to justify such
191
an oversight regime. In the last decade, Congress appears to have
toiled mightily to ensure that procurement officials were
192
understaffed and overworked.
Compared to the private sector,
some suggest that government buyers are not as well informed about
193
what they are buying.
Similarly, “government purchasing officials
have weaker incentives to make optimal procurement choices than


190. A less sanguine assessment of the private attorney generals’ prospects is
presented by Rabkin, supra note 176, at 203 (“The private attorney general . . . can
often be a considerable convenience for Congress, a device to delegate policy
initiative without taking full responsibility for the consequences.”).
191. See, e.g., Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 20-22 (noting
that the private attorney generals’ detached perspectives makes them more likely to
prosecute government acts that are contrary to the public interest); see also Kovacic,
Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 486-87 (suggesting that private attorney generals
have more incentive than government actors to prosecute inappropriate
procurement selections).
192. See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79.
193. See Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 7-8. I reject this
broad proposition for which, not surprisingly, the authors offer no support. By way
of explanation, the authors suggest that the alleged information deficiency occurs
“because government personnel are less experienced and because many government
purchases involve idiosyncratic goods that are infrequently purchased.” Id. Surely,
amongst the tens of thousands of government procurement professionals, you can
find examples of inexperience (and even incompetence), but no empirical studies
demonstrate that those individuals outnumber the cadre of experienced, highly
qualified buyers. If anything, recent data might suggest the exact opposite. With
regard to the current composition of the Defense Department’s acquisition
workforce: the workforce averages more than eighteen years of service; the average
age exceeds forty-six; over 12% are retirement eligible (and that figure will exceed
18% by 2005); and only about 4% are under the age of thirty-one. See, e.g., DEP’T OF
DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79, at 24-27 fig. 9-12; Stephen Barr,
Federal Diary: Graying Defense Department’s Mission: To Recruit Acquisition Experts, WASH.
POST, Aug. 23, 2000, at B2 (“[B]y 2005, half of the acquisition staff . . . will be eligible
to retire or take an early out.”). Nor do the authors point to research suggesting that
the private sector better equips its purchasing personnel. Moreover, the government
continues to mandate minimum standards with regard to education, training,
experience, and career development, through the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1763 (1994), and Clinger-Cohen Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 4307, 110 Stat. 186, 666 (1996) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 433
(Supp. IV 1998)). For a discussion of the professionalization of the acquisition
workforce, and its tendency to become expert, yet insular and careerist, see Keith F.
Snider, DAWIA and the Price of Professionalism, ACQUISITION REV. Q., Fall 1996, at 97,
103 (bemoaning the “concomitant focus on the trappings of professionalism”).
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194

their private sector counterparts.” Those same officials may “place
195
inordinate weight on product quality[,]” skewing the expected
quality-price tradeoffs. Similarly, government personnel remain
susceptible to temptation, whether prompted by illicit marketing
efforts, improper suggestions regarding future employment, or even
196
blatantly illegal bribery.
These temptations may induce
government employees to draft restrictive specifications in an effort
197
to limit competition and steer awards toward a favored vendor.
Advocates for such a system assert that third-party enforcement “both
198
deters and corrects” improper agency activity.
In the procurement regime, the most frequently discussed thirdparty oversight mechanisms are the qui tam provisions of the False
199
Claims Act, discussed above, and disappointed offeror litigation or
200
I do not suggest here a need for additional bounty
protests.
hunters, akin to the oft-maligned qui tam relators (deputized by the
201
False Claims Act amendments of 1996), class action litigants, and
202
citizen-suit plaintiffs generally.
Instead, I prefer the term
“accidental private attorneys general” to denote those interested


194. Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 486-87 (citing Marshall et al.,
Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 7-8).
195. Id. at 487 (citing Shane M. Greenstein, Did Installed Base Give an Incumbent
Any Measurable Advantages in Federal Computer Procurement?, 24 RAND J. ECON. 19
(1993)); see also William P. Rogerson, Quality Versus Quantity in Military Procurement, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 83 (1990).
196. See Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 22.
197. See Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 488 (examining “close
monitoring” as a means of ensuring a fair procurement process”).
198. Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 21 (discussing the
regulatory effects of protest litigation).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37 (discussing whistleblower lawsuits
brought under the False Claims Act).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40 (distinguishing protests from
disputes).
201. For a broader theory on an oversight scheme intended to replace the qui tam
regime, see Michael Abramowicz, Market-Based Administrative Enforcement, 15 YALE J.
ON REG. 197, 197 (1998) (arguing that the market can serve as an alternative to qui
tam litigation).
202. See Freeman, supra note 148, at 551-52 (suggesting the view that public
interest groups and professional organizations primarily fill the private attorneys
generals’ ranks); see also Richard Thornburgh, Introduction, in JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL.,
CITIZEN SUITS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 3, 3
(Roger Clegg & James L.J. Nuzzo eds., 1996). In the introduction, Dick Thornburgh
criticizes citizen suits initiated by private attorneys general: “Unfortunately, but not
surprisingly, the citizens bringing such actions frequently have been special-interest
organizations with priorities of their own, often not consistent with those delineated
by Congress. . . . [A] healthy skepticism about their motives and Congress’s
prolitigation regime is appropriate.” Id. He also finds “troubling . . . the assignment
of the executive branch’s law-enforcement responsibility to private parties—parties
who are given quasi-governmental authority to pursue their own interests . . . at the
expense of other private parties.” Id. at 5.
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203

parties, discussed at length below, who serve the oversight function
by prosecuting protests and disputes in the course of conducting
204
their routine business transactions.
In this regard, it troubles me
that some scholars have stereotyped the private attorney general so
badly so as to exclude from consideration those plaintiffs that meet
conventional standing requirements, but also serve the public interest
205
in litigating. For example, it has been suggested that:


203. This seems congruous with Rabkin, supra note 176, at 202 (“The law . . .
seems to be returning to more traditional patterns, where courts focus on defending
individual rights rather than vindicating environmental entitlements.”).
204. But note that this type of activity has little in common with bounty hunting.
Bounty hunters, although they stand to reap potential windfalls, often, by necessity,
take significant risks. Pursuing one’s contractual rights through the administrative or
judicial disputes process or challenging an agency’s exercise of discretion in
awarding a contract may entail certain business risks, but it is neither dangerous nor
life-threatening. See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (“The object of
civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into
prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering
activity. . . . The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by the expected
benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an object pursued the sooner the
better.”) (citations omitted). Similarly,
Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by
providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Both
statutes bring to bear the pressure of “private attorneys general” on a serious
national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed
inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the
Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both
statutes aim to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a
plaintiff show injury “in his business or property by reason of” a violation.
Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987). The
same principles apply to qui tam relators, who typically risk their current jobs and, in
many industries, future job prospects. These risks remain despite the clear
congressional mandate of whistleblower protections. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2409
(1994); 41 U.S.C. § 251 (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 3.903 (1999) (“Government contractors
shall not discharge, demote or otherwise discriminate against an employee as a
reprisal for disclosing information to a Member of Congress, or an authorized
official of an agency or of the Department of Justice, relating to a substantial
violation of law related to a contract (including the competition for or negotiation of
a contract).”).
205. Much of the existing literature is lawyer-centric, focused upon the
ambulance-chaser mentality, assuming that fee-shifting or windfall generation
motivates attorneys to initiate lawsuits. Garth, Nagel and Plager summarize that:
Liberals remain enthusiastic about the potential for private law enforcement
of certain regulatory policies; likewise, conservatives hold to the belief that
the private attorney general market can obviate the need for government
underwriting of legal advocates. But both liberals and conservatives now
define and promote their views almost exclusively in terms of whether there
is enough or too much of a market incentive for individual attorneys to take
particular lawsuits.
Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From an
Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 366 (1988) (emphasis
added). Here, I do not desire attorney-initiated litigation, but contractor-initiated
litigation. For the accidental private attorney general, bringing suit must make
business sense (from the business’s standpoint, not from outside counsel’s) in light
of the pending dispute and not based upon a prospective windfall. The approach I
seek to avoid is suggested by Rabkin, where he posits that “[f]or lawyers today, it is far
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A first step toward understanding the private attorney general is to
think of the concept as referring to two separable phenomena: the
‘mercenary law enforcer,’ whose chase for attorney fees depends in
substantial measure on the regulatory bureaucracy, which is
typically federal, and the ‘social advocate,’ for whom litigation is a
206
form of pressure group activity.

In that regard, I embrace neither of these phenomena. Rather, I
am more interested in encouraging litigation by a class of potential
plaintiffs that already enjoy standing because, for them, the
government has already waived sovereign immunity and endeavored
207
to provide a meaningful remedy for their redress.
The current pool of potential litigants, already deputized with
existing waivers of sovereign immunity, are sufficient to carry out the
208
bulk of the oversight function.


less inviting to play the role of ‘private attorney general’ than it was in the 1970s.”
Rabkin, supra note 176, at 180; see also David Shub, Note, Private Attorneys General,
Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: Attorney’s Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42
DUKE L.J. 706, 725 (1992) (suggesting that, if the prevailing party standard for
attorneys fee recovery remains high, “[a]ttorneys would become increasingly hesitant
to take on [civil rights] clients [with little or no means].”). Similarly, I reject efforts
to paint the Independent Counsel as a private attorney general. See generally Rabkin,
supra note 176, at 180-82 (suggesting that the “Independent Counsel is, almost
literally, an alternate Attorney General”). I have less difficulty with the “alternate”
label in this context, but I see nothing “private” about the Independent Counsel
other than the happenstance that the appointed Independent Counsel typically is
hired from the private sector.
206. Garth et al., supra note 205, at 356.
207. For this reason, I leave to others the issue of how broadly to define standing.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1276 (1989) (“[I]n the context of statutory
standing cases, a liberal standing doctrine provides an important vehicle for
enhancing the political accountability of agency policymaking.”). As discussed
above, I generally agree with Professor Pierce’s assessment of the “politically
accountable administrative state,” id. at 1285, particularly that the “opportunity for
judicial review initiated by a ‘private attorney general’ harmed by an agency action
remains an important means of enforcing the agency relationship between the
people and the agencies putatively accountable to them.” Id. at 1282. My concern
here, however, is not that factions of affected parties are excluded from the process,
but rather that the affected parties could sue but are choosing not to. Thus, there is
a less pressing need for broadening the standing doctrine in this context. For a
consistent and elegantly clean approach to standing, see Lee A. Albert, Standing to
Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J.
425, 426 (1974) (“There are no better or worse plaintiffs, only those with or without
a claim.”). For an additional extensive and thoughtful examination, see Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371 (1988).
208. Nonetheless, I welcome an examination of fee-shifting regimes. Some
commentators have suggested that Kelman’s success in amending the cost principles
to disallow the costs related to protests was one factor leading to reduced protest
activity, particularly among small organizations. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-47(f)(8)
(2000) (prohibiting costs if incurred in connection with protests of Federal
Government solicitations or contract awards). “The most common device for
encouraging lawsuits is to shift the usual ‘American Rule’ on fees so that a party with
a meritorious lawsuit can recover legal fees.” Rabkin, supra note 176, at 195; see also
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These contractors and prospective contractors, not a hungry
plaintiff’s bar, need to be motivated to more aggressively protect their
209
rights. For that reason, I turn my attention first to protests, which
have generated significant debate regarding private attorneys general
210
in the past, and then to disputes.


Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(providing the primary fee-shifting device in government contracting for courts); 5
U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (granting the primary fee-shifting device in
government contracting for the administrative boards). A wealth of literature
addresses the EAJA experience, now spanning almost twenty years. See generally
Louise L. Hill, Equal Access to Justice Act—Paving the Way for Legislative Change, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 50, 51 (1985) (discussing foiled efforts to expand the scope of the
law); Donald J. Kinlin, Equal Access to Justice Act, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 266 (1986)
(examining the EAJA experience in government contract disputes); Harold J. Krent,
Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 458, 461 (1993) (supporting, inter alia, automatic fee shifting and other efforts
to reduce litigation involving recovery of fees); Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the
Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Conduct (Part
Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (noting that most of the EAJA’s litigation concerns
the provision for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees unless the United States’
position is substantially justified); Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to
Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L.
REV. 217, 220 (1994) (describing the EAJA as an expansion of the federal
government’s liability for and broad waiver the United States’ sovereign immunity
from the payment of attorney’s fees in civil actions where the federal government’s
position is without substantial justification); John Sullivan, Note, The Equal Access to
Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90 (1984) (criticizing
how federal courts have failed to develop uniform interpretations of the three
substantive EAJA phrases: “prevailing party,” “the position of the United States,” and
“substantially justified”). This approach is not without problems. For example, in
existing statutory regimes where attorney’s fee awards are intended to facilitate
litigation, critics bemoan the restrictive interpretation of the term “prevailing party.”
See, e.g., Shub, supra note 205, at 709-12 (discussing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). For example, it might prove effective to
broaden the existing procurement related fee-shifting mechanism to include otherthan-small contractors and prospective contractors, without any requirement that the
fee-shifting be a two-way street. Imposing upon the contractor community the risk of
fee shifting would chill lawsuits, not facilitate them, and such a result would defeat
the purpose. Further, with the exception of unusual cases (primarily related to
fraud), the government is never the plaintiff in government contract litigation. Thus
the government does not initiate litigation in government contracts matters—the
government merely defends itself. See Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy:
Panacea or Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1995) (introducing a symposium on
fee-shifting and providing a more broad-based discussion of fee-shifting).
209. As Garth, Nagel, and Plager have suggested: “[T]he question now is whether
the incentives are adequate to motivate an attorney to take the case but not such as
to constitute ‘windfall’ fees. It is assumed that law enforcement will take place if the
incentives to litigate a particular case are established at the proper level.” Garth et
al., supra note 205, at 353, 362. Conversely, Rabkin concludes that “[d]isputes about
attorneys’ fees . . . are probably a secondary matter. . . .” Rabkin, supra note 176, at
196. He suggests that “more is needed than the promise of fees far down the road.”
Id. Yet, neither Rabkin’s examples, neither the opportunity to recover punitive
damages nor the qui tam relator’s recovery share, is apt here. To the extent that
contractors and prospective contractors are accidental private attorneys general,
initiating litigation is a business decision related solely to the contract and typically
made without regard to any potential public good that may result. See id. at 194-95.
210. This phenomenon has been examined through the law and economics lens,
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Protests police the contract formation process

Without agreeing with Professor Kelman’s overall conclusion, my
colleague William Kovacic previously summarized “five basic
criticisms of [a] robust decentralized private monitoring” regime in
211
the context of protests. First, protests interfere with the business of
governing. Disappointed offeror litigation, particularly when it
entails injunctive relief, delays agencies’ abilities to obtain goods,
services, and construction. At times, these delays adversely affect
government efficiency and mission accomplishment.
Second,
litigation consumes valuable resources. Both the contractors and the
government expend attorney’s fees. Discovery demands, and in some
matters, hearings or trials, distract both the government’s and the
contractors’ executives and key employees from other duties. Third,
given the competitive business context, “the protest process may be


albeit in a limited, and now obsolete, context. See generally Robert Marshall et al.,
Multiple Litigants With a Public Good Remedy, 16 RES. IN L. & ECON. 151 (1994)
[hereinafter Marshall et al., Multiple Litigants]; Robert C. Marshall et al., Curbing
Agency Problems in the Procurement Process By Protest Oversight, 25 RAND J. ECON. 297
(1994) [hereinafter Marshall et al., Curbing Agency Problems] (examining the
phenomena of the protest process via deterrence, litigation, revision of solicitations,
and settlements); Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 2 (examining
the phenomena[ON?] of private attorneys general through a legal and economic
perspective). Professor Marshall and his colleagues, all economists, focused upon
the protest regime here. Unfortunately (in retrospect), they devoted most of their
attention to “the particular question of the efficacy of the General Services
Administration Board of Contact Appeals (“GSBCA”) bid protest process, as applied
to federal computer and telecommunications procurements.” Id. at 3. The GSBCA,
alternatively loved and reviled during its tumultuous tenure, represents a failed
experiment—Congress repealed the GSBCA’s jurisdiction in 1996, a mere decade
after unleashing it upon the Government’s information technology marketplace. See
generally Brook Act, 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101,
110 Stat. 186, 680 (1996). The forum’s high sustain rate (i.e., protestors frequently
overturned agency procurement actions and awards); permissive discovery; liberal
use of protective orders (which, in effect, barred in-house corporate counsel from
involvement in the litigation); and brutally compressed scheduling imposed by a
congressional mandate that decisions be rendered within forty-five working days of
the action’s commencement, led to a lucrative practice niche for the Washington,
D.C.-area protest bar, while causing debilitating delays in agency information
technology procurements and deep-seeded animosity amongst agency counsel and
procurement professionals. See generally Michael A. Hordell & Eric L. Lipman, The
Rise and Use of Protective Orders at the General Services Board of Contract Appeals, 20 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 22, 28-36 (1990) (describing the protective order as a balance between
competing policy interests and examining the public policies such orders serve);
Frank K. Peterson, In-House Counsel and Protective Orders in Bid Protests, 21 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 53, 54-55 (1991) (commenting on the lack of consistency in granting or denying
access to information to in-house counsel under such protective orders); Richard J.
Webber, Bid Protests and Agency Discretion: Where and Why Do the GSBCA and GAO Part
Company?, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (answering why the GSBCA has been a
more favorable venue than the GAO in hearing bid protests).
211. See Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 489-91 (listing the five
criticisms and explaining each one).
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212

prone to strategic misuse. . . .” An incumbent service contractor or
supplier may benefit if litigation delays contract awards to a
competitor, or even better, if litigation results in a re-solicitation (or
213
new competition).
Fourth, consistent with Professor Kelman’s
primary thesis, protests chill government buyers’ creativity and
214
initiative and discourage exercise of discretion.
Finally, absent
scrutiny of settlements, which occur frequently, competitors might
215
collude to increase prices paid by agency buyers.
Although these criticisms are not without merit, they neither justify
reduced oversight, nor do they address alternative oversight tools.
Further, protest proponents advocate that, while pursuing their own
216
interests, protestors serve the public as private attorneys general.
When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be followed in
carrying out its mandate in a specific area, there should be some
procedure whereby those who are injured by the arbitrary or
capricious action of a governmental agency or official in ignoring
those procedures can vindicate their very real interests, while at the
217
same time furthering the public interest.


212. Id. at 489 (noting that a disappointed offeror may initiate litigation merely to
financially burden a less well capitalized competitor).
213. It is common practice during protest litigation for the buying agency to
utilize a “bridge” contract to maintain existing services or sustain a flow of needed
supplies. The most efficient method for accomplishing this is to change or modify
the incumbent’s contract to mandate additional performance. See generally 48 C.F.R.
pt. 43 (2000). “The Contracting Officer may at any time . . . make changes within
the scope of this contract. . . .” Id. § 52.243-1(a), (b).
214. See Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36, at 489-90 & n.126 (citing, inter
alia, KELMAN, supra note 1).
215. See id. at 490-91 & nn.129 & 131 (citing, inter alia, Marshall et al., Oversight by
Protest, supra note 171, and William E. Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57
ANTITRUST L.J. 517 (1988)).
216. It is not my goal here merely to rehash fields already plowed. Kovacic and
Marshall have plowed that field. See, e.g., Kovacic, Procurement Reform, supra note 36,
at 488 (advocating that these “private attorneys general” are more likely to have
better information than auditors about deviations from procurement statutes);
Marshall et al., Oversight by Protest, supra note 171, at 3 (offering the suggestion that
oversight protesters induce procurement officials to make more consistent decisions
regarding contract awards).
217. Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (following
Judge Frank’s analysis in Assoc. Indus. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)). The court further articulated that “[t]he
public interest in preventing the granting of contracts through arbitrary or
capricious action can properly be vindicated through a suit brought by one who
suffers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought in the
public interest by one acting essentially as a “private attorney general.” Id. The court
adopts the view . . . that government officers were making contracts on behalf of the
government, that Congress is also a participant in the exercise of the government’s
proprietary functions, and that the most practicable way to keep the government’s
contracting officers within their statutory powers is by letting complainants . . . obtain
judicial review of the officers’ action. Id. at 866 & n.9. Finally, the court summarized
that:
If there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of any contracting
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Third-party monitoring takes on added significance in a system in
which previously loose oversight was diluted dramatically during the
1990s. In a robust protest regime, the threat of protests spurs riskaverse behavior, causing many within the procurement community to
comply more faithfully with the relevant statutes, regulations, and
policies. A broad range of protests produce precedent that interprets
evolving standard solicitation provisions and contract clauses, and
218
In turn, this
clarifies proper agency procurement practices.
precedent increases certainty, which reduces the government’s and
the private sector’s transaction costs (or, in other words, increases
systemic efficiency). By enhancing compliance and generating
precedent, protest activity increases the system’s transparency.
Protests also enhance competition by giving potential offerors
confidence in the level nature of the playing field.
d.

Disputes: Unheralded accidental private attorneys general

Unlike the protest regime, little attention has been paid to the role
of the private attorneys general in the contract disputes arena. It has
always struck me as somewhat odd that Kovacic, Marshall, and other
scholars willingly portray protestors as third-party monitors, but fail to
219
This may result because
cast contractors in the same light.
protestors policed a remarkably pristine contract formation system
220
221
without the cadre of resident auditors, inspectors, and others


official, who is going to complain about it, if not the party denied a contract
as a result of the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it will be a very
healthy check on governmental action to allow such suits . . . as a watchdog
of government activity. . . .
Id. at 866-67.
218. Because of the widespread dependence upon standard solicitation provisions,
the value of precedent created by an individual protest likely provides greater value
added than a typical case in the commercial marketplace. See infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
219. Granted, in terms of vocabulary, to the extent that contractors are parties to
government contracts, it may be more appropriate to label these litigants as private
attorneys generals or “external monitors,” rather than third-party monitors.
220. For example, the government frequently establishes a “resident office” within
a contractor’s plant or facility. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 42.602 (2000) (discussing resident
administrative contracting officers (“ACOs”) and their assignments and locations);
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, DCAA CONTRACT AUDIT MANUAL 1-502.3 (2001)
(discussing resident auditors), available at http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/reflib
/DDCAA/0018M/001/ 0018M001doc.htm #T14.
221. The most visible manifestation of this machinery is the Defense Contract
Management Agency (“DCMA”), formerly the Defense Contract Management
Command (“DCMC”) and, before that, the Defense Contract Administration Service
(“DCAS”). See Defense Contract Management Agency Home Page, at http://www.dcmc.
hq.dla.mil/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2000). Although the agency has a limited role before
the award of certain contracts (“perform[ing] a variety of Early Contract
Administration Services (CAS) functions to evaluate the competence, capability, and
reliability of new or existing contractors”), its primary purpose is the administration
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historically present in the contract administration or performance
222
processes. It may also derive from the perception that competition
for business is the key ingredient that spurs third-party monitoring of
the contract formation process.
Nevertheless, contractors who litigate disputes to enforce the
government’s compliance with its bargains improve the integrity of
the procurement process and enhance the transparency of the
system. These contractor-litigants benefit the system by generating
precedent that provides public interpretation of widely used
standardized contract clauses. Moreover, in a more indirect manner,
they increase competition for future government purchases, and
ensure that government pays market (or better) rates for the goods
223
and services it purchases.


of contracts during performance. Id.
After contract award, during the life of a contract, we administer the
contract through final product delivery by providing product and
manufacturing assurance, delivery surveillance, and program integration
services. After the final product is delivered, our contract closeout services
continue until all business, technical, and financial matters are reconciled.
We ensure that our customers receive the right item, at the right time, for
the right price.
FY 00 DCMA Business Plan, Part B—DCMA Long-Range Plan, 1. Comprehensive Mission
and Vision Statements, at http://www.dcmc.hq.dla.mil/Teaminfo/AQBD/2000pln/
00partb.pdf (visited Aug. 5, 2000). In 1999, the Defense Contract Audit Agency
employed more than 3,300 auditors. Id. Although this number may seem large, it
represents a huge decrease. Consistent with the across the board reductions in
acquisition personnel, “the Defense Contract Audit Agency staffing decreased from
7,030 workers in FY 1990 to 3,958 in FY 1999, a reduction of about 44 percent.”
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79, at 7.
222. The contracting officer normally delegates authority to a Contract
Administration Office (“CAO”) to perform contract administration functions. The
CAO may, among other things, review the contractor’s compensation structure and
insurance plans; conduct post-award orientation conferences; determine the
allowability of costs incurred; attempt to resolve issues in controversy; review and
approve contractor’s requests for progress payments; make payments; ensure timely
notification by the contractor of any anticipated cost or schedule overrun; monitor
the contractor’s financial condition; approve contractor acquisition of special test
equipment; perform production support, surveillance, and status reporting; monitor
contractor industrial labor relations; ensure contractor compliance with contractual
quality assurance requirements and contractual safety requirements; perform
engineering surveillance; maintain surveillance of the contractor’s purchasing
system; consent to the placement of subcontracts; evaluate and monitor compliance
with small business subcontracting plans; ensure timely submission of required
reports; accomplish administrative closeout procedures; confirm that the contractor
has a drug-free workplace program; evaluate the contractor’s environmental
practices; administer commercial financing provisions; and deobligate excess funds
after final price determination. See 48 C.F.R. § 42.302(a)(1)-(69) (2000) (identifying
sixty-nine discrete contract administration functions).
223. By publicly holding the government to its bargain, these contractor litigants
demonstrate the system’s integrity and transparency, in effect advertising the
existence of a level playing field.

SCHOONERJCI-CONTRACT.DOC

2001]
i.

FAILURE OF BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT

7/23/2001 12:20 PM

695

Breaching the contingency promise

In the same manner as reduced protests, reduced external
monitoring of contractual performance through disputes threatens
compliance and confidence in the government’s buying regime. This
merits particular attention as Congress reduces the ranks of
acquisition personnel. Agencies must apply their limited resources to
meet their most pressing needs. When faced with applying limited
resources, agencies focus first on awarding contracts and less on
224
administering those contracts once awarded.
As the volume of disputes decreases, the harm appears subtle, but
is nonetheless insignificant. Particularly for reform advocates focused
on efficiencies, reduced disputes activity may prove more harmful
because the inefficiencies, particularly in terms of long-term costs, are
more latent. Reduced disputes activity slowly and subtly, but
inexorably changes the fundamental bargain between purchasing
agencies and the contracting community, which eventually leads to
the government paying more for what it buys.
Most government contracts, and specifically large, complicated,
and long-term agreements, are defined by their ability to address
anticipated and unanticipated contingencies. Accordingly, the most
cited standard Federal procurement contract clauses allocate,
between the parties, the risk of frequently anticipated
225
contingencies.
The hallmark of these standard government


224. For example, “[f]our of the 14 DoD acquisition organizations believed that
less oversight will be placed on contracts for administrative review as the
organizations experience more workforce reductions.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, supra note 79, at 31. Further:
In this regard, DCMC commented that some contractors stated that when
DCMC stopped performing inspections of all products, so did the
contractors. As a result of the lack of inspections and recent failures with
hardware in the Space Program, DCMC is concerned that it may have
reduced its quality assurance program too much. Also, [the Defense
Logistics Agency] stated that customer complaints about the quality of
material received ha[ve] increased; however, it has placed less emphasis on
responding to the customer complaints because of acquisition workforce
reductions.
Id. at 77; see supra note 146 and accompanying text (quantifying the decrease in
internal oversight).
225. The cost principles define a contingency as: “[A] possible future event or
condition arising from presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of which is
indeterminable at the present time.” 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-7(a) (2000). Contingencies
“that may arise from presently known or unknown conditions, the effect of which
cannot be measured so precisely as to provide equitable results to the contractor and
to the Government . . . are to be excluded from cost estimates . . . but should be
disclosed separately . . . to facilitate the negotiation of appropriate contractual
coverage.” Id. § 31.205-7(c)(2); see also Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v.
United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (stating that “long-standing,
deliberately adopted procurement policy” that bidders “need not consider how large
a contingency should be added to the bid to cover the risk”); Differing Site
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contract clauses is their methodical endeavor to control
226
contingencies by: (1) demanding that contractors not pad their
bids/offers when competing for government business; and (2) reassuring those contractors that the government will equitably adjust
227
contracts to reimburse for unforeseen contingencies. I refer to this
as the contingency promise. In exchange for the contractor’s willingness
not to inflate its contract price to insulate itself against certain contingencies,
the government agrees to make the contractor whole if such contingencies occur.
The effectiveness of this promise plays a key role in the government’s
ability to obtain goods and services at prices at or below the
commercial market.
During the performance of government contracts, if an
unanticipated contingency arises that requires the contractor to incur
228
additional costs, the parties have a number of options.
For
example: (1) The contracting officer and the contractor may agree
on compensation and enter into a bilateral modification of the
229
contract; (2) the contracting officer can unilaterally determine the


Conditions Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2 (2000) (anticipating subsurface or latent
physical conditions that differ from the contract or unknown and unusual physical
site conditions); Changes Clause, id. § 52.243-1 (anticipating potential changes
within the scope of the contract); Government Furnished Property Clause, id. §
52.245-2(a)(3)-(4) (anticipating potentially defective, or late delivery of, government
furnished property); Termination for Convenience Clause, id. § 52.249-2
(anticipating the Government’s need to end contracts for a host of non-contractual
reasons); Richard J. Kendall, Changed Conditions As Misrepresentations in Government
Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 978, 979-82 (1967) (discussing the
common law doctrine of misrepresentation and the Changed Conditions Clause).
All of the aforementioned clauses include a similar remedy—reimbursement of all
allowable costs, plus an allowance for profit.
226. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism
in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 695-97 (1996) (discussing
the use of standardized clauses to anticipate unforeseeable contingencies in
government contracts). For additional discussion of the Winstar litigation, see
Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of Congruence in Government Contracts
Law?, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 481 (1997).
227. Contingency planning strikes at the core of Federal procurement policy. See
generally Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 693, 698-99 (1966) (“[T]erms and conditions . . . are an attempt . . . to define
the remedies of the parties for most foreseeable contingencies that may occur. . . .
Little is left to the workings of the common law of contracts since these standard
terms and conditions represent a relatively thorough statement of intended risk
allocation.”).
228. In addition to these options, the contractor may choose simply to absorb the
additional costs and continue performance. As discussed below, the contractor may
forego the claim if its assessment of the 1990s reforms—such as the evaluation of past
performance—persuades it that the opportunity cost of pursuing the claim
outweighs the value of the claim. Furthermore, stopping work is a far less attractive
option for a government contractor than it would be for a contractor in the
commercial marketplace. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
229. See 48 C.F.R. § 43.103(a) (2000) (allowing the parties to make negotiated
equitable adjustments, definitive letter contracts, and reflect the parties’ other
agreements).
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230

additional compensation to be paid; and (3) the contracting officer
can deny additional compensation, which likely prompts the
231
contractor to file a claim, commencing the disputes process.
The
long-standing contingency promise is premised on the assumption
that the contractor can and will utilize the disputes mechanism to
232
pursue these claims.
In the eyes of the contractor community, however, the Kelman
regime discourages contractors from pursuing their claims, which as
some suggest, stigmatizes those that do pursue their contractual
rights through litigation. For example, contractors fear that they will
receive degraded past performance ratings if their government
233
customer perceives them as litigious. Although this may not be the
reason, it is unmistakable that the volume of dispute litigation has
decreased by more than two-thirds in less than a decade. It is fanciful
to assume that the frequency of unanticipated events plummeted
during the 1990s or that government officials promptly and
unhesitatingly paid contractors appropriate sums for unanticipated
work. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that contractors, for
whatever reason, have chosen to rely less frequently on the disputes
process to make themselves whole in their contractual relationships
234
with the government.
It makes no difference whether reinvented government explicitly
or implicitly dissuaded contractors from aggressively pursuing their
rightful entitlement to hold the government to its bargain. In the


230. See id. §§ 43.103(b), 43.201 (describing various unilateral changes that the
parties can make under clauses other than a changes clause).
231. See id. §§ 33.206, 52.233-1 (discussing the initiation of a claim and the clause
governing such disputes).
232. The contingency promise also depends upon the existence of an accessible,
reasonably inexpensive, expeditious, and fair process for the resolution of claims and
disputes. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 607(e) (1994) (“An agency board shall provide to the
fullest extent practicable, informal, expeditious, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes. . . .”); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing whether the
current fora provide such a process).
233. Although the contractor community has expressed this concern vociferously,
it has been unable to obtain statutory or regulatory protection from retaliatory
downgrading of performance based upon the pursuit of valid claims. The Office of
Federal Procurement Policy recently addressed the issue in a non-binding policy
document, articulating that “[t]he source selection team should be cautious not to
downgrade or penalize offerors for the judicious use of the contract claims process.”
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 95, ch. 3. Although this general statement represents a
step in the right direction, the contractor community’s anxiety remains justified.
234. I would welcome any empirical evidence demonstrating (1) that the
frequency with which unanticipated problems arise in federal procurement has
decreased steadily for a decade; (2) the existence of a culture change in which freespending contracting officers disburse government funds freely to maintain positive
relations with their contracting partners; or (3) that contractors willingly volunteer to
absorb additional costs incurred in the performance of individual contracts without
adjusting their pricing practices for prospective work.
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future, contractors will have little choice but to pad their bids/offers,
235
thereby inflating the prices the government pays for what it buys.
In the long run, this diluting of the deal will require that the
government—and, accordingly, the taxpayers—pay significantly more
for what the government buys. Moreover, as discussed below, this
concern is exacerbated by statutory requirements relating to the
certification of claims, a predicate to engaging in government
contract dispute litigation.
ii. Avoiding another certification externality
To the extent that the Kelman regime’s chilling of contractors’
willingness to litigate has violated the contingency promise, a related
issue merits brief examination. Since 1978, the Contract Disputes
236
Act intentionally tilted the playing field to discourage frivolous
237
The CDA requires that, in pursuing recovery of increased
claims.


235. Additional empirical research could lead to an actuarial comparison of the
risks (the perceived contingencies or the “unknown unknowns”) and premiums (bid
or proposal price increases) involved. Whether the government’s total costs increase
depends, in large part, upon contractors’ ability to accurately predict the frequency
with which contingencies actually arise. If, based upon the imperfect information
available to them, contractors perceive a likelihood of confronting contingencies
that exceeds the government’s actual experience, violation of the contingency
promise will increase the government’s total expenditures.
236. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
237. For well over a decade, the intense focus upon the jurisdictional
ramifications of the certification masked this externality. Courts and administrative
boards struggled with the issue of whether certification was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the commencement of litigation. Congress finally resolved the matter
and specified that the certification requirement “shall not deprive a court or [BCA]
of jurisdiction . . . .” 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(6) (1994); see also 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(f)
(2000) (noting that a defective certification must be corrected prior to the entry of a
final judgment by a court or decision by an agency BCA). Literature exists discussing
the prolonged, expensive, inefficient, and often bitter litigation concerning
certification in the context of a jurisdictional prerequisite. See generally Frank Baltz,
A Checklist for Negotiating the Dawco Minefield, 30 PROCUREMENT L. 4 (1995); C. Stanley
Dees & Stephen D. Knight, Certification Requirements and Problems of Contract Claims
and Requests for Relief, 12 PUB. CONT. L.J. 162 (1982) (outlining the certification
requirements of the CDA and the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act of 1979);
Robert H. Koehler, Certifying Claims under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978—The Ghost
of Rickover Past, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25 (1991) (analyzing the debate surrounding who
qualifies as a proper corporate officer under the Federal Acquisition Regulation);
Jeffrey A. Lovitky, Frequently Encountered Problems with Certification of Claims Under the
Contract Disputes Act, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 511 (1987) (discussing the merits of the
arguments in the debate regarding the problems arising out of certification of
government contract claims); Val S. McWhorter & Carl T. Hahn, Virtual Final
Decisions on Government Claims, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 157 (1997) (discussing the statutory
and historical foundations of final decision requirements for government contract
claims and analyzing the subsequent treatment of these requirements); Val S.
McWhorter & Carl T. Hahn, Disputing the Meaning of a Claim: The Fallout from Dawco
Construction, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 451 (1994) (concluding that the Dawco decision has
complicated the claims filing process and has done little to foster the negotiation of
claims); Val S. McWhorter & Carl T. Hahn, Dawco’s Dispute Requirement is Bad Law and
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costs under government contracts, contractors must certify their
238
The certification specifies that, with regard to the
claims.
contractor’s claims, inter alia, the “amount requested accurately
reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the
239
government is liable . . . .”
This certification requirement prompts
two relevant outcomes. First, as Congress intended, the certification
requirement prompts risk-averse behavior, and in so doing, chills
240
contractor willingness to submit frivolous or even marginal claims.
Second, it restrains contractors from inflating their initial demands
or prayers for relief in anticipation of settlement bargaining, or in an
effort to cover their costs of claim preparation or litigation.
The legislative history of the CDA reflects that Congress accepted
241
Admiral Hyman Rickover’s
assertions that “contractors often
submitted unsupported and inflated claims . . . ,” and that
certification was necessary “to insure that complete[,] clear and
242
honest claims are presented to Federal contracting officers. . . .” To


Bad Policy, 30 PROCUREMENT L. 21 (1994); Mary Mitchelson, Dawco’s Dispute
Requirement Is a Sound Element of the Dispute Resolution Process, 30 PROCUREMENT L. 20
(1994); Henry J. Schweiter, Post-Award Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction of the Claims
Court and the BCA over Non-monetary Claims: Faithful Statutory Construction or the
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277 (1989) (concluding that
jurisdictional disparity between available forums makes future jurisdictional litigation
virtually inevitable); V.J. Zupa, When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 654
(1993) (discussing the new procedural roadblock created by the Dawco decision). I
have suggested previously that, to the extent that the current certification
requirement no longer has jurisdictional significance, and to the extent that neither
contractors nor advocates believe that the certification requirement encourages
settlement, the certification requirement has outlived its usefulness. See Steven L.
Schooner, What Next? A Heuristic Approach to Revitalizing the Contract Disputes Act of
1978, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635, 649-50 (1999).
238. See Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 6(c)(1), 92 Stat. 2383, 2385 (1978) (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1) (1994)) (requiring certification for claims over
$50,000).
239. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1) (1994). The statute requires a four-part certification
for claims exceeding $100,000. In addition to the non-inflation statement,
contractors must also certify that: (1) the claim is made in good faith; (2) that the
supporting data are accurate and complete; and (3) that the certifier is authorized to
certify on the contractor’s behalf. See id.; see also 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c), (e) (2000)
(specifying the certification’s text and that it may be executed by “any person duly
authorized to bind the contractor with respect to the claim”).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 128 & 137 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
contractors are discouraged from pursuing claims).
241. See Koehler, supra note 237, at 35-37 (discussing the content of Admiral
Rickover’s testimony regarding the certification requirement). Admiral Rickover’s
familiar moniker, the “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” is inscribed on his tombstone at
Arlington National Cemetery. See Arlington National Cemetery Website, at http://www.
arlingtoncemetery.com/hymangeo.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2000).
242. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5242;
H.R. REP. NO. 102-1006, pt. 1, at 28 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921, 3937;
Skelly & Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (discussing the
certification requirements of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978). Mark Roe’s
description of path dependence as “the history of problems that had to be solved in
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ensure compliance with this non-inflation requirement, Congress
made contractors liable “for an amount equal to such unsupported
243
part of the claim. . . .” Today, it is reasonable to conclude that the
requirement survived either through inertia or because it is
advantageous to “trigger[] a contractor’s potential liability for a
244
fraudulent claim. . . .”
In any event, the certification requirement
continues to meet Admiral Rickover’s aim of sanctioning frivolous
claims, and more broadly, chilling contractors’ demands for
reimbursement.
More troubling is that, despite its best intentions, the non-inflation
245
constructs a scenario in which,
element of the certification
regardless of the merit of a contractor’s claim, the contractor can
246
never be made entirely whole.
Through its application, the
247
certification requirement limits contractors’ claims to the amount


the past but that may be irrelevant today” seems apt. See Roe, supra note 73, at 668.
243. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (1994) states:
If a contractor is unable to support any part of his claim and it is determined
that such inability is attributable to misrepresentation of fact or fraud on the
part of the contractor, he shall be liable to the Government for an amount
equal to such unsupported part of the claim in addition to all costs to the
Government attributable to the cost of reviewing said part of his claim.
Id.
244. Skelly & Loy, 685 F.2d at 418 & n.11; see also S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 8 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5242; H.R. REP. NO. 102-1006, pt. 1, at 28 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921, 3937.
245. What is so surprising is that the pervasive certification requirement was
created by the Contract Disputes Act, the statute that eliminated an equally illconceived edifice—the arguably pointless distinction between judicial and
administrative fora jurisdiction to consider breach matters. Under the CDA, both the
Court of Federal Claims and the agency boards of contact appeals enjoy jurisdiction
to resolve matters not only arising under, but also relating to a contract. See 41 U.S.C.
§§ 605, 607(d) (1994).
The pre-1978 distinction between matters involving
remedy—granting clauses—which were covered by the Disputes Clause, and breach
matters, proved unnecessarily problematic. See, e.g., Joseph Sachter, Resolution of
Disputes Under United States Government Contracts: Problems and Proposals, 2 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 363, 366 (1969) (suggesting that “[t]he distinction is perhaps better understood
in the context of . . . court decisions which speak of disputes over rights given by the
contract and disputes over violations of the contracts”) (emphasis in original). The latter
of these, by arising outside of the contract, permits immediate access to the courts. Id.
See also David V. Anthony, Recommendations Concerning Legal and Administrative
Remedies for Contract Claims: A Workable Remedies Package, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 300,
301-04 (1974) (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 401
(1966)) (discussing the pre-CDA “rules that give boards of contract appeals
jurisdiction over one kind of contract claim, claims arising ‘under the contract,’ and
the Court of Claims jurisdiction over another kind of claim, ‘breach of contract’”).
246. For example, “The cost of preparation and presentation of claims against the
United States is not includable in . . . [a] damages award.” CIBINIC & NASH,
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 34, at 770; see also 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-47 (2000)
(specifying when costs incurred in connection with proceedings are recoverable).
The exception is that small businesses have a better chance of achieving something
akin to complete cost recovery due to the Equal Access to Justice Act. See supra note
208.
247. The contractor’s claim can be analogized to a prayer for relief. Eight
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248

Contractors cannot
of the incurred costs they can demonstrate.
249
Further, with
recover the costs associated with claim preparation.
250
the exception of some small business contractors, contractors can
neither recover their attorney’s fees incurred in litigation against the
Federal Government, nor can contractors include these costs in their
251
252
overhead pools.
As a result, if a contractor is forced to litigate

commonly articulated elements of a claim in this context include: (1) a demand;
(2) in writing; (3) for a sum certain of money; and (4) submission to the contracting
officer for a decision. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994); 48 C.F.R. §§ 33.201, 52.233-1(c)
(2000). For claims exceeding $100,000, the remaining four elements of a claim are
accurate and complete supporting data, representations relating to good faith, noninflation of the claim, and authority to certify. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(5)-(8) (1994);
48 C.F.R. §§ 33.207, 52.233-1(d)(2) (2000).
248. Government contractors cannot avail themselves of many remedies available
in the conventional contract disputes. See, e.g., Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States,
324 F.2d 516, 519-20 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (rejecting a fair market approach, and explaining
that contractors are only entitled to recover their costs incurred, not the value of the
services provided); CIBINIC & NASH, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 34, at 684-86
(explaining “value measures” and discussing cases pertaining to that concept).
Further, “[t]here has been almost no recovery against the Government for
consequential damages.” Id. at 732. Similarly, specific performance is not a remedy
available to government contractors, because it “would unduly interfere with
government operations.” Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43
VILL. L. REV. 155, 155 (1998); see also 48 C.F.R. §§ 43.205(f), 52.243-6 (2000)
(discussing the government’s right to require change order accounting).
249. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available
to contractors in contract disputes). Further, given the statutory and regulatory
requirements for disclosure of incurred costs, the expenses associated with
government contract claim preparation dwarf the costs of preparing a similar
demand in the commercial marketplace.
250. Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, small contractors may recover
their attorneys fees in disputes if they are a prevailing party, the government’s
position is not substantially justified, and no special circumstances would make award
of attorney’s fees unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). There are no
similar fee-shifting devices available to large contractors.
251. “Costs . . . are unallowable if incurred in connection with . . . the prosecution
of claims or appeals against the Federal Government. . . .” 48 C.F.R. § 31.20547(f)(1) (2000) (referencing 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (2000), which deals with claims and
disputes). These unallowable costs include, inter alia,
administrative and clerical expenses; the costs of legal services, whether
performed by in-house or private counsel; the costs of the services of
accountants, consultants, or others . . . ; costs of employees . . . ; and any
similar costs incurred before, during, and after commencement of a judicial
or administrative proceeding which bears a direct relationship to the
proceedings.
Id. § 31.205-47(a).
252. Bear in mind that a government contractor is not entitled to simply perform
to the letter of the contract and avoid potential disputes with the government. The
government enjoys broad bilateral or unilateral rights to modify its contracts. See 48
C.F.R. § 43.103(a)-(b) (2000). “The Contracting Officer may at any time, by written
order . . . make changes within the general scope of this contract[.]” Id. (2000); see
also id. § 52.243-4(a), 52.243-5(a). This powerful tool implicates one of the most
unique aspects of government contract disputes regime—the “procedure to prevent
disputes from disrupting performance by giving the government the contractual
right to require the contractor to continue performance in the manner directed by
the government.” Joel P. Shedd, Jr., Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of
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against the government to recover money to which it is entitled as a
matter of law, the maximum recovery to which the contractor is entitled
is the amount of the contractor’s actual loss less the cost of pursuing its
valid claims. Any effort to pad a claim so that the recovery would
include the costs of litigating against the government would be
253
considered fraudulent behavior.
The certification requirement, therefore, exacerbates the
government’s subtle breach of the contingency promise. Contractors
may no longer rely on the expectation that, in exchange for their
willingness not to inflate their contract prices to insulate themselves
against certain contingencies, they can rely on the disputes
procedures to make themselves whole if contingencies occur. First,
contractors perceive that the opportunity costs associated with
pursuing valid claims have risen. Second, contractors recognize that,
even if they elect to pursue their valid claims through litigation, they
cannot be made whole. Accordingly, as reasonable business people,
they have no choice but to insulate themselves against contingencies
before entering into government contracts by raising the prices they
demand for goods and services. Specifically, the breach of the
contingency promise and the effect of the certification requirement
erodes the government’s right to expect that contractors will sell to
the government at prices at or below the commercial market.
Acquisition reform advocates have yet to acknowledge these costs.
3.

Diluted contract interpretation: Diminished litigation’s externality
Oversight is not the only value that third-party monitoring brings.
For good or ill, litigation provides the primary vehicle for clarifying
procurement regulations and standard clauses on which the


Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 40 (1964); see also Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 877 (1978) (approvingly recognizing
the government contract regime in the context of non-disruptive dispute settlement,
because “it often behooves contract planners to plan for continuing relations in the
face of conflict”); Carl L. Vacketta & Thomas C. Wheeler, A Government Contractor’s
Right to Abandon Performance, 65 GEO. L.J. 27, 28 (1976) (“[T]he Government has
determined as a matter of procurement policy that it is always in its best interest to
obtain timely performance[, and] . . . that it must receive prompt and diligent
performance from a contractor even when the common law would not entitle the
Government to receive such performance because of the Government’s
misfeasance.”).
253. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 604 (1994) (discussing liability stemming from
fraudulent claims); see also 48 C.F.R. § 33.209 (2000) (“If the contractor is unable to
support any part of the claim and there is evidence that the inability is attributable to
misrepresentation of fact or to fraud on the part of the contractor, the contracting
officer shall refer the matter to the agency official responsible for investigating
fraud.”).
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254

The value of
government’s contractual obligations are based.
255
precedent generally, and specifically in a highly regulated system
subject to frequent congressional modification, cannot be
256
overstated. In the procurement regime, buyers, sellers, and counsel
routinely utilize standard solicitation provisions and contract
257
clauses. Accordingly, the published, precedential interpretation of
those provisions and clauses by the GAO, the boards of contract
appeals, and the Court of Federal Claims serve to inform buyers and
258
sellers, and in so doing, modulate behavior.
If, when faced with


254. The literature suggests a broad range of opinion on this issue. See, e.g.,
Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party
Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 256 (1999) (“Settlement and
precedent conflict because the former necessarily precludes the later.”); Luban,
Settlements, supra note 32, at 2622-23 (“Rules and precedents . . . have obvious
importance for guiding future behavior and imposing order and certainty on a
transactional world that would otherwise be in flux and chaos.”); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement
(In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2678-82 (1995); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 262, 280-84 (1978);
Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent, supra note 91 (“In a legal system such as ours, in
which legislative bodies confine themselves for the most part to prescribing general
norms of conduct rather than highly specific rules, the published decisions of courts
and administrative agencies interpreting and applying the legislative enactments are
important sources of the specific rules of law.”).
255. See generally supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing ADR and its
effect on formal adjudication). Further, James Madison recognized that “[a]ll new
laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,
until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions
and adjudications.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
287-93 (1977) (reflecting on literature in the field of political science addressing the
consequences of court decisions and criticizing, inter alia, “the unfortunate
assumption that how a party implements a court order is no part of judicial
business”).
256. “Precedents can be expected to depreciate more rapidly in areas of law in
which there is considerable statutory activity, since a change in statutory law will tend
to make precedents based on earlier statutory language obsolete.” Landes & Posner,
Legal Precedent, supra note 91, at 269. Moreover, frequent, broad-based judicial review
of agency decision-making serves the public interest. See generally Linda R. Hirshman,
Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
646, 703-04 (1988) (discussing various positions in the debate over agency discretion,
and arguing for active judicial review).
257. The Federal Acquisition Regulation distinguishes between: (1) solicitation
provisions, which identify terms or conditions used only in solicitations (e.g., request
for proposal, invitation for bid) and applying only before contract award; and
(2) contract clauses, which include terms or conditions used in contracts, and
applying after contract award or both before and after award. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.101
(2000) (explaining the use of provision and clause numbers, prescriptions, prefaces,
and the matrix). For an informative table identifying all of the required or optional
government-wide provisions and clauses, organized by the numerous contract types
utilized by the government (e.g., fixed-price supply, cost-reimbursement supply,
fixed-price research and development, cost-reimbursement construction, time and
materials, commercial item, etc.), see 48 C.F.R. § 52.301 (2000).
258. See generally supra note 82 (noting that ADR deprives the procurement
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erroneous or improper government action, parties fail to exercise
their due process rights (or, having exercised those rights, resolve
259
their differences with sealed settlement agreements), their mistakes
serve no greater good. The reduction in precedent fails to apprise
other buyers, sellers, or counsel of valuable lessons learned.
The existing regulatory regime places an enormous pedagogical
value on precedential decisions in interpreting commonly used
260
The drafters of the
contractual terms and conditions.
government’s procurement rule book, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, avoid inserting extensive guidance into the published
261
regulations.
As a result, just as a robust litigation regime tests the
validity of regulations implementing a constantly-evolving
262
congressional scheme, the reported protest and dispute precedent
provides necessary interpretation and guidance to counsel and the
263
procurement professionals they advise. Further, as suggested above

community of vital information regarding contract clauses and provisions, practices,
and policies).
259. One of my primary reservations with regard to the ADR movement is the
public’s diminished access to and scrutiny of settlements. I find this particularly
troubling given the number of experienced agency counsel that express their belief
that their agencies today willingly pay out larger settlements to comply with the
“spirit” of their agency’s ADR initiatives and mandates.
260. For an analogous examination of commonly used terms in corporate
contracts, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). The
authors suggest that commonly used terms offer potential learning benefits,
including: “(a) drafting efficiency; (b) reduced uncertainty over the meaning and validity
of a term due to prior judicial rulings; and (c) familiarity with a term among lawyers[]
[and] other professionals. . . .” Id. at 719-20 (emphasis added).
261. Given the daunting size of the regulation, 48 C.F.R. ch. 1, this may come as a
surprise. Nonetheless, “[t]he Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established
for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all
executive agencies.” 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (2000) (emphasis added). The drafters
historically have refrained from including extensive guidance in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. Principle 1(b) of the drafting guide directs drafters to:
“Limit FAR requirements (including provisions and clauses) to the minimum necessary
to—(1) Implement statutes and Executive branch policy; (2) Correct a critical
problem or deficiency; or (3) Otherwise add value to the overall procurement
process.” Federal Acquisition Regulation Drafting Guide, at http://www.arnet.gov/far/
draftingguide.htm#chapter1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (emphasis added).
262. Directly affected contractors—interested parties, knowingly or unknowingly
serving as private attorneys general—are in the best position to probe and prod new
laws and regulations to ensure their validity, accuracy, and effectiveness.
The political power which the Americans have entrusted to their courts of
justice is therefore immense, but the evils of this power are considerably
diminished by the impossibility of attacking the laws except through the
courts of justice. . . . The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a
real want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as
the basis of a prosecution.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1972).
263. “Judicial opinions can reduce uncertainty regarding the validity and meaning
of a term and the interaction of the term with relevant legal requirements. . . . This
reduction in uncertainty reduces the expected costs of corporate planning and of
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and discussed further below, I perceive that the norms of the
purchasing regime are threatened not only by diminished protest
264
volume, but also by the anemic pace of new contract disputes.
4.

Diminished oversight threatens public trust
It is striking that Professor Kelman, the Clinton Administration’s
architect of acquisition reinvention, anticipated and warned against
reduced oversight as a by-product of procurement reform. Even to
the extent that he perceived that the 1980s regulatory framework
burdened the process with an “enormous toll on the quality of
performance, . . . [he conceded that] we are obliged to seek other
265
ways of reaching the goal of keeping corruption down.”
Specifically, Professor Kelman cautioned that:
Any loosening of the procurement regulatory straightjacket should
be accompanied by, and linked to, increased resources for public
corruption investigations to investigate units both outside the line
agencies responsible for procurement and within those
agencies. . . . Deregulation of the procurement system should also
be accompanied by an increase in criminal penalties for
procurement corruption. . . . A public announcement of increased
resources devoted to investigation and of increased penalties would
allow elected officials who might otherwise be worried that


litigating disputes regarding a contract term.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 260, at
722. For a more cynical assessment of the use of case law to broadly communicate
the rule of law, see K. N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47
YALE L.J. 1243, 1243-44 (1938) (“Where we have a statute, we know at least what its
words are. . . . But in the field of case-law . . . even the sureness about what the
precise authoritative words are . . . is almost wholly lacking.”). Kahan & Klausner also
suggest that “widespread use of a term can offer . . . network benefits[,] . . . [which]
include higher quality and lower cost legal and professional services in the future, as
lawyers and accountants gain (and retain) expertise by encountering questions or
disputes regarding a particular contract term.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 260, at
726.
264. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (distinguishing protests and the
disputes).
265. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 96. The current trend of reduced oversight is
particularly startling when juxtaposed against the aggressive 1980s reforms intended
to eliminate, or at least reduce, fraud, waste, and abuse in government contracting.
Many of the 1980s reforms, such as increased contractor certifications and
representations, with correspondingly increased penalties for non-compliance,
derived from highly publicized scandals within the Department of Defense, such as
the Ill-Wind Investigation. See generally, e.g., ANDY PASZTOR, WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS
FOR SALE (1995); JAMES G. BURTON, THE PENTAGON WARS: REFORMERS CHALLENGE THE
OLD GUARD (1993) (discussing the fraud and corruption regarding Pentagon
procurements during the 1980s). Nor was the 1980s trend Congress’ first attempt to
ratchet up contracting officials’ ethical and behavioral standards. See generally Harold
C. Petrowitz, Conflict of Interest in Federal Procurement, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 196,
196 (1964) (“As government has grown more and more pervasive, standards of
conduct for public officials have been pushed ever upward until they now stand at an
all time high.”).
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procurement deregulation signaled a withering of concern over
public integrity, to display a visible signal of continuing
266
concern. . . .

Professor Kelman anticipated, and willingly conceded, that broad
procurement reforms would be accompanied by new or increased
monitoring tools to ensure that agency buyers and contractors
complied with the revised rules. Thus, Professor Kelman and I agree
that, whether or not trade-offs are required, there is a symbiotic
relationship between procurement reform and the need for
267
meaningful oversight. Accordingly, I readily concede that many, if
not most, of Professor Kelman’s reforms permit the government to
procure high quality goods and services more quickly, expending less
money, and potentially resulting in higher end user (e.g., agency)
satisfaction. I part company with Professor Kelman because his
implementation efforts failed to recognize that oversight generally,
and third-party monitoring specifically, could add significant value to
268
this flexible, discretionary, and rapidly evolving buying regime.


266. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 98-99. Kelman also suggests “[d]eregulation of the
procurement system should . . . be accompanied by an increase in the criminal
penalties for procurement corruption.” Id. at 98.
267. In this regard, I reject “the essential claim[] of formal legalism . . . that
bureaucrats should have no discretion in either making or implementing policy.”
JOHN P. BURKE, BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1986). Instead, I concede that
bureaucrats, particularly public purchasers, require a great deal of discretion to
make business judgments, and, in that manner, those bureaucrats may resemble
their private sector counterparts. But, the comparison ends by adding the lens of
transparency. The public purchaser’s discretionary actions must remain subject to
scrutiny, not only to ensure the buyer’s legal compliance, but to demonstrate to the
public that confidence in that compliance is warranted. Having herein broached
formal legalism, I concede that in my effort to frame my disagreement with Kelman,
I have found the most commonly utilized rubrics for analyzing issues involving
bureaucratic authority and discretion wanting. See generally, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The
Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (detailing the
formalist model (which captures the nondelegation doctrine), the expertise model,
the judicial review model, and the market/pluralist, or interest-group model);
Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The
Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385 (discussing the rule of law ideal, the public
purpose ideal, and the democratic process ideal); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992)
(“[G]overnment’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about
altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common good.”).
268. I concede that “[t]he fact that government cannot be run just like a business
does not mean it cannot become more entrepreneurial. . . .” DAVID OSBORNE & TED
GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS
TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 22 (1992) (emphasis in original). Similarly, I
agree that “[f]ew Americans would really want government to act just like a
business—making quick decisions behind closed doors for a private profit.” Id. It is
on this latter point that I perceive that Kelman’s compass has lost its course. As one
commentator remarked, “Kelman’s zeal for the private sector’s way of doing business
is matched only by his disgust for the government’s traditional approach.” Ripley,
supra note 24, at 46.
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Change management and brinkmanship

I remain perplexed by Professor Kelman’s relentless determination
to pursue something akin to a pure form of entrepreneurial
government, rather than accepting a compromise that may entail a
269
more businesslike system that features adequate monitoring. In my
view, this raises a curious possibility. Professor Kelman is an
270
articulate champion of the change management discipline.
Professor Kelman rejects incrementalism. Rather, he believes that
dramatic change is necessary to counter inertia and change behavior.
Professor Kelman felt strongly that dramatic change was a key
ingredient in convincing seasoned procurement personnel that,
despite their career training and experience in rule adherence, their
new mandate required them to exercise discretion, and more
importantly, constantly innovate. Accordingly, I am inclined to
reconcile Professor Kelman’s disregard of the need for controls and
deterrence—which his writings support—as goal-oriented behavior.
During his time in Washington, D.C., Professor Kelman focused his
energy on swinging the pendulum as far toward the corporate model
271
as possible. In so doing, it was safe for Professor Kelman to assume
that others, driven by more traditional values, eventually would
burden the procurement system with appropriate oversight
mechanisms.
b.

What price efficiency?

It may seem unfair to fault Professor Kelman for neglecting
oversight while he was swept into the frenzy surrounding the
acquisition reform bandwagon. The Clinton Administration, private
industry, and the trade press showered Professor Kelman with praise
for leading the government reinvention movement. At the same
time, no one expected the Vice President to present “hammer
awards” for increasing investment in oversight, auditing, or
272
Maintaining, and more specifically, funding an
compliance.


269. This is not to say that striking a happy medium would be easy. “The difficulty
of striking a reasonable balance between rules and discretion is an age-old problem
for which there is no ‘objective’ solution any more than there is to the tension
between other competing human values such as freedom and order, love and
discipline, or change and stability.” WILSON, supra note 19, at 342.
270. See generally Steven Kelman, Making Change: Why Change Occurs in Federal
Organization—and Why its Pace is Likely to Increase in the New Millenium, GOV’T EXEC.,
Jan. 2000, at 28 (discussing the evolution of a more businesslike approach to Federal
Government procurement programs). Kelman’s recommended readings along these
lines led to my review. See generally Schooner, supra note 27.
271. For additional discussion of the frequent use of the “pendulum” analogy in
descriptions of acquisition reform, see supra note 144.
272. The NPR’s most visible manifestation of success in reinvinenting government
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oversight regime, is difficult; however, during the 1990s, it may have
273
In the absence of a pending scandal,
seemed nearly impossible.
little credit is assigned for investing in oversight to avoid future
274
scandals.
Driven to make the procurement system more
businesslike, Professor Kelman appears disinclined to support such
investment, discarding what he previously perceived as a clear
mandate.
I take very seriously the goal of keeping the level of corruption in
government low. The costs of government corruption are far
greater than the monetary or performance losses to the
government that result from corrupt bargains. Public corruption
can devastate the ethical tone of society as a whole and decrease
the inclination of citizens to behave ethically in their everyday
lives. . . . Thus, even the economist Arthur Okun has written that
government ‘should spend $20 to prevent the theft of $1 of public
275
funds.’


is a blatant criticism of the pre-reform procurement system. “The Award is the Vice
President’s answer to yesterday’s government and its $400 hammer. Fittingly, the
award consists of a $6.00 hammer, a ribbon, and a note from Vice President Gore, all
in an aluminum frame.” National Performance Review, Hammer Awards Web Page, at
http://www.npr.gov/library/awards/hammer/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2000).
“Nominations must show real innovation in at least one of the following areas of
reinvention: Putting customers first; Empowering employees; Cutting red tape;
Cutting back to basics (stop doing things not in core mission); Achieving results
Americans care about.” National Performance Review, Criteria for Vice President Gore’s
Hammer Awards, at http://www.npr.gov/library/awards/hammer/criteria.html (last
visited Aug. 18, 2000).
273. Moreover, it has also been suggested that congressional oversight diminished
during the 1990s because: (1) then-Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt
Gingrich, shifted committee resources from programmatic oversight towards a
partisan effort to expose alleged corruption in the Clinton administration; and
(2) Republican efforts to reduce the size of the congressional bureaucracy limited
traditional oversight resources. See Eric Pianin, In Congress, GOP Leaders Take On
Oversight, WASH. POST, July 28, 2000, at A23. Conversely, these criticisms are not a
recent phenomenon. See, e.g., James B. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected
Congressional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 277 (1975) (arguing that Congress appears
to be content with reacting to administrative decision-making problems on an
emergency basis rather than conducting effective oversight of congressionally
authorized programs and their administrative implications).
274. Rooting out fraud, waste, and abuse “depends upon management
improvements that are difficult, thankless, and often expensive. . . . A gross
imbalance in the time horizon of the waste, fraud, and abuse issue makes such a
sustained attack difficult.” KETTL, supra note 2, at 32; see also SPARROW, supra note
149, at 12 (describing a hypothetical “dream” of contemporary regulatory
practitioners).
[S]ometime within the last seven years, and quite unexpectedly,
enforcement numbers or judicial referrals dropped precipitously. You do
not remember anyone actually saying “we don’t do enforcement anymore.”
In fact, you are pretty sure no one would ever have said that. But apparently,
that is what everybody thought they heard.
Id.
275. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis in original) (citing ARTHUR M. OKUN,
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 60 (1975)). Okun elaborates on this
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It is telling that Professor Kelman attributes the concept of the
marginal investment in oversight to another, rather than embracing
276
Professor Kelman appears more comfortable
it as his own.
advocating the opposite position, asserting that we should not invest
too much to police the buying process.
I am suggesting that too much weight is currently placed on equity and
integrity at the expense of other values, such as the substantive
quality of procurement performance. . . . My critique might be seen
as a variant of the economist’s concept of an optimal level of
corruption, in which not more than a dollar in detection costs is
277
spent to uncover a dollar’s worth of fraud.

Yet, Professor Kelman promptly retreats from this extreme when
he states, “one need not sacrifice equity and integrity to obtain better
278
If Professor Kelman
substantive procurement performance.”
stopped there, or if the policies he implemented mirrored this
sentiment, he and I would have no quarrel.
Professor Kelman, an accomplished public policy scholar, knows
well that reduced oversight threatens fundamental norms that define
the procurement process. For example, the buying process is


point:
Because the government gets its funds from taxpayers by mandatory, not
voluntary, decisions, there is no room for the principle of caveat emptor. . . .
The government must be accountable to the citizens, and accountability is as
costly in resources as it is precious to the integrity of the political process.
Bureaucratic red tape is neither an accident nor a reflection of bad rules . . . : it is the
result of the obligation of political decision-makers to be cautious . . . and to guard
against any misuse of taxpayers’ money. Public officials follow the Ten
Commandments of their profession, which proclaim that thou shalt not be
experimental or venturesome or flexible.
Id. (emphasis added).
276. It is also telling that Kelman advocates for “an increase in criminal penalties
for procurement corruption.” KELMAN, supra note 1, at 98. Increasing penalties, of
course, requires less investment than maintaining or increasing oversight. But even
Kelman is not persuaded by his own argument, conceding that “criminology research
suggests that the likelihood of punishment is a more important deterrent than the severity of
the punishment, so the increase in penalties is no substitute for keeping up the
investigative pressure.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
278. Id. With regard to another key norm, maximizing competition, I harbor no
doubt that Kelman would acknowledge his willingness to increase efficiency at the
expense of competition. The most stark manifestation of this was Kelman’s success
in permitting reduction of the competitive range in negotiated procurements solely
for the purposes of efficiency. See 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(4) (1994); 41 U.S.C.
§ 253b(d) (1994); 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.306(c)(2), 52.215-1(f)(4) (2000) (“If the
Contracting Officer determines that the number of proposals that would otherwise
be in the competitive range exceeds the number at which an efficient competition
can be conducted, the Contracting Officer may limit the number of proposals in the
competitive range to the greatest number that will permit an efficient competition
among the most highly rated proposals.”); see also supra notes 104-09 and
accompanying text (noting that multiple award task order and delivery contracts
have provided increased efficiency in exchange for greatly reduced competition).
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premised on: (1) robust competition; (2) high standards of
individual and institutional integrity; and (3) system transparency—
all of which are key to maintaining public trust. When, in good faith,
contractors actively exercise their statutorily-granted due process
rights, they, intentionally or inadvertently, support all three policies.
Less external oversight also erodes the competitive underpinnings
of the procurement system. The existing buying scheme system
demands, and is premised on the existence of, meaningful
279
competition.
Without robust competition in the marketplace,
assumptions about the price and quality of goods and services are
misplaced. Agency contracting professionals, however, faced with
unrelenting pressure to fill vital agency needs, are insufficiently
motivated to maximize competition. Recent procurement reforms,
compounded with the arbitrary culling of the purchasing workforce,
exacerbate this concern by tilting the balance from full and open
competition to increased efficiency. This balance is a precarious one.
Surely, the Government saves agency resources (e.g., time, energy,
and money) when fewer competitors vie for specific contracts. Yet, in
a less crowded market, it is more difficult to ensure that competitive
pressure guarantees that the government receives the best value, in
terms of price, quality, and contractual terms and conditions.
Striking this balance—finding the golden mean between competition
and efficiency—is the ultimate hurdle facing acquisition reform.
Procurement reformers trumpet reduced barriers to entry into the
Federal procurement marketplace. This is a laudable achievement.
Historically, however, a level playing field for new entrants, regardless
of any particular disincentive inherent in the government’s contracts,
proved one of the most attractive features of our procurement
system. Potential vendors enjoyed access to impartial adjudicators if
they believed agencies failed to administer fair procurements. Absent
such a perception, certain firms’ willingness to compete decreased.
When the public loses insight into how the government spends its
money, when contracts are awarded or administered based upon
friendships rather than the rules, or when competing firms lack
confidence that they stand on equal footing with incumbent
contractors, the system suffers.
Similarly, if contractors find
themselves unable to enforce their contracts and unwilling to


279. See generally Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (“CICA”), Pub. L. No.
98-369, Div. B, tit. VII, 99 Stat. 494, 1175 (codified as amended in various sections of
31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.). CICA imposed upon the procurement system the now well
accepted standard of “full and open competition,” which “when used with respect to
a contract action, means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete.” 48
C.F.R. § 6.003 (2000).
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aggressively pursue the benefit of their bargain, they will view
prospective government purchases through a more jaded, if not
jaundiced, lens, and, accordingly, inflate the price of their goods and
services.
This returns us to the overarching theme of public trust. Even
Professor Kelman acknowledges the role that public perception plays
in this calculus.
It is important to note the perception gap between a general public
that perceives corruption to be a major problem in government
procurement . . . and government officials who generally perceive
it to be of only minute proportions. . . . I believe the public tends to
exaggerate the problem more than practitioners within the
government tend to underestimate it. Nonetheless, the recurrent
corruption in municipal procurement, the occasional scandals at
the federal level, and the anecdotal evidence suggesting that
payoffs are an endemic problem in private-sector purchasing all
reinforce concerns about the possibilities of corruption in
280
government procurement.

Yet, colored by his deep-seeded distaste for the role of attorneys
and enamored with the private sector governance model, Professor
Kelman cannot see that reduced litigation threatens the defining
281
norms of the process.
For example, Professor Kelman’s work
largely ignores the transparency issue, and remaining true to form,
his reform initiatives frequently came at the expense of
282
transparency.
Moreover, to the extent that transparent
procurement systems are “characterized by clear rules and by means to
283
verify that those rules are followed[,]” the dramatic trend toward


280. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 96.
281. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining Kelman’s views on
litigation and the role of attorneys in the government contracts process).
282. Just to highlight a few examples: (1) the micro-purchase threshold and the
purchase card removed twenty million transactions and $10 billion dollars in
purchases from the public’s eye; (2) the simplified acquisition procedures, and many
of the associated test programs, reduced the number of procurements synopsized in
the Commerce Business Daily; and (3) multiple-award task order and delivery
contracts removed billions of dollars worth of task orders from open marketplace
and, in suppressing protests on individual task orders, reduced potential challenges
to improprieties and correspondingly diminished the potential for protest precedent
to provide guidance to the procurement community.
283. Sue Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in
Government Procurement, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 793, 796 (1998) (emphasis added).
Arrowsmith suggests that two generally accepted features of a transparent system are
“(i) the rules to be applied in conducting procurements and (ii) information on
specific procurement opportunities are made clearly known to affected parties.” Id.
Further, transparency
ensure[s] that procurement decisions are based only on considerations
regarded as ‘legitimate’ within the system . . . [It also] supports the goals of
procurement systems by encouraging and facilitating participation by
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increased discretion for procurement professionals could be
considered antithetical to certain perceptions of transparency. This
does not trouble Professor Kelman because, in large part, his models
and analogs are derived from the private sector. In the private sector,
284
transparency is not considered, let alone valued at a premium.
c.

Measuring accountability?
285

It is reasonable to ask how it can be that, with all of this flexibility,
we survived the late 1990s without at least one headline-grabbing
procurement scandal. Although it seems disingenuous to suggest
that the current laissez-faire regime, with its diminished oversight
286
tools, is scandal resistant, this ideal offers a certain appeal.
More
likely, however, diminished oversight correspondingly uncovers less
illegality, less non-compliance, fewer errors in judgment, and less
287
288
sloppiness, resulting in a culture seemingly defined by lawlessness.


suppliers. Publicity for procurement opportunities, the application of clear
and accessible rules, and the assurance that these rules will be adhered to all
mean that suppliers are more willing and able to bid. There is less risk that
their participation will prove wasteful. . . .
Id. at 796-97.
284. “Numerous laws designed to ensure transparency, rationality, and
accountability in decision making, including the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and the Freedom of Information Act, apply to agencies, and not to private
actors.” Freeman, supra note 148, at 586-87 (citations omitted).
285. Surely, added flexibility may tempt personnel to stretch the limits of proper
behavior. Yet, the expanded discretion is not as insidious as the broader reform
message that customer service—e.g. saving money, more quickly obtaining products,
or purchasing from a preferred vendor—is far more important than longstanding
norms such as integrity, competition, or transparency. Along those lines, one of
Kelman’s prized legacies was the insertion of the following statement into the
Federal Acquisition Regulation: “If a policy or procedure, or a particular strategy or
practice, is in the best interest of the Government and is not specifically addressed in
the FAR, nor prohibited by law (statute or case law), Executive order or other
regulation, Government members of the Team should not assume it is prohibited.” 48
C.F.R. § 1.102-4(e) (2000) (emphasis added). Although this phrase is tempered by
vague references to “sound business judgment, . . . consisten[cy] with law, and . . .
limits of . . . authority[,]” the message is clear. See id. Customer service first,
compliance second. Unfortunately, in the long term, human nature suggests that
disrespect for compliance obligations becomes epidemic. See, e.g., Alan Sipress &
Josh White, Guilty, but Feeling Guilt-Free: More Drivers Disregard Traffic Laws and Blame
Congestion, WASH. POST, July 16, 2000, at A1 (discussing Americans’ increasingly
pervasive disregard for traffic laws).
286. The absence of a high-profile scandal does not suggest that the public is not
exposed periodically to discouraging news regarding the procurement system,
merely that the individual stories fail to gain traction. See, e.g., John Solomon &
Katherine Pfleger, Avoiding Federal Debarment: Some Firms Keep Getting Contracts Despite
History of Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2000, at A19 (discussing an Associated Press
survey finding that 737 of 1,020 companies sued or prosecuted for fraud within the
last five years remain eligible for future government contracts). “The review suggests
that the debarment program catches many smaller companies on their first offense
while larger companies preserve eligibility despite multiple lawsuits and criminal
charges.” Id.
287. See, e.g., Cancian, supra note 185, at 194 (“The most important tradeoff . . . is
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One of the key principles of the government reinvention effort
embraces this concern. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, the
prophets of entrepreneurial government, focused heavily on
performance measurement to determine the success of governmental
289
endeavors. At the same time, they concede that one of the greatest
difficulties of performance measurement is identifying what to
290
measure and how to quantify success. For the Federal Government,
these issues evolved from theory to practice with the passage of the
291
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (“GPRA”). The


between the risk of abuse and the level of oversight. Reductions in oversight . . .
mean that more things will go wrong and that they will remain unseen longer.”). In
the future, it may be elucidating to pursue a line of inquiry suggested by my
colleague Joshua Schwartz. He suggests that the relationship between monitoring
resources and the reported incidence of scandal is particularly complex due to the
blurring of deterrence effects and detection effects, both of which are reduced by
diminished oversight. This may prove fertile ground at a micro level (i.e., with
regard to specific government programs), but I am not optimistic regarding data at a
macro level. “Indeed, good estimates of the real levels of fraud, waste, and abuse in
the Federal Government simply are unavailable. The government’s enterprise is
huge, the opportunities for taking advantage of the system are legion, and the
government’s investment in fighting fraud has been modest.” KETTL, supra note 2, at
29; see also Penska & Thai, supra note 138, at 490 (“all surveyed groups believed in the
importance of compliance enforcement, rather than self-governed compliance.”).
288. See SPARROW, supra note 149, at 12 (reflecting the perception that “everybody
thought they heard” someone say “we don’t do enforcement and more”).
289. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 268, ch. 5, app. B.
290.
To determine program efficiency, an organization would simply measure the
cost per mile swept. But to determine policy efficiency, it would have to
measure the cost to achieve a desired level of street cleanliness, by whatever
method—street sweeping, prevention, community self-help. Finally, to
measure program effectiveness, a city might measure citizen satisfaction with the
level of street cleanliness. But to measure policy effectiveness, it might ask
citizens whether they wanted their money spent keeping the streets clean, or
whether alternative uses, such as construction or repaving, would be
preferable.
Id. at 354 (emphasis in original); see also HERBERT A. SIMON ET AL., PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 488-512 (1991) (discussing the meaning of efficiency and suggesting
that the term is vague and ambiguous).
Because of the ethical views that prevail . . . because efficiency is generally
regarded as something desirable, the word is a political symbol of
considerable potency. It has the power of organizing sentiment behind the
proposals to which it is attached. Most people feel they ought to be efficient,
and that they ought to want efficient government.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many debates in our political scene about
“efficiency” are really debates about what values government should
implement.
Id. at 510-11 (emphasis in original).
291. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.,
31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). As the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) explained:
every major federal agency must now ask itself some basic questions: What is
our mission? What are our goals and how will we achieve them? How can we
measure our performance? How will we use that information to make
improvements? . . .
GPRA requires agencies to set goals, measure
performance, and report on their accomplishments.
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GPRA requires agencies to create strategic plans, publish annual
performance objectives, and report their progress against those
objectives.
One of Professor Kelman’s most vexing challenges before his
return to academia was leading the effort to define performance
292
For better or for worse,
objectives for procurement professionals.
this effort was never formally scrutinized, in large part because buying
is rarely perceived as a core purpose or mission of executive
293
agencies.
Today, the articulated vision of the procurement
professionals, laden with corporate-speak, mirrors Professor Kelman’s
294
businesslike model. Fundamental principles that define the nature
of government procurement and distinguish it from corporate
295
practice,
such as maximizing competition, maintaining


GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-118, EXEC. GUIDE-EFFECTIVELY
IMPLEMENTING THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT 1 (1996). See
generally Paul R. Verkuil, Comment, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?, 43 DUKE L.J.
1221, 1231 (1994) [hereinafter Verkuil]; Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt,
Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the
Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 479, 517 (1995).
292. “The problem in government is not lack of accountability, . . . but the nature
of the accountability. Government people . . . are indeed held accountable . . . if
they violate rules. . . . What is missing is demand for accountability for the quality of
the government’s performance.” KELMAN, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis added).
293. In discussing the implementation of the GPRA, the Senate Report conceded
that “[n]ot all governmental programs lend themselves easily to measurable goals.
For some it will be very difficult, and for a few, perhaps impracticable altogether.”
SEN. REP. NO. 103-58, at 16 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 342
(discussing the necessary means and practicality of effectuating efficient government
programs). Moreover,
[p]ublic management—or at least good public management—is not so
relentlessly utilitarian as to think that only results matter. One reason for
this is that every public agency produces many kinds of outcomes—not just
progress toward the primary goal of the agency, but also conformity to the
contextual goals and constraints in which the agency is enmeshed.
WILSON, supra note 19, at 168 (emphasis added).
294.
VISION FOR THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION WORKFORCE.
The federal acquisition workforce are the government’s business leaders. As
the government’s business leaders, we: Provide strategic business advice to
agency leaders for spending and managing billions of the taxpayers dollars
annually; apply the most effective business practices from the public and
private sectors; join industry in a mission-oriented business partnership;
obtain the best value goods and services for the taxpayer; provide responsive,
creative, solution oriented service to support the Program mission.
PROCUREMENT EXEC.S COUNCIL, STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2000), available at
http://www.arnet.gov/CommCouncil/PEC/pecstpl2.html [hereinafter PROCUREMENT EXEC.S].
295.
The standard of performance of private business . . . is regulated by market
competition and the rate of profit. . . . Government administration is subject
to . . . scrutiny. . . . What is at issue in such scrutiny is not merely the costefficiency of public provision, but whether money is spent for the purpose
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transparency, or ensuring integrity, no longer dominate the
296
government buyer’s radar screen.
B. The Limits of Businesslike Government
1.

Government is different: Failure of the private sector model
It is not hyperbole to suggest that the NPR represents one of the
297
largest efforts to reinvent government
since the New Deal.
Although it is too early to assess whether the NPR will permanently
change the public’s expectations of government or the way
government operates, it is not premature to begin an examination of
what the future holds if the NPR movement maintains its
momentum.
298
Quite simply, the government is different.
First and foremost,


and on the terms for which it was voted, and administration conducted in
accordance with legally defined powers, and the legally established rights of
the citizen.
DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY 33 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter BEETHAM].
296. Fortunately, some of these principles are not completely forgotten, but
merely suppressed. For example, the “Vision for the Federal Acquisition System”
concedes that the business model “[b]uilds on a foundation of integrity, fairness, and
openness.” PROCUREMENT EXEC.S, supra note 294 (emphasis added). Competition,
however, receives no recognition.
297. This now common term “reinvent government” derives from OSBORNE &
GAEBLER, supra note 268. Unaware that their work would soon become ingrained in
the lexicon of the Clinton Administration brain trust, the authors began by
acknowledging that they had “chosen an audacious title for this book.” Id. at xv.
Reflective of their perception that government should be more businesslike, the
authors “use the phrase entrepreneurial government to describe the new model [they]
see emerging. . . .” Id. at xix (emphasis in original).
298. Congress bears little resemblance to a corporate board in purpose, policy, or
practice. The role of partisan politics in the annual appropriations process renders
analogy to corporate capital accumulation inapt. “Given [the] political realities, it is
probably pointless to push the corporate governance analogy too far. It might work
better with a different constitutional framework.” Verkuil, supra note 291, at 1230
(acknowledging that “extreme [congressional] micromanagement would make most
corporate boards blush”).
I agree with the sentiment that:
the Federal government has been and always will be different from the
commercial sector. Thus, while striving to make the Federal acquisition
system more like its commercial counterpart, [we] continue[] to recognize
the unique constraints that are imposed on public-sector organizations. No
matter how commercial, competitive, or cost-effective the Federal acquisition
system becomes, it ultimately will still be governed by public policies—
policies that are driven not only by economic objectives but also by social
and political considerations.
PROCUREMENT ROUND TABLE 2000, THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION SYSTEM: TRANSITIONING
TO THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (1999), available at http://www.contracts.ogc.doc.gov
/cld/papers/21CentAcqn.pdf. The Procurement Round Table is a nonprofit
organization chartered by former Federal acquisition officials, serving pro bono,
seeking to advise and assist the government in making improvements in Federal
acquisition. Id.
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Not only do the ends that
the government lacks a profit motive.
business and government seek differ, the dichotomy between their
300
purposes breed distinct cultures and norms.
The government is
301
It no longer
not on equal footing with those from which it buys.
makes sense to accept the oft-cited proposition that, when the
government steps down from its sovereign perch and enters the
commercial domain, it submits itself to the same laws and subjects
302
itself to the same treatment as ordinary businesses. Rather, there is
truth in the sentiment, expressed almost forty years ago, that “the
myth of the government descending to the market place and
303
negotiating like any other businessman is being slowly exploded.”
Professor Kelman, however, tenaciously clings to the private sector
model. Accordingly, my fundamental departure from Professor
Kelman’s regime can be summarized by one of his most frequent
“ice-breakers.”
Kelman . . . would often introduce his ideas by talking about his


299. For these and other reasons, I cannot accept Frug’s endeavor to treat as
similar governmental and corporate bureaucracies. See Frug, supra note 267.
300.
A businessman who bends the rules is showing flexibility, and a rule book
which is highly general allows scope for individual initiative in the pursuit of
profit. A civil servant who does the same is guilty of misconduct, and a rule
book which allows large discretion to the official in dealings with the public
is inviting arbitrariness in the treatment of different citizens. Rule keeping is
not a means to the end of profit . . . but a value in itself.
BEETHAM, supra note 295, at 32. If this analogy does not ring true on first reading,
substitute the word “contractors” for “citizens.” This substitution implicates
citizenship at a number of different levels. Some contractors, particularly small
businesses, are individual citizens. Larger contractors are owned, managed, and
staffed by citizens whose employment may depend upon certain contracts. Finally,
citizens own stock in companies that are affected by government purchasing
decisions. In these, and other scenarios, affected citizens have reason to expect that
the government will not be arbitrary in dealing with them or others similarly situated.
301. See J. RONALD FOX, ARMING AMERICA: HOW THE U.S. BUYS WEAPONS 453 (1974)
(“In truth, the defense industry is not free enterprise. It never has been.”).
302. See generally Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 396 (1875) (noting that the
government “conceded . . . that, when the United States become parties to
commercial paper, they incur all the responsibilities of private persons under the
same circumstances”). Further, the Court in Cooke stated, “if [the Government]
comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it
submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there.” Id. at 398.
303. Gilbert A. Cuneo & Eldon H. Crowell, Impossibility of Performance—Assumption
of Risk or Act of Submission?, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 531, 548 (1964); see Arthur S.
Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27,
56 (1955) (“Conditions imposed by the Government in its contracts are on a take-itor-leave-it basis, and give only the illusory freedom of choice to business concerns.”);
Whelan & Pearson, supra note 155, at 339-40 (“No contract between private parties is
so deeply involved in the policies, politics and economy of the whole nation. . . . In
what other lines of business . . . are contractors subjected to scrutiny for the purpose
of determining whether their total contract activities have yielded ‘excessive
profits’? . . . Another striking difference is found in the process known as
‘debarment.’”).
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daughter Rory. She loved going to a restaurant that featured
children’s party games. The eatery rewarded skilled players with
tickets that could be converted into prizes upon departure. On
one outing Rory, then 6, was left holding 23 tickets, two short of
the minimum needed to claim a prize. But the employee behind
the counter gave her a prize anyway. When Kelman remarked on
the restaurant’s generous spirit, Rory replied, ‘They want us to
come back.’ The family tale, in Kelman’s view, represented a
common sense example of the value of ‘past performance,’ one of
304
several new federal buying practices that he championed. . . .
305

It is a great story, but inapt. For the same reason that you cannot
tip a government employee, either before or after he or she calculates
your social security benefits, one of the most fundamental precepts of
Federal procurement is that you are not entitled to obtain a leg up on
your competition if you offer, let alone provide, “freebies” to
306
government customers.


304. Stephen Barr, Outgoing Chief Leaves His Mark on Procurement Process, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A23. I witnessed Kelman spin this yarn frequently, and it was
well received by a broad cross-section of audiences. Consistent with his businesslike
approach, Kelman did not hesitate to identify the restaurant as the popular familywith-children chain, Chuck E. Cheese (visited Aug. 1, 2000), at http:// www.chucke
cheese.com/.
305. Even the oracles of governmental reinvention concede that there are limits
to businesslike government.
Many people, who believe government should simply be ‘run like a business,’
may assume this is what we mean. It is not.Government and business are
fundamentally different institutions. Business leaders are driven by the
profit motive . . . . Businesses get most of their money from their customers;
governments get most of their money from taxpayers. Businesses are usually
driven by competition; governments usually use monopolies . . . .
Government is democratic and open; hence it moves more slowly than
business . . . . Government’s fundamental mission is to ‘do good,’ not to
make money . . . . Government must often serve everyone equally . . . . These
differences add up to one conclusion: government cannot be run like a
business.
OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 268, at 20-21; see also WILSON, supra note 19, at 369
(“The difference, of course, is that both the price system and the profit motive
provide a discipline in markets that is absent in non-markets.”).
306. My four-year-old son’s experience similarly distinguishes acceptable behavior
in the private marketplace from tolerable behavior in the public sector. My son’s
favorite grocery store, Harris-Teeter, won his loyalty by offering him, each time he
visits, a “free” sugar cookie, balloon, and coloring book. Unlike my son, I recognize
that I am paying—albeit indirectly—for each of these amusements. Although I often
willingly pay more for my groceries in exchange for my son’s entertainment,
government buyers do not enjoy this luxury. An extensive statutory and regulatory
construct is intended to limit both actual and apparent conflicts of interests involving
government procurement officials. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2000) (discussing
safeguards against improper business practices and personal conflicts of interest).
The regulatory mandate is clear:
Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach
and . . . with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none.
Transactions relating to the expenditure of public funds require the highest
degree of public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct. The general
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Congress, of course, bears a significant responsibility for the
current regime. Although, historically, Congress prided itself on its
307
commitment to the integrity of the procurement system, it seemed
caught up in the euphoria associated with potential savings. As a
result, the legislature turned a blind eye toward the need for external
oversight just as it eschewed common sense in diminishing internal
oversight by systematically gutting the acquisition workforce.
2.

Reflections on the National Performance Review
Professor Kelman deserves credit for making acquisition reform
the NPR’s most successful endeavor. To be clear, streamlining
procurement featured prominently in the NPR’s initial efforts and
literature. Acquisition reform did not begin headlining the NPR
literature, however, until Professor Kelman’s initiatives gained
traction through legislation and other NPR initiatives—such as
reform of the civil service personnel system—began to falter. To the
extent that these buying reforms echoed the NPR’s larger themes of
businesslike government, the NPR repeatedly touted the Kelman
initiatives.
Acquisition reform, therefore, serves as a microcosm to study the
larger effort to reinvent government. Thus, as critical as reduced
internal and external oversight may seem to the public purchasing
regime, the policies implicated reach beyond government buying,
308
addressing the larger issues of the purpose of government.


rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or even the appearance of a
conflict of interest in Government- contractor relationships. While many
Federal laws and regulations place restrictions on the actions of Government
personnel, their official conduct must, in addition, be such that they would
have no reluctance to make a full public disclosure of their actions.
Id. § 3.101-1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (discussing gratuities and bribes). It is
unlawful to offer, give, solicit or accept gifts (or things of value) to or by government
employees). See id. “Gift includes any gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment,
hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary value.” 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.203(b) (2000) (emphasis in original).
The same regulations define
“prohibited source” as “any person who: (2) Does business or seeks to do business with
the employee’s agency. . . .” Id. § 2635.203(d) (emphasis added). Although the
Office of Government Ethics has promulgated a number of de minimus exceptions,
the exceptions are just that—exceptions to the prohibition. See generally Standards of
Ethical Conduct by Employees of the Executive Branch, id. § 2635.
307. See, e.g., Cancian, supra note 185, at 192 (“The Congress is moved primarily by
its fiduciary responsibilities; that is, the need to ensure that public moneys are seen
to be used in ways consistent with national purposes. Here the end does not justify
the means; the means must stand on their own. This concern is often characterized
by a focus on fraud, waste, and abuse.”).
308. See KETTL, supra note 2, at 56. Kettl acknowledges that:
[N]o results come for free. Buried in every good-government initiative to
strengthen customer service, reform procurement, or improve the performance
of a high-impact agency are implicit trade-offs. The more reformers hope to
increase government’s productivity through administrative reform, the more
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Consider the NPR’s basic mandate: creating a government that
works better and costs less. It is indeed difficult to disagree with that
aspiration, yet what sounds good in principle may prove problematic
in practice. The government can act more like a business without
309
being one, but its ability to do so in the long-term hinges, in large
part, on standards unrelated to the bottom line. Government is not a
business, and a market-based private sector model cannot sustain the
310
public trust.
The goal, therefore, remains electing the most
efficient or effective alternatives, consistent with a vision of
government that the public can accept.
Determining with specificity the actual boundaries of the public’s
tolerance in this regard is neither feasible nor realistic. Nevertheless,
it is safe to assume that the public favors a government that works
better and costs less. Specifically, few would complain—at a macro
level—about a procurement system that promises to provide goods
and services for government agencies more quickly, generates higher
levels of end-user customer satisfaction, and costs less to maintain.
What proves to be more difficult is asking the questions at a micro
level. Consider the following examples:
If the government’s competition requirements were diluted, it
could purchase more goods and services using fewer personnel,
thereby saving money. Thus, a compelling argument can be made
that the government can fulfill its requirements by buying solely from
a small number of (hypothetically) superior vendors. Thus, if the
government prefers to buy billions of dollars of personal computers
from Dell, should Compaq, Gateway, or Toshiba be permitted to
compete for the public’s dollars?
There seems little doubt that the government would be more
businesslike and could work better (e.g., save time and increase
customer satisfaction) and cost less (e.g., utilize fewer personnel) if
buyers were unencumbered by congressionally mandated social


important those implicit tradeoffs are. Should managers invest more time in
fighting fraud or delivering services?
Id. (emphasis added)
309. “Government can become efficient but not in the same way a business can.”
Verkuil, supra note 291, at 1235.
310. For a discussion of an isolated example of the private sector model run amok
in federal procurement and administrative law, see Andrew M. Sherman, GPO
Answers Critics: Commerce Department Policy to Suspend Publication of Solicitation Notices
For Debtor Agencies Furthers Procurement Process Objectives, 41 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 167
(Apr. 14, 1999); Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment—The Future of “Businesslike”
Government: The CBD Asserts Its Rights Against Debtor Federal Agencies, 41 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 112 (Mar. 10, 1999) (discussing the Commerce Department’s and the
Government Printing Office’s willingness to bar agencies from publishing statutorily
mandated public notices in the Commerce Business Daily based upon delinquent intraagency transfers of $5 fees).
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policies. Is it, therefore, a public service to be less vigilant in
enforcing these mandates? Should the government buy all of its
office supplies from a national superstore, or should local small
businesses have the opportunity to compete for, or be given a
preference in obtaining, that business?
Should government
employees take the time to identify and buy recycled copy paper or
re-refined oil? Should government employees write with pens
manufactured by blind and severely handicapped workers, or the
latest, stylish imports?
The government could work better and cost less if it did not need
to operate in the sunshine. How important is it for the public to
know how the government buys, what the government intends to buy,
what it eventually purchases, and which businesses earn the public’s
funds?
To the extent that both internal and external oversight are
expensive (costs more) and frequently interferes with transaction
efficiency (impairs buyers’ efforts to work better), how important is it
for government buyers to follow the rules? What level of investment
is justified to maintain the desired level of integrity? What level of
corruption is tolerable? If a government buyer, who possesses only
the best of intentions, can get a “good deal” by avoiding the rules,
should she? How troubling is it if individual government buyers go
astray?
Professor Kelman and I differ with respect to the answers to many
of these questions. Businesses consider similar questions, and their
responses are simplified by the profit motive. For larger firms, the
analysis may depend upon return on stockholder investment.
Lacking the profit motive as its ultimate catalyst, government
agencies require clear guidance. It is difficult to divine congressional
intent while attempting to serve the public interest.
Whether phrased as efficiency versus oversight, or discretion versus
control, the stark contrast remains. Management commentator Tom
Peters succinctly summed up the problem facing the government’s
reinvention efforts:
[W]e’re trapped on the horns of a monumental dilemma. The
United States was invented against government. Historically we
don’t trust those who govern. Thus[,] our rulers, counterpoised
against each other to begin with (legislative, judicial, executive
branches), create procedures to make government inefficient—so
as to protect us from corruption and abuse over the long haul. But
those self-imposed inefficiencies, especially in a $1.5 trillion outfit
that even the prescient [James] Madison couldn’t have imagined,
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lead to a million madnesses. . . .
Make no mistake, while most of the eight hundred suggestions in
[the (NPR) Report] appear innocent, they aren’t. Collectively they
depend on allowing federal employees a degree of freedom that
311
might worry Mr. Madison.

Agencies cannot succeed simply by being efficient or even
profitable; they are held to a different, arguably higher, standard of
conduct. Thus, if government plans to follow a private sector model,
its greatest chance of success in serving the public while maintaining
the public’s trust would be to integrate a robust public oversight
regime into that model.
CONCLUSION
I agreed with Professor Kelman when he wrote: “Reform is not
possible as long as people believe that the current system minimizes
corruption, provides all Americans a fair opportunity to bid for
government business, and gets the good products or services for a
312
good price.” I subsequently joined Professor Kelman in his efforts
to make the procurement process more efficient. Unfortunately,
something went awry in Professor Kelman’s attempts to convince
Congress that the pre-existing procurement “system represent[ed] an


311. Tom Peters, Forward, in AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS; CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS; THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW xx-xxi (rev. ed. 1993) (emphasis in original); see also Kettl,
Public Administration, supra note 163, at 26. Kettl suggests that:
Indeed, the NPR’s arguments for customer service and entrepreneurial
government enraged Madisonians. Not only did they see the public and
private sectors as so different that private reforms simply were not
transferable to government, they also believed that private-sector approaches
threatened democratic accountability.
Id. James Madison asserted that:
[t]he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue,
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most
effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold the public
trust.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added). Although Jefferson might favor the customer service orientation
of the NPR initiatives, it seems that many of the NPR’s entrepreneurial initiatives
would offend Jefferson’s concern with public accountability. See, e.g., STILLMAN, supra
note 159, at 362-63, 386-88. As Jefferson warned:
Human nature is the same on every side of the Atlantic, and will be alike
influenced by the same causes. The time to guard against corruption and
tyranny is before they shall have gotten hold of us. It is better to keep the
wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and claws after he shall
have entered.
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
312. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 102.
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affront to our common sense.” The resulting procurement regime
exhibits disregard for whether noncompliance (or worse, corruption)
permeates the system. A substantial portion of the government’s
acquisitions deny Americans (and our trading partners) a fair
opportunity to compete for the taxpayer’s dollar. Moreover, in the
interest of furthering efficiency-related policies, current buying
practices devalue the importance of obtaining a good price in most
transactions.
Any effort to improve the operation of the Federal Government
requires difficult decisions, seemingly irreconcilable trade-offs, and
hard work. I harbor neither illusions with regard to rolling back the
successful NPR reforms, nor do I aim for inefficiency or aspire to
recreate the pre-Clinton/Gore procurement system. Yet, I fear that,
in the same manner in which irrational exuberance animated the
securities markets, the public too easily became enthralled with
businesslike government. To the extent that our ever-evolving
314
government is not yet utopian, we must continue to examine the
role of oversight and endeavor to quantify the risks of reduced
monitoring of governmental behavior. We can aspire to an ultimate
public procurement system, which exhibits the peak of efficiency
while maintaining absolute integrity through a non-burdensome
oversight regime. Until that aspiration becomes reality, however,
trade-offs are necessary.
No one expects the government to make a profit. At the same
time, the public does not want, nor should it tolerate, a government
that is so inefficient that it is wasteful. Within those extremes,
Professor Kelman (in the context of procurement) and the Clinton
Administration (through the larger NPR initiative) have pushed in
315
the direction of businesslike government.
I fear they may have


313. Id. at 103.
314. Our system is not yet Panglossian, nor should we necessarily aspire to nirvana.
See, e.g., Harols Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1969), cited in Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
YALE L.J. 1219, 1229-30 (1994) (suggesting that a fundamental flaw of much social
choice scholarship is to “erroneously compare real-world institutions with some
abstract or ideal institution, even if the ideal institution has never existed or . . . has
been proven impossible to devise.”). For a broader view of the origins of social
choice theory, see Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability—Ironies in the Evolution of
Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 984-93 (1998) (providing a historical
assessment of the Social Choir Theory, as well as implications that emanate
therefrom).
315. The NPR’s most dramatic statement along these lines is referred to as “the
Dilbert Report.” See generally AL GORE, BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM AMERICA’S BEST CORPORATIONS (1997) (featuring DILBERT comic strips by Scott
Adams, and discussing how the Clinton Administration worked to create a
government that worked in a more efficient and cost-effective manner than in the
past).
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pushed too far. Efficiency, whether or not driven by a profit motive,
may be a public good. Like most things, I prefer this public good in
moderation. Efficiency coupled with meaningful oversight seems a
prudent approach. Lacking oversight, we may soon learn what price
we are willing to pay for efficiency in spending the public’s funds.

